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ABSTRACT 
To improve the safety of a process system, engineers use different methods to identify the 
potential hazards. Chemical processes involve handling of hazardous chemicals, which on 
release may potentially cause catastrophic consequences in terms of assets lost, human fatalities 
or injuries and loss of public confidence in the company. In spite of using endless end-of-the-
pipe safety systems, tragic accidents such as BP Texas City refmery still occur. One of the main 
reasons of such rare but catastrophic event occurrences is lack of effective monitoring a,nd 
modeling approaches that provide early warnings and help to prevent such events. Other reasons 
such as lack of criteria and/or assessment parameters and measures for detection of abnormal 
events may also have an important contribution. 
One of the most popular methods used in the industry today is quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA) which quantifies the risk associated with a particular process activity by determining the 
likelihood of occurrence of an unwanted event and the consequences involved. One of QRA's 
major disadvantages is its inability to update risk during the life of a process. As the 
process/system operates, abnormal events will result in incidents and near misses. These events 
are often called accident precursors. A conventional QRA process is unable to use the accident 
precursor information to revise the risk profile. 
Dynamic failure assessment is a new approach in process safety management, which enables the 
real time failure analysis of a process. Dynamic failure assessment has been used in the past by 
nuclear industries for accident likelihood estimation using accident precursors. Recently it has 
been successfully applied to process units to revise failure probabilities using incident and near 
miss data. In dynamic risk assessment, an extension of dynamic failure assessment, Bayesian and 
joint probability theories are used to develop a predictive failure model for a given process. As 
the process/system operates and generates incidents and near misses, the accident occurrence 
probability is predicted using accident precursors and later multiplied with consequences to 
quantify real time risk. 
In this thesis the dynamic risk assessment methodology is discussed in detail. First, potential 
accident scenarios are identified and represented in terms of an event tree, next, using the event 
tree and available failure data end state probabilities are estimated. Subsequently, using the 
available accident precursor data, safety system failure likelihood and event tree end state 
probabilities are revised. Finally, the updated probabilities are used in revising the risk profile of 
the process system. 
Application of this tool is demonstrated by two case studies. The first case study is the process 
facility of an offshore oil and gas platform where the risk profiles of process units are determined 
over time. In the second case study dynamic risk assessment is applied to the BP Texas City 
refmery in order to demonstrate the predictive abilities of the tool. Dynamic risk assessment 
demonstrates the importance of a learning and predictive tool in risk assessment by verifying 
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1.1. Risk Assessment in Process Industries: 
Risk assessment and management is an integral part of safety and loss prevention in process 
industries. Process industries often have large inventory of hazardous chemicals, and their 
process area is often highly congested with the presence of complex piping and various other 
equipment necessary for process operations such as high-pressure compression, separation, 
desulphurization, storage, and blending. These operating conditions are vulnerable to escalate a 
series of small mishaps into catastrophic events. To prevent such situations process industries 
have adopted the use of risk assessment within their facilities. Risk assessment is the 
determination of risk associated with a recognized hazard which includes determination of events 
that produce an accident, probability of those events and the consequences involved (Crawl & 
Louvar, 2002). Risk assessment looks into the key aspects of unwanted events such as the 
development of techniques to predict accidents, development of tools and models to analyse the 
potential consequences of an accident and the development of managerial strategies to minimize 
the risk involved in a potential accident scenario (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). 
Risk assessment methodology is often categorized as Qualitative or Quantitative risk assessment. 
Qualitative risk assessment is mostly descriptive and it is used to identify the causes and 
consequences of unwanted events. Hazard and operability (HAZOP) and Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) are among the most widely used methods in qualitative risk 
assessment. Quantitative risk assessment determines a quantitative value for risk which requires 
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calculation of the two major components of risk, magnitude of potential loss (consequence) and 
occurrence probability of the unwanted event. 
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) comprises of three main steps each answering one of the 
three important questions of risk assessment: 
1- What can go wrong and how? (Hazard identification) 
2- What are the chances? (Probability assessment) 
3- What are the probable outcomes? (Consequence assessment) 
The last two steps are mostly referred to as risk estimation. Hazard identification is the detection 
of possible scenarios which have the potential of producing an accident. In other words, it is the 
identification of an event or a combination of events that may lead to an expected incident. 
Hazard identification may be applied using techniques such as process hazard checklist, hazard 
survey and safety reviews. "Hazard identification and risk estimation are best done together. If 
hazard identification is done alone, it might lead to a process becoming "goldplated ". This 
means that potentially unnecessary and expensive safety equipment and procedures are 
implemented because hazards of low probability and minimal consequences are identified'' 
(Crawl & Louvar, 2002). Risk estimation steps contain probability and consequence assessment 
which are the two elements of risk. Methods such as Fault tree analysis (FTA), Event tree 
analysis (ETA), Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) and Markov modeling (MM) are used m 
the probability assessment step of risk estimation. 
ETA is among the most widely used methodologies in risk estimation which has also been 
adapted in this work. ETA is an inductive diagrammatic method which links the initial unwanted 
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event to all its known consequences. ETA begins with the initiating unwanted event as the first 
branch of the tree and works toward the end-states considering the impact of failure or success of 
the safety systems involved. This method provides information on how a failure may occur with 
its probability of occurrence. Assuming availability of failure probabilities of each safety system 
in terms of deterministic values or probabilistic distributions, numerical values may be assigned 
to various branches of the event tree. This may be used to determine the probability of 
occurrence of any sequence of events beginning from the initiating event and leading to an end-
state by simply multiplying the branch values in each sequence. 
Consequence assessment requrres the potential consequences to be presented in terms of 
numerical values. Consequence assessment has many approaches depending on its specific 
application. The quantification approach in this study is to transform all types of consequences to 
their equivalent dollar value amount. This may be done using consequence matrices which 
convert different types of consequences and severities into dollar value of damage. 
Finally, risk may be calculated simply by multiplying the probability of occurrence of the 
unwanted event by the related potential consequences. If the risk value obtained is higher than 
the standard risk limit of the given process, design parameters will be changed to reduce the risk 
and the process will be validated by re-applying the QRA procedure until the process risk falls 
into acceptable regions. 
1.2. Motivations and Objectives of Research: 
QRA is a very common approach currently used by safety engineers in process industries with 
encouraging results. However statistics show that catastrophic accident still occur within the 
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process facilities that seem to be preventable. Explosions and fires on March 23, 2005 at BP's 
Texas City refinery that killed 15 people and injured 180 (BP, 2005) and the most recent incident 
on 10 August 2008 in which heavy explosions occurred in Sunrise propane storage facility in 
Toronto, Ontario killing two and causing evacuation of thousands of people (CBC, 2008) are 
examples of such tragic incidents. This may be partly attributed to a major disadvantage of the 
conventional QRA approach which is its inability to capture variations in the risk profile as the 
process is subjected to upsets, deviations from normal operation, aging of assets, and human 
intervention. Also, risk control strategies in QRA are developed based on major events. 
Frequencies of such events are very low and thus not much information or scientific data are 
available to yield accurate results in risk analysis. 
Dynamic failure assessment is a novel approach initially used in the nuclear industry which has 
recently been adopted in process industries (Meel, 2006). Dynamic failure assessment is a 
learning tool which uses incidents and near misses, herein referred to as accident sequence 
precursor (ASP) data, to update the frequency of occurrence of unwanted events. The objective 
of this research is to develop a Dynamic Risk Assessment approach by introducing the 
consequence assessment concept to the earlier proposed Bayesian probability updating 
mechanism and to validate its use by applying the model to sample case studies in the process 
industry. 
1.3. Thesis Structure: 
This thesis is categorized into seven chapters. The first chapter is a brief introduction on the 
concept of risk assessment in process industries followed by the motivations and objectives of 
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this research. Chapter 2 gives a broad overview on the development of QRA strategies over the 
years and its significance and current practices in the process industry along with the novel and 
state-of-the-art methods developed recently by researchers as the literature review of this thesis. 
Chapter 3 gives a detailed description of QRA, its methodology, steps and tools and advanced 
QRA application approaches. Chapter 4 introduces the dynamic risk assessment model. This 
chapter presents a detailed study on probability assessment and Bayesian inference along with 
consequence analysis in dynamic risk assessment and the development of the dynamic risk 
profile. The model is then validated by adapting data from an earlier case study on a nuclear 
power plant. Chapter 5 attempts to demonstrate the application of the dynamic risk assessment 
model by applying the tool to two case studies in process facilities. The first case study is an 
offshore oil and gas (OOG) process facility. Data from representative units of the OOG platform 
is used to develop the updated risk profile and to compare the units on the basis of safety and 
risk. The second case study demonstrates the tool's ability to foretell accidents by modeling the 
BP Texas City refinery incident. The objective of this case study is to evaluate whether this 
accident could have been predicted early on with reasonable confidence (in terms of likelihood 
of occurrence), if yes, how this information could be transformed so that it is effectively used in 
decision making. Chapter 6 concludes the study by a brief summary of results, conclusion and 




Risk may be defmed as a function of the potential scenario of accident, frequency of occurrence 
ofthe scenario and the consequences involved if scenario does materialize. (AICHE, 2000). 
Risk= F(s, c,f) 
Where s is the hypothetical scenario, c is the estimated consequence and f is the estimated 
frequency of occurrence ofthe scenario. Kaplan and Garrick (1981) have defined risk as a set of 
scenarios each with a designated occurrence probability and consequence. Risk assessment is the 
analysis of these events, probabilities and consequences. Contini, Amendal and Ziomas (1991) 
have presented a benchmark exercise undertaken with the aim of assessing the state-of-the-art 
techniques in risk analysis. A study of accident release and dispersion of ammonia from a 
pressurized tank was conducted by 11 different risk assessment teams worldwide. 
Many techniques and methodologies have been proposed since the 70's for risk assessment 
(Khan & Abbasi, 1998). Quantitative and qualitative risk assessment are two types of the risk 
evaluation system (Ferdous, 2007). Qualitative risk assessment is mostly used to identify the 
hazards associated with a process and it is usually used as a preparation step for consequence 
analysis (Hauptmanns, 1988; Lees, 1996). Quantitative risk assessment analyses system risk in 
terms of numerical evaluation of consequence and occurrence probability of an unwanted event. 
The first effort to apply quantitative risk assessment (QRA) was attempted by a team of 
specialists under the supervision of Norman Rasmussen for the US nuclear regulatory 
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commission to estimate the public risks posed by commercial nuclear power plants (US NRC, 
2007a). The result of this research was published in 1975 under the title WASH-1400, 'The 
Reactor Safety Study' which is mostly referred to as the "Rasmussen Report" (Levin and 
Rasmussen, 1984). After nearly 4 decades QRA has now become an advance and powerful tool 
in industries such that some initial methodologies have now been declared obsolete and are 
replaced by new and state-of-the-art techniques. QRA is now being extensively used in other 
industries such as the process industry. This tool plays an important part in ensuring the safety of 
equipment and personnel in dangerous working environments such as offshore platforms. A 
study by the UK Health and Safety Executive (2008) showed that process and structural failure 
incidents account for almost 80% of the risk to personnel offshore. The underlying causes of 
these incidents are mostly organizational and management factors. The probability of such 
events tends to be low, but the consequences are high in terms of loss of human life, capital 
assets, and damage to the natural environment. Quantitative risk assessment is one of the most 
important approaches used to prevent or reduce the impact of such incidents. Vinnem (1998) has 
presented a good overview ofthe application ofQRA in offshore industries with emphasis on the 
importance of QRA in the development of regulations in various jurisdictions. 
Research is still conducted in this area to improve the current methodologies used in QRA, Khan 
and Abbasi (1998) have presented a review on the available risk analysis techniques in chemical 
process industries among which HAZOP, FMEA, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA) can be listed as the most important. ETA and FT A are among the most widely 
used methods in QRA. ETA is one of the focuses of this study and therefore more effort to 
introduce this method will be made. ETA was originally used in the nuclear industry to 
determine the possible effect of failure in any safety system (Ramzan et al., 2007). Rausmussen 
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(1975) and Arendt (1986) used ETA in pre-incident and post-incident analysis of process 
systems. Researchers have also contributed to the ETA making the tool more efficient and easier 
to use. Papazoglou (1998) has developed an algorithm for the formulation of the basis of an 
automated computer assisted construction technique for an event tree, and recently Bucci et al. 
(2008) have presented an approach to construct dynamic ETs/FTs and address the concerns with 
the traditional ET/FT methodology. 
Other efforts in the study of QRA in process industries may be seen in the work of Crawley and 
Grant (1997) which has proposed an offshore risk assessment screening tool that permits the risk 
assessment of many design options in a methodical manner. Khan and Amyotte (2007) have 
modeled BP Texas City refinery accident from a quantitative risk assessment perspective. 
Subsequently, Falck et al. (2000), Rettedal et al. (2000), Cross and Ballesio (2003) and Cleaver 
et al. (2003) have discussed the use of QRA in the design of an oil production/transportation 
system. De-Leon and Ortega (2004) have presented a risk analysis study of an offshore oil 
complex in Mexico. Yasseri and Prager (2004) have presented explosion recurrence models. 
Recently, Pula et al. (2005a, b, 2007) proposed a set of models for consequence assessment of oil 
and gas processing facility and Ferdous et al. (2007) have developed a reliable tool for 
probabilistic risk assessment. Both works are integral parts ofQRA of a process facility. 
Khan et al. (2002,a) integrated an analytical simulation and maximum credible accident analysis 
approach for analyzing safety management options for process facilities. This integrated 
approach determines exactly what safety measures, and level of sophistication is required to 
lower the risk to acceptable levels. It can also distinguish those units that cannot fulfill the safety 
requirements even after installing all conventional safety measures. This methodology is 
generally applicable at the design stage of a process. This approach could be revised to adopt real 
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time abnormal situations (defmed as deviations from the normal behaviour of the system 
described in the process procedures) or incident data to estimate updated probabilities of accident 
scenarios. The updated probabilities could be used in risk calculation. The revised risk would 
provide a more up to date status of the risk of process facilities. 
Although QRA has proven effective so far in the industry it lacks an important element which is 
the interdependency of the risk function with time or in other words lack of learning from the 
process history. In the recent years researchers have been working on developing a more 
dynamic approach to QRA. This innovation was again initially attempted by the nuclear industry 
as it is among the most hazardous industries. Due to extreme consequences of incidents in this 
industry and the protecti e measures involved, accident frequency in the nuclear industry is very 
low and hence very little accident data is available for risk analysis; therefore, an approach to use 
incidents and near misses as updating tools was developed (Bier and Mosleh, 1990; Bier and Yi, 
1995). Early examples ofthis approach may be seen in the works of Cooke and Goossens (1990) 
and Johnson and Rasmuson (1996), Kirchsteiger (1997). This methodology is recently being 
developed in the process industry. Cepin et al. (2002) have developed a method which represents 
the extension of the classic fault tree with time requirements while Boudali et a!. (2005) have 
defined a discrete-time Bayesian Network reliability formalism and demonstrated its capabilities 
from a modeling and analysis point of view. Sonnemans et al. (2003) have investigated the 
possibility of predicting 17 accidents in the Dutch chemical industry with the use of double or 
single loop control analysis and Mili et al. (2009) has demonstrated the possibility to use 
FMECA in a dynamic environment. 
Dynamic failure assessment is a new approach that enables the real time failure analysis of a 
process. Meel and Sieder (2006) are pioneers in successfully implementing this approach to 
9 
revise process deviations and failure analysis in chemical process industries. This approach 
combines Bayesian and joint probability theories to conduct dynamic failure assessment and to 
develop a predictive model of a given process (Meel et al. 2007). A similar methodology was 
recently used by Yun et al. (2009) to conduct a risk assessment analysis on LNG terminals. 
Kalantamia and coworkers have used the dynamic failure assessment model to analyze a 
chemical process unit and joint probability theory as a predictive model (Kalantamia et al. 2008). 
A similar work by these authors analyses the risk profile of an offshore oil and gas process 
facility (Kalantarnia et al. 2009). 
Dynamic failure assessment uses Bayesian Inference as the updating mechanism. Bayesian 
Inference is a direct application of the probability theory which uses the basis of conditional 
probability in Baye's theorem (Bayes, 1763; Robert, 2001) to describe the uncertainty of a 
parameter. Bayesian theory has been gaining increasing attention in the recent years. In process 
industries many contributions have been made by researchers in this area. Won and Modarres, 
(1998) have developed an improved Bayesian method for diagnosing the partial failures of 
equipment in process plants, also Mehranbod et al. (2005) have presented a sensor fault detection 
and diagnosis method using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) for processes in transient or 
steady-state operations. In another study, Chen et al. (2004) have carried out a Bayesian 
estimation of state variables and model parameters of chemical processes using sequential 
Monte-Carlo sampling. Contributions have also been made in other areas such as reliability 
engineering, a Bayesian reliability assessment method has been proposed by Wu (2004) that 
assigns prior distributions to fuzzy parameters. Furthermore, a Bayesian approach has been used 
by Jun et al. ( 1999) to predict system failure rates by criticalities using event trees for a simple 
hypothetical model. However, the failure rates are assumed to be the same under different 
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accident criticalities. Also, a method to analyze dependencies in event trees, using copula and 
Bayesian theory along with accident sequence precursor data, has been proposed for nuclear 
plants by Yi and Bier (1998). 
This tool may be applied to update failure probabilities in QRA by incorporating new data to 
revise earlier failure probability estimates. In simple words, the resulting failure probability is 
not a new value but an improvement of the earlier estimate with better confidence. In process 
safety, end events are rare to occur thus it is difficult to estimate their frequency based on 
historical data; however, near miss and incidents occur more frequently. This approach makes 
use of the near miss and incident data, to update failure probabilities of a process system. The 
updating method is used to revise the failure frequencies which in turn add confidence to the 
QRA. QRA without improvements and updates become obsolete over time as failures, 
degradation and occurrence of abnormal events cause changes in the behavior and characteristics 
ofthe system. 
Dynamic failure assessment can be used as the foundation of a systematic tool which is capable 
of producing the real time risk profile of a given process. This may be achieved by incorporating 
consequence analysis with failure assessment which is attempted in this study. 
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Chapter 3 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) determines a quantitative measure of risk in terms of 
likelihood of occurrence and potential consequences of an unwanted event. QRA generally 
consists of three main steps: hazard identification, probability assessment and consequence 
assessment. The last two steps are known as risk estimation steps. Figure 3-1 shows the 








and hazard assessment 
No Update design 
parameters 
Figure 3-1. Conventional QRA procedure 
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3.1. Hazard Identification 
Hazards are defined as events or processes that have the potential of creating an accident. Hazard 
identification is a key step in identifying the potentially hazardous elements of a process and the 
accident scenario in which they are likely to be involved. After the hazards have been identified, 
the scenarios in which hazard may potentially cause an accident are identified. This step is 
referred to as hazard identification. In this step the initial event causing the incident, the safety 
systems involved and the possible outcomes including the type of failure are determined. Hazard 
identification may be conducted independently from the risk estimation steps; however, best 
results are obtained when they are done together (Crawl & Louvar, 2002). One of the most 
frequently used hazard identification methods is HAZOP. 
Hazard and operability (HAZOP) study is an approach that involves brain storming in a 
controlled environment to consider all possible ways an incident could occur. To conduct this 
study detailed information about the selected process must be available. The HAZOP committee 
use predefined guide words to determine if any combination of process parameters and guide 
words are valid. Subsequently, possible causes, control systems and potential consequences of 
the incident are investigated and recommendations are made. Other common methods of hazard 
identification are process hazard checklist, hazard survey and safety reviews. 
3.2. Probability Assessment 
Probability assessment is an important part of risk estimation which deals with the likelihood of 
event occurrence. The likelihood of an unwanted event usually corresponds to the probability of 
a failure in process industries. Failure probability used in risk assessment may be either a single 
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value or in terms of a probability distribution taking into account the uncertainties involved. In 
order to better understand the probability assessment step, it is essential to briefly review the 
concept of probability theory. 
3.2.1. Probability Theory 
Probability theory is a widely accepted technique to express uncertainties in a parameter. In 
many cases, estimating the probability of an event may be the most difficult part of the 
computation. Randomness in an event means that more than one outcome is possible or in other 
words the outcome is somewhat unpredictable. Possible outcomes of events are a range of 
observed values in which usually some occur more frequently than others. To analytically 
quantify this randomness probability density functions (PDF) are used. A PDF does not directly 
provide information on probability but indicates the nature of the randomness (Haldar et al., 
2000). Any mathematical model satisfying the properties of a PDF may be used to quantify 
uncertainties in a random variable. These mathematical models are known as probability 
distributions. Depending on the nature of the variable (continuous or discrete) many types of 
distributions exist from which various distributions are commonly used in a specific profession 
to model the probability of an event. In this chapter the probability distributions used for this 
study are briefly reviewed. 
3.2.1.1. Continuous Random Variables 
• Beta distribution: Beta distribution displayed as Beta (a, fJ) is often used to describe 
uncertainty about the probability of an event occurrence in which a number of trials n 
have been made with a number of recorded success s. The PDF of this distribution is: 
f(x) oc xa-l (1- x)P-l 
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• Gamma distribution: Gamma distribution, Gamma (a, /3) , models the time requires for 
a events to occur with a mean time between events of fl. The PDF function may be 
written as: 
3.2.1.2. Discrete Random Variables 
• Binomial distribution: Binomial distribution, Binomial (n, p), shows the number of 
success from n independent trials where there is a p probability of success in each trial. 
The function indicating the nature of randomness in discrete variables is a probability 
mass function (PMF). The PMF of a Binomial distribution is: 
• Poisson distribution: The Poisson distribution, Poisson (At), models the number of 
occurrences of an event in a time t where At is the average number of occurrence of the 
event. The PMF of the Poisson distribution may be written as (Vose, 2003): 
f(x) ex: e - .tt (ilt)x 
3.2.2. Probability Assessment Methods 
The most common methods in probability assessment are event tree analysis (ETA) and Fault 
Tree Analysis (FT A). 
3.2.2.1. Event Tree Analysis 
An event tree is a graphical representation of the logic model that identifies and quantifies the 
possible outcomes following an initiating event. In order to construct an event tree the following 
steps need to be taken: 
Step 1: Identify the initial unwanted event as the first branch of the tree. 
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Step 2: Identify the safety systems involved in the potential see nario caused by the initial event 
and their failure probabilities. 
Step 3: Construct the event tree based on all possible scenario s of failure or success of each 
safety system. 
Step 4: Identify all end-states and calculate their occurrence probabilities by multiplying the 
branch values in each sequence from the initiating event to th e last safety system. Figure 3-2 
shows the schematics of an event tree. 
Safety System (Protective Layers ) 
Success 




Initiating Event Failure 









X2,2 ...,.---- End-state 4 
Ftgure 3 2. Schematics of an even tree -
Figure 3-2 shows that calculating end-state probabilities is easily done via the event tree by 
multiplying the branch values leading to that end-state. For example, the occurrence probability 
of end-state 1 may be obtained simply by following the highlighted branches: 
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.-------------------------------- -
P(End- state 1) = x0(1- x1)(1- x2,1) 
The example in Figure 3-2 is very simple while for large processes an event tree analysis could 
be very complicated and time consuming. 
3.2.2.2. Fault Tree Analysis (Ff A) 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive graphical design technique which is structured in terms of 
events rather than components. This approach identifies ways in which hazards may lead to 
accidents. This tree begins with an accident as the top branch and works backwards to reach the 
basic causes of the accident. This diagram uses logic gates to express logical relationships 
between events. The most common gates used in a fault tree are AND and OR gates. AND gate 
requires all events to combine to yield the top event; however, in the case of the OR gate 
occurrence of at least one event is sufficient to lead to the top event. The following steps are 
required for the development of a fault tree: 
Step 1: Defme the system and identify the top event. 
Step 2: Using appropriate logical gates construct the fault tree starting from the top event and 
working backwards to the intermediate and finally the basic events. 
Step 3: Perform quantitative evaluation by assigning failure probabilities to the basic events and 
calculating the probabilities ofthe intermediate and top events (Ebeling, 2000). 
Figure 3-3 shows the schematics of a fault tree. Using Boolean algebra the relation between the 
top event and the basic events in Figure 3-3 may be written as: 
A = B u C = (D n E) U C 
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In which A, B, C, D and E are occurrence probabilities of each event. Assuming independency 
between the events, by applying the properties of set theory to the Boolean equation we will 
have: 
A = (D x E) + C - (D x E x C) 
c 
D 
Figure 3-3. Schematic of a fault tree 
3.3. Consequence Assessment 
Consequence is defmed as "a measure of the expected effects of the results of an incident" 
(Crawl & Louvar, 2002). Figure 3-4 shows a generalized algorithm to categorize the 




Confidence or Reputation 
Figure 3-4. Generalized algorithm for consequence analysis 
Consequence assessment describes the extent of damage in terms of asset loss, human fatality, 
environmental loss and confidence or reputation loss. The most common incident in process 
industries are loss of containment and releases which can be quantified using toxic release and 
dispersion models. Consequences of other common incidents such as fire and explosion may be 
determined via fire and explosion modelling. 
In order to incorporate the consequences of an accident into the risk profile, those consequences 
can be presented in quantifiable terms such as dollar value. As briefly explained in Chapter 1, 
this conversion may be done using consequence severity matrices. Table 3-1 shows one example 
of such matrix developed for the process industry. 
It may be seen from Table 3-1 that the three categories ofhuman fatality, environmental loss and 
confidence or reputation loss may be converted into their equivalent dollar value of damage 
19 
according to the severity of loss. With the severity class known, the dollar value of damage may 
be directly integrated into the risk profile to yield the risk associated with a hazard. 
After both the frequency of occurrence of the unwanted event and the potential consequences are 
determined the next step in risk estimation is to develop the process risk by multiplying the two 
parameters above. 
The fmal step of QRA is to compare the risk value obtained to the predefined risk limit. If the 
risk value exceeds that limit than the design parameters must be changed to reduce frequency of 
failure of to mitigate the consequences so that the revised risk would fall within the acceptable 
region of the risk limit. 
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Severity Asset Confidence or 
Human Loss Environmental Loss 
Class Loss Reputation Loss 
One minor injury Around the operating 
1 <IOK needing first aid unit area, Easy recovery Get noticed in plant 
attention and remediation 
Get attention in the 
One or two injuries 
industrial complex. 
10 k to requiring hospital Within plant, Short 
2 Information shared 
lOOK attention however no term remediation effort 





Minor offsite impact, 
injuries, potential Local media 
3 to 1 Remediation cost will 
million 
disabilities, potential 
be less than 1 million 
coverage 
threat to life 
One fatality and/or 
Community advisory 
Regional media 
1 to 10 issued, Remediation 
4 multiple injuries with coverage a brief note 
million cost remain below 5 
disabilities on national media 
million 
Community evacuation National media 
> 10 for longer period, coverage, Brief note 
5 Multiple fatalities 
million Remediation cost in on international 
excess of 5 million media 
Table 3-1. Consequence seventy matriX 
(Developed with the feedback of loss prevention group of a major oil and gas company) 
3.4. Advance QRA applications 
As further research is being conducted in the field of QRA new and advance approaches are 
developed to facilitate the application of each three step of QRA in the industry. Some of these 
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methods are based on a combination of various techniques previously developed. A few of these 
tools are listed below: 
1- MCAA: Maximum Credible Accident Analysis is an approach for forecasting an accident in a 
process plant. MCAA comprises of four main steps: hazard identification, development of 
credible accident scenarios, assessing the damage likely to be caused by those scenarios and 
determining the most credible accident scenario (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). 
2- PSA: Probability Safety Analysis provides a framework for hazard identification and risk 
estimation. It also provides a basis for safety related decision making. PSA consists of seven 
major steps: hazard identification, accident sequence modelling, data acquisition and parameter 
estimation, accident sequence quantification, hazard substance release categories, consequence 
assessment and integration of results (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). 
3- SCAP: Safety, Credible Accidents and Probability fault tree analysis is new methodology 
which integrates Analytical Simulation (a new methodology for fault tree analysis proposed by 
Khan and Abbasi in 2002a) and maximum credible accident analysis. The methodology intends 
to identify and quantify the presence of hazards in an industry, predict the impact of likely 
accidents in and around the industry, recommend safety measures and reassess the hazards by 
incorporating the recommended safety measures. Hence, it allows one to work out exactly what 
safety measures, of what sophistication, can decrease the hazard to an acceptable level (Khan et 
al., 2002,a). 
There are other advance tools and techniques which one may choose depending upon the 
complexity of the system. 
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Chapter 4 
DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
Dynamic risk assessment is a new approach which uses the fundamentals of quantitative risk 
assessment and real time data from the process to develop a risk profile for the system. The 
special feature of this profile is the ability to simulate the risk of the system as a function of 
abnormal events occurring over its lifetime. Therefore the risk profile obtained using dynamic 
risk assessment approach is indirectly a function oftime. 
Depending on the rate of event occurrence in a system the current risk profile could be 
significantly different from the original risk of the process calculated at the design stage. This 
shows that the design stage data may not be very reliable after the process is subjected to 
deterioration, fatigue and possibly human intervention. 
Risk has two major parameters which are failure probability and consequence. Failure 
probability in this methodology is continuously updated and changes every time an accident 
sequence precursor (ASP) such as incidents and near misses occur in the system. The resulting 
risk profile developed after the failure probability update is referred to as the posterior risk. At 
the design stage of the process the original failure probability function, herein denoted as the 
prior function, is determined in terms of a probability distribution due to the uncertainties 
involved. With the ASP data available, Bayesian theory is used to determine the posterior failure 
probability in the form of a probability distribution. Subsequently, the posterior risk profile is 
obtained simply by multiplying the new failure probability function by its related consequence. 
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Finally using both Bayesian and joint probability theories a predictive model is developed which 
can predict the number of expected abnormal event occurrences within the next time interval. 
4.1. Methodology 
Figure 4-1 shows graphically the step by step procedure of applying the dynamic risk assessment 
methodology. Dynamic risk assessment may be implemented to a selected unit in five steps: 
Step]: Scenario identification: This step identifies the most likely scenarios, types of failures and 
end-states associated with an incident. After determining the scenario, the initiating abnormal 
event and all safety systems serving as protective layers to reduce or eliminate the effect of that 
event are identified. This information is then used to form the event tree as discussed previously 
in Chapter 3. This event tree will show the relations between failure or success of each safety 
system with the possible end-states. 
Step2: Prior function calculation: Using design stage data the initial or prior failure probabilities 
of each safety system are calculated in terms of probability distributions from plant specific data 
and expert judgment. Given that in event tree analysis a single value is used as failure probability 
in each branch and not an entire distribution, the mean value of the PDF is selected as the 
representative value of the distribution to be used in the event tree to obtain end-state 
probabilities. 
Step 3: Formation of the likelihood function: Incident and near misses are used to form the 
likelihood function which is later used to update the prior failure function. The data recorded 
from the system are number of process upsets, shutdowns and other forms of failures which are 
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all defined in the event tree. These values are recorded every year and are used in the cumulative 
form to develop the likelihood function. 
Step 4: Posterior function calculation: Bayesian theory is used to calculate the posterior function 
using subjective prior knowledge and real time data from the system which are mathematically 
presented in the form of the prior and likelihood functions. This step will yield the posterior 
failure probabilities of all the safety systems and end-states. 
Step 5: Consequence analysis: Consequence analysis is conducted on a selected scenano to 
estimate the potential consequences of all possible end-states using the methodology described in 
Chapter 3. The consequences obtained in this stage are presented in dollar value amount. 
These five steps develop the two main elements of risk, failure probability and consequence. 
Therefore, the posterior risk profile is obtained by multiplying the two elements . 
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Figure 4-1. Dynamic Risk Assessment Methodology 
4.2. Bayesian Inference 
Bayesian inference is a powerful technique based on Bayes' theorem which uses data to improve 
the estimation of a parameter. There are mainly three steps involved: Determining the prior 
function, fmding the appropriate likelihood function and calculating the posterior function. 
Baye's theorem represents the conditional probability of occurrence of event A given that event 
B has already occurred. This probability may be presented as: 
p(BI AJp(AJ 
p(AdB) = L~ (BIA-) (A-) L=l P l p L 
"Bayesian inference mathematically describes a learning process" (Vose, 2000). The first step of 
this methodology is selecting a prior function which is mostly chosen subjectively based on 
expert opinion; this function is modified later after data is collected from the system as evidence 
of its behaviour. The equation below is based on Bayes' formula; however, the notations are 
changed to what is often used in Bayesian inference. 
rr(B)lCXIB) 
reel X) = I rr(B)l(X I B) 
In dynamic failure assessment, Bayesian theory is used to improve failure probabilities. The 
parameters in the above equation are (Vose, 2000): 
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• rr(O)- The prior distribution: A PDF function representing the original knowledge 
available about the process. Priors could also be uninformative showing that there is no 
initial data available for the system. 
• l (X jB)- Likelihood function: The probability of observing the value X given value of(}. 
• f(Oj X)- Posterior distribution: A PDF function representing the state ofknowledge after 
observing the data. 
The term in the denominator of this equation is called the normalizing factor which normalizes 
the posterior distribution over an area of one and since it is not a function of a it is considered as 
a constant; therefore, we can rewrite the Bayesian equation as: 
f(OjX) ex: n(8)l(Xj8) 
As mentioned previously, the prior function is mostly subjective and describes the initial 
available knowledge about the system prior to observing data. There are many types of priors 
which may be selected for use based on the available knowledge and the type of system. 
Conjugate priors are often used to provide estimated but convenient demonstration of the 
subjective priors. A conjugate prior has the same function form as the likelihood function which 
leads to the posterior function being in the same family of distribution as the prior. 
4.3. Predictive Model 
Predictive model is developed to estimate the number of abnormal events in the next time 
interval. This model was developed by Meel et al. (2006) using Bayesian theory and joint 
probability methods. The development of this model is briefly discussed in this section. 
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Assuming that Yn represents the number of abnormal events occurring in the n1h time interval, 
Yn+ J would represent the number of abnormal events in the next time interval. This value 
conditional on the observed data may be obtained by the following approach (Meel et al., 2006). 
Where A is the average number of abnormal events over the time intervals. Using joint 
probability distribution properties, this equation may be further simplified to: 
p(yN+1 1Data) = { XlP(YN+liA, Data)p(AIData)dA 
As an example we may consider that the possible number of occurrences of an abnormal event in 
a time interval of a process follows a Poisson distribution of (yn) oc A5 e- N-t , where s is the 
cumulative number of abnormal events and N the total number of time intervals, and the prior 
distribution of A follows a Gamma distribution of p(A) oc Aa-le- P-t . Therefore using the 
predictive model the number of abnormal events occurring within the next time table would be: 
r(a + s + Yn+l) ( {J + N )a+s ( 1 )Yn+l 
- r(a + s)r(YN+l + 1) {J + N + 1 {J + N + 1 
This is a mixture distribution of Poisson-Gamma as it takes a mixture of Poisson distribution, 
using probabilities from a Gamma distribution as the mixing agents. 
Looking closer at the predictive mode~ it becomes evident that the final equation follows the 
format of a Negative Binomial distribution. Therefore it may be written as: 
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(a + S + Yn+l - 1) ( {3 + N )a+s ( 1 )Yn +l = (k + r - 1) r 1 _ k a+ s- 1 {3 + N + 1 {3 + N + 1 r- 1 p ( p) 
The term on the right hand side is the Negative Binomial distribution where k = Yn+l• r =a+ 
s and p = ...f!.2!:!_ . H~nce for abnormal events which can be presented by Poisson-Gamma 
P+N+l 
distributions Negative Binomial distribution may be directly used as the predictive model. 
4.4. Testing and Validation of the Dynamic Risk Assessment Model 
To test and validate the dynamic risk assessment methodology, the approach is applied to a 
practical case of a pressure water reactor in a nuclear power plant. This plant is a part of the US 
nuclear regulatory commission' s (NRC) accident sequence program. The abnormal event under 
study in this plant is loss-of-offsite-power which can lead to core damage. The status report 
issued by NRC for the year 1993 has been used as reference for precursors to potential severe 
core damage accidents (Johnson and Rasmuson, 1996). 
The objective of this study is to determine the core damage frequency and risk associated with 
the abnormal event of los of offsite power (LOOP). Figure 4-2 shows the simplified schematics 
ofaPWR. 
Figure 4-2. Schematics of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) (US NRC, 2007b) 
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The data available for loss of offsite power events which occurred at the PWR plant in 1993 are 
shown in Table 4-1. This table represents the events involved in a core damage accident (CD) 
and their failure probability distributions (Johnson and Rasmuson, 1996). 
Event Description Distribution Parameters Mt N2 
a b 
0 Loss of offsite power Gamma 0.500 0.200 na 2 
1 Failure to recover offsite power in Beta 0.359 0.838 0 0 112 hour 
2 Reactor trip given a LOOP None Constant 2 0 
3 Emergency power failure Beta 0.497 217.302 2 0 
4A Failure of AFW system Beta 0.500 5059.000 2 0 
4B Failure of auxiliary feed water Beta 0.475 27.437 2 0 (AFW) system given EP failure 
5 PORV is NOT challenged Beta 10.560 0.440 2 1 
6A PORV does not reseat when Beta 0.500 1513.152 1 0 
challenged 
6B PORV does not reseat when Beta 0.455 14.712 0 0 
challenged given EP failure 
7 Failure to get a seal LOCA Beta 0.519 0.155 0 0 
8A Failure to recover EP before core Beta 0.610 0.424 0 0 
uncovery following a seal LOCA 
8B Failure to recover EP prior to Beta 0.408 6.288 0 0 battery depletion 
9A Failure of high pressure injection Beta 0.500 1982.127 0 0 (HPI) 
9B Failure ofHPI with feed and bleed Beta 0.485 48.015 0 0 
10 Failure ofhigh pressure Beta 0.498 432.800 0 0 
recirculation 
11 PORV fails to open for feed and None Constant 0 0 bleed 
12 Failure of containment spray Beta 0.500 5374.344 0 0 
recirculation 
Table 4-1. Event distribution information (Johnson and Rasmuson, 1996) 
1. M= Number of challenges contained in the data 
2. N= Number of failures occurred. 
Where PORV is the power operated reliefvalve and LOCA is loss of coolant accident. 
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Only two PWR LOOP events occurred in 1993. The operating history for the PWRs was 37.9 
reactor years during 1993 (Johnson and Rasmuson, 1996). 
With the information above an event tree for the abnormal event of loss of offsite power and 
with the safety barriers in table 4-1 is developed as shown in Figure 4-3 where CD indicates core 
damage. 
LOOP I R•actorTrle l EP A.FW PORV I PORV R~sutlng I SfAL LOCA I EP Recovery I HPI HPR PORV CSR End Slates 
1·P6A OK 1 
1·P5 
1·P12 OK 
1·P4A 1·P10 I 
1·P9A I IP12 CD 3 
1·P3 P6A I IPl O co 4 
P9A CD 5 
PS OK 6 
1·P12 OK 
l ·Pll I 
1·P10 I IP12 co 
1-P2 1-1'98 IP11 co 9 
I P10 P4A CD 10 
IP9B co 11 
1·P12 OK 12 
1·P10 I 
PO"P1 l ·P9A I IP12 CD 13 
1·P6A I IP1o CD 14 
1·!'7 I IP9A CD 15 
IPSA co 16 
1· P68 
1-PBB OK 17 
1·P5 P7 
P88 CD 18 
P68 CD 19 
1· Pl 2 OK 20 
l·P48 1-1'10 J 
l ·P9A I 1Pt2 CD 21 
l ·P6A I IP10 CD 22 
l ·P7 1P9A CD 23 
P3 P8A CD 24 
P5 
l ·PSB OK 25 
P7 
IPBB CD 26 
P48 CD 27 
2 OK 28 
Figure 4-3. LOOP event tree for a PWR plant (revised after Johnson and Rasmuson, (1996)) 
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4.4.1. Posterior Core Damage Frequency: 
Using the event tree and the distributions from Table 4-1 the prior end-state probabilities may be 
easily obtained. In this study, the mean value of each distribution is used for analysis. 
After the prior function is developed using the precursor data and Bayesian theory the posterior 
distribution is obtained. Below is an example of the mathematical formulation for the event 5 
" PORV is not challenged": 
Prior distribution (Beta): f(x) ex xa- 1(1- x)h - 1 ex x 10·56 - 1(1- x)0.44 - 1 
Likelihood function (Bernoulli): l(Datalx) ex xN (1- x)M ex x(1- x) 2 
Posterior function (Beta): f(xiData) ex f(x)l(Datalx) ex xa+N- 1 (1- x)h+M-1 
f(xiData) ex x10·56 (1- x)l.44 
a 10.56 
MeanPrior =a+ b = 10.56 + 0.44 = 0.96 
a+N 11.56 
MeanPosterior =a+ N + b + M = 11.56 + 2.44 = 0.826 
Posterior probabilities of events may be obtained similarly and the end-state probabilities can be 
calculated using the event tree by multiplying the related event probabilities for a specific end-
state. Table 4-2 shows these results as core damage frequencies for both prior and posterior 
distributions: 
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End End-State Probabilities 
States Prior Posterior 
3-CD 4.E-11 6.E-11 
4-CD 5.E-10 7.E-10 
5-CD E-10 2.E-10 
8-CD 2.E-10 2.E-10 
9-CD 0 0 
10-CD 3.E-09 2.E-09 
11-CD 3.E-08 2.E-08 
13-CD 3.E-11 4.E-11 
14-CD 3.E-10 5.E-10 
15-CD 6.E-11 E-10 
16-CD 6.E-07 6.E-07 
18-CD 1.E-07 2.E-07 
19-CD 8.E-08 l.E-07 
21-CD 6.E-10 3.E-10 
22-CD 7.E-09 4.E-09 
23-CD 2.E-09 8.E-10 
24-CD 9.E-06 5.E-06 
26-CD 3.E-06 2.E-06 
27-CD 1.E-06 6.E-07 
Table 4-2. Prior and posterior core damage probabilities 
It is evident that there is considerable difference between prior and posterior core damage 
frequencies. 
Comparing the results from the dynamic risk assessment approach and the study by Johnson and 
Rasmuson (1996) shows consistency between the failure values. This in turn validates the 
dynamic risk assessment approach to this point as a learning tool for updating the knowledge 
concerning system performance. The following section takes a step further in the methodology to 
develop the updated risk profile of the process. 
4.4.2 Consequence Analysis 
Following the procedure in section 3.3, after identifying the accident scenario an estimate of the 
consequences due to core damage, which assuming no radioactive leak to the outside is mostly 
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asset loss, is made. To designate a dollar value for the amount of damage only the asset loss 
section of the consequence matrix is used which has categorized the loss based on the severity of 
accident in dollar value. Table 4-3 shows this matrix. Similar matrices may be created for other 
damages such as human fatality and environmental loss. 
Severity Class Potential asset loss 
0 No loss 
1 Less than $10,000 
2 $10,000-$100,000 
3 $100,000-$1,000,000 
4 $1 ,000,000-$10,000,000 
5 More than $10,000,000 
Table 4-3. Classification of asset loss based on severity 
Based on the consequence matrix, all 28 end-states are given a severity class which is shown in 
table 4-4. It may be seen from this table that although all end-states result in core damage, their 
severity classes are not the same. This value depends on the units and equipments involved in 
each path of the event tree. 
End 3 4 5 8 9 10 11 13 14 15 16 18 19 21 22 23 24 26 27 State 
Class 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 
Table 4-4. End-state classification based on severity of damage 
After each end-state is assigned a dollar value of damage, the associated risk is determined by 
multiplying the damage value by the related probability. Table 4-5 shows the risk values for the 
end-states resulting in core damage for prior and posterior probabilities: 
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End Severity Risk Estimation Posterior 
States Class Prior Risk Risk 
3-CD 4 4.E-04 6.E-04 
4-CD 4 5.E-03 7.E-03 
5-CD 4 E-03 2.E-03 
8-CD 4 3.E-03 2.E-03 
9-CD 4 0 0 
10-CD 4 3.E-02 2.E-02 
11-CD 4 3.E-01 2.E-01 
13-CD 5 2.E-03 4.E-03 
14-CD 5 3.E-02 5.E-02 
15-CD 5 6.E-03 E-02 
16-CD 5 4.E+01 6.E+01 
18-CD 5 1.E+01 2.E+01 
19-CD 4 8.E-01 l.E+OO 
21-CD 5 6.E-02 3.E-02 
22-CD 5 7.E-01 4.E-01 
23-CD 5 2.E-01 8.E-02 
24-CD 5 9.E+02 5.E+02 
26-CD 4 3.E+01 2.E+01 
27-CD 4 l.E+01 6.E+OO 
Table 4-5. Risk estimation for end-states resulting in core damage 
The cells in bold have a risk value greater than one, which requires prompt attention and risk 
management efforts. Detailed calculations are presented in Appendix A. 
4.4.3. Predictive Model: 
Using joint probability method as stated in section 4.3, it is possible to predict the number of 
abnormal events occurring in the next time interval. The abnormal event in this case study is 
LOOP and the representative distribution is a Gamma; therefore, with a likelihood function of 
Poisson distribution the posterior function will be: 
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Following the procedure in section 4.3 the Negative Binomial distribution to be used as the 
predictive model has the following parameters: 
{J+N 
p = B + N + 1; k = Yn+l; r =a+ s 
Using the above parameters for a Negative Binomial distribution, the number of LOOP events in 
the next time interval is determined. The Mean of the distribution is selected as the desired value 
in this study. Table 4-6 shows the results of this predictive model: 
Time Predictiv e Model 
Incident Probability of Mea Rounded Mean (years) n success 
1 2 0.545 2.08 3 2 
Table 4-6. Predicted number of abnormal events wi thin the next time interval 
The testing of this approach has been done by Meel and coworkers for a different case study 
(Meel and Seider, 2006) using one year of data. The predicted number of incidents in year one is 
2, which matches the reported incident. This confirms the applicability and predictability ofthis 
approach in conditions where incident data is sparse. However, further testing and validation is 
required with more data. This model will be a useful tool to forecast the likelihood of accidents 
and number of likely events in a given period. This in tum would help to revise the risk profile 
and develop risk management strategies. 
This study has tested and validated the abilities of the dynamic risk assessment approach as a 
learning and predicting tool. The real time risk values obtained by this method for each end state 
shows the deviation of the risk ofthe process as it is subjected to abnormal conditions throughout 
its life cycle. Now that this tool has been validated by an existing study, we may proceed to the 
next step which is to apply this tool to actual process units. 
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Chapter 5 
APPLICATION OF DYNANIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
Application of dynamic risk assessment is demonstrated in this chapter in two case studies 
related to the process industry. The first cast study is the process facility of an offshore oil and 
gas platform where the risk of the equipment in use is determined based on the number of 
occurrence of unwanted events. This case study shows that the application of this tool to such 
dangerous working conditions may in fact play a critical role in saving valuable human life and 
assets. 
The second case study is based on the incident in Texas City refmery which occurred in March 
2005. The objective of this study is to determine whether or not this catastrophic incident was 
predictable and could have been prevented by this approach. The results and conclusions from 
each study are presented individually. 
5.1. Dynamic Risk Assessment of an Offshore Process facility 
5.1.1. Process Description 
An offshore oil and gas platform is used to drill wells in the ocean, produce oil and gas, process 
the fluids and ship the fmal products to shore. The processing section of an OOG platform 
generally contains three main parts: wellhead, separators, and gas compressors. Auxiliary 
equipment such as dehydrators, pumps, etc .. . are also present but the focus of this work is 
limited to larger unit operations. 
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Crude oil enters the separators where it is separated into three major components: oil, gas, and 
water. Gas condensate may also be separated depending on the size of the platform and 
composition of the crude. Oil is shipped to onshore process facilities and gas is further processed 
to high pressure dry gas which is partly used for power generation on the platform, re-injected 
into the reservoir, and/or transported to onshore facilities. 
Dynamic risk assessment is applied on each process unit, due to space limitations the results of 
three representative units (separator, compressor and flash drum) are discussed. 
5.1.2. Separator 
5.1.2.1. Posterior Failure Probability 
Separators are used to separate crude oil into oil, gas, gas condensate and water, the first 
separator in the offshore process which is the main focus of this section separates oil and gas. 








~ Water outlet 
Figure 5-l. Cross section of a spherical separator and control system 
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Table 5-1 shows the data available after hazard identification of this unit at the design stage. 
Depending on the sequence of events three possible categories of end-states are possible: a) 
continued operation, b) process shutdown and c) high pressure release. Release is due to the most 
credible scenario which is Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) followed by 
ftre. The most credible scenario is defmed as the scenario having a combination of both high 
likelihood of occurrence and scale of damage potential (Khan et al., 2002,a). High pressure 
development in the separator causes the unit to fail as BLEVE and the vapour cloud on ignition 
will form a fireball (Khan et al., 2002,b). 
Failure frequency 













Excess flow through 0.08 Gamma 0.2 
the inlet 
Flow controller failure 0.025 Beta 10 
Flow control valve 0.02 Beta failure 9 
Level indicator failure 0.02 Beta (OiVWater) 11 
Automatic valve 0.02 Beta failure (OiVWater) 12 
Gas outlet valve 0.07 Beta 
chocked or failed 20 
Pressure gauge failure 0.02 Beta 10 
Safety relief valve 0.0015 Beta failure 80 
Temperature controller 0.02 Beta failure 10 
High temperature 0.15 Beta 
alarm failure 9 
Emergency shutdown 0.2 Beta 
system failure 2 
. .. Table 5-l. Fatlure probabthtles of separator components 














Prior probabilities used in the event tree analysis (Figure 5-2) are developed using plant specific 
data and safety expert's opinion. With the event tree formed, the end-state probabilities are 
obtained simply by multiplying the probabilities of the associated branches leading to a specific 
end-state. These results are generally available at the design stage of a process unit. 
End-state 
A 
1-P2 I 1·P5 A 
I P3 
1-P4 1 -P6 




l -P7 1-P9 
P8 I 1-PlO 
A 
6 
I P9 1·Pll 
PlO I 
(Pu 8 c 
l-P9 9 A 
P7 I l..P10 10 8 
I P9 I 1-Pll 11 8 
IP10 I 
IPU 12 c 
1..P6 13 A 
P4 1 1-P8 14 A 
IP6 
1-P7 J I -P9 
P8 I 1· P10 
15 8 
16 8 
!.!.,_ I P9 I 1..Pll 17 8 
IPlO I 
I P11 18 c 
l -P9 19 A 
P7 I 1-P10 20 8 
I P9 l..P11 21 8 
P10 I 
IPll 22 c 
1-PS 23 ,.. 
1-P4 I 1-P6 24 A 
F5 I 1-PB 25 A 
IP6 
1-P7 l -P9 
IP8 I 1-PlO 
26 ,.. 
27 8 
I P9 l..P11 28 8 
PlO J 
P2 (Pu 29 c 
l -P9 30 A 
P7 I 1-PlO 31 8 
I P9 1-PU 32 8 
Pl O I 
IP11 33 c 
1-P6 34 ,.. 
IP4 I 1-PB 35 A 
IP6 
1-P7 1-P9 
P8 I l..P10 
36 A 
37 8 
I P9 I 1-Pll 38 B 
PlO 
IPll 39 c 
1-P9 40 A 
P7 I l..PlO 41 8 
I P9 l..Pll 42 8 
P10 I 
IPU 43 c 
Figure 5-2. Event tree for the abnormal event of excess flow input in a separator 
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During a five year period after the start of the process the unit is monitored and ASP data during 
this five years are recorded which are presented in Table 5-2. Using the ASP data the likelihood 
function is formed and Bayesian theory is applied to calculate posterior probabilities. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 YearS 
1-A 4 4 2 4 3 
2-A 4 2 3 3 3 
3-A 3 l 2 2 2 
4-A 2 1 2 I l 
5-A 1 1 2 I 0 
6-8 2 2 l 2 I 
7-8 1 0 1 l I 
8-C 0 0 0 0 0 
9-A 2 2 l 2 1 
10-8 1 l 1 0 I 
11-8 I 0 1 l l 
12-C 0 0 0 0 0 
13-A 4 4 4 2 2 
14-A 2 5 5 2 l 
15-8 2 2 1 l 1 
16-8 1 0 l l 1 
17-8 2 3 l 2 l 
18-C 0 0 0 0 0 
19-A l l 0 l l 
20-8 2 l 1 2 I 
21-8 I l 1 l l 
22-C 0 0 0 0 0 
23-A 3 4 4 2 I 
24-A 2 0 0 0 2 
25-A 2 1 1 1 1 
26-A 2 5 2 4 1 
27-8 2 2 1 l 1 
28-8 1 0 l l l 
29-C 0 0 0 0 0 
30-A l 0 1 l 1 
31-8 2 l 1 2 1 
32-8 1 1 1 2 1 
33-C 0 0 0 0 0 
34-A 4 4 2 4 2 
35-A 1 1 2 2 1 
36-A 1 1 2 2 1 
37-8 3 3 3 1 l 
38-8 1 0 1 l l 
39-C 0 0 0 0 0 
40-A 2 2 2 2 1 
41-8 1 0 1 I I 
42-8 1 2 2 1 1 
43-C 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5-2. ASP data from the separator unit during a five year period (Safety expert feedback) 
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5.1.2.2. Consequence Analysis 
With the posterior probability function available, the consequences associated with each category 
of end-state are determined. According to the severity matrix in Table 3-1 the end-state severity 
levels with equivalent dollar values for the separator are selected and shown in Table 5-3. 
End-state categories B 
Severity Level 2 
Dollar value $100,000.00 
Table 5-3. Consequence severity vs. Dollar value for the separator unit 
5.1.2.3. Predictive Model 
In the last step Bayesian and joint probability theory are used together to develop a predictive 
model as discussed in Chapter 4 which estimates the number of abnormal events occurring 
within the next time interval. These values are estimated using the negative binomial approach 
also discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Table 5-4 shows the results of the predictive model 
compared to the actual number of initiating abnormal events in each year. 
Data Time 
(Year) f----------.-----------; Mean No. of Event Occurrence Incidents Cumulative Form 
0 0 0.143<1 
2 0 0 0.083<1 
3 0 0 0.059<1 
4 0.273<1 
5 2 0.407<1 
Table 5-4. Predictive model of the separator unit 
5.1.3. Compressor 
A gas compressor increases the pressure of the gas by reducing its volume. Figure 5-3 shows a 











Figure 5-3. Centrifugal gas compressor and safety systems 
Hazard identification on this unit leads to the most credible accident scenario being a jet fire. The 
continuous release of flammable gas from the compressor finding a source of ignition will cause 
the jet fire (Khan et al., 2002,b). Table 5-5 shows the data available regarding component failure 
at the design stage of the unit. 
Failure frequency 
Event Description Discrete Distribution 
value Distribution parameters 
a b 
1 Excess flow through the inlet 0.08 Gamma 0.2 0.4 
2 Flow controller Failure 0.025 Beta 10 390 
3 Flow control valve failure 0.02 Beta 9 441 
4 Outlet valve failed closed 0.02 Beta 11 539 
5 High pressure gauge failure 0.01 Beta 1 99 
6 Vent pipe failure 0.02 Beta 10 490 
7 Safety valve failure 0.0015 Beta 80 53253 
8 High high pressure alarm 0.15 Beta 9 51 failure 
9 Emergency shutdown valve 0.2 Beta 2 8 failure 
.. . Table 5-5 Fatlure probabthtles of compressor components 
(Khan et al. (2002,b), plant specific data, safety expert feedback) 
Figure 5-4 shows the event tree related to the abnormal event of excess flow entering the 
compressor. Severity consequences are presented in Table 5-6. Following the same approach as 
the separator, using the ASP data from 5 years back shown in Table 5-7, the posterior end-state 




Vent Safety relief 
Flow controller Outlet valve Pressure HPA ESO 
valve pipes valve 
gauge 
End-state 
1 P3 A 
1-P2 I 1-Pi! A 
IP3 l-P7 A 
1-P6 I 1-PS 4 8 
1-PS I P7 r 1-P9 5 8 
P4 IPS I 
l P9 6 c 
P1 1-PS 7 8 
P6 I l-P9 8 8 
IPS I 
I P9 9 c 
PS 10 c 
l-P4 11 A 
1-P7 12 A 
P2 1-P6 I 1-PS 13 B 
1-PS IP7 I l-P9 14 B 
P4 IPs I 
IP9 15 c 
1-PS 16 8 
P6 r 1-P9 17 8 
IPs I 
IP9 18 c 
P5 19 c 
Figure 5-4. Event tree for the abnormal event of excess flow input in a compressor 
End-state categories 8 
Severity Level 2 
Dollar Value $10,000.00 $100,000.00 $1,000,000.00 
Table 5-6. Consequence severity vs. Dollar value for the compressor unit 
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Year 1 Year2 Year3 Year4 YearS 
1-A 2 2 1 2 1 
2-A 2 1 2 1 1 
3-A 3 2 1 0 1 
4-B 1 0 2 1 0 
5-B 1 1 1 1 0 
6-C 0 0 0 0 0 
7-B 2 2 1 1 0 
8-B 1 1 0 I 1 
9-C 0 0 0 0 0 
10-C 0 0 1 1 0 
11-A 2 2 1 I 0 
12-A 1 0 1 1 0 
13-B 0 2 1 I 0 
14-B 1 1 1 1 2 
15-C 0 0 1 1 0 
16-B 1 1 4 2 0 
17-B 2 1 1 0 1 
18-C 0 0 0 1 0 
19-C 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 5-7. ASP data from the Compressor unit during a five year period (Safety expert feedback) 
The predictive model for the compressor is also developed with the same approach as the 
separator which is presented in Table 5-8. 
Time Data Mean No. of Event 
(Year) Incidents Cumulative Occurrence Form 
1 0 0 0.143<1 
2 1 1 0.500<1 
3 2 3 0.941<1 
4 2 5 1 <1.182<2 
5 1 6 1<1.148<2 
Table 5-8. Predictive model of the compressor unit 
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5.1.4. Flash Drum 
A flash drum is a vertical vessel used to separate vapour from liquid to facilitate storage of "dry" 
gas. Figure 5-5 shows the simplified schematics of a flash drum and its related safety systems. 
High pressure alarm 0- ---~ra~~~~---- - ---: I I 
I I :---- : 





Figure 5-5. Flash drum and safety systems 
liquid 
OuUet 
Applying a hazard identification study for the drum identifies the most credible accident scenario 
as vapour cloud explosion. Flammable gas released from the flash drum would form a highly 
flammable vapour cloud which on ignition would burn instantly causing overpressure. 
Umeleased condensate in the unit would burn as a pool fire (Khan et al. , 2002,b). 
Table 5-9, 5-10, 5-11 and 5-12 show the failure probability of flash drum components, the 
consequences in terms of dollar value, the ASP data for 5 years and the predictive model values 
respectively. Figure 5-6 show the event tree related to the initial abnormal event of excess flow 














Description Distribution Discrete value Distribution parameters 
a 
Excess flow through the 0.08 Gamma 0.2 inlet 
Flow controller failure 0.025 Beta 10 
Flow control valve failure 0.02 Beta 9 
Liquid level controller 0.02 Beta 11 failure 
Level control valve failure 0.02 Beta 1 
Pressuregaug_e failure 0.02 Beta 8 
Pressure control valve 0.02 Beta 9 failure 
Safety relief valve failure 0.0015 Beta 80 
High pressure alarm failure 0. 15 Beta 9 
Emergency shutdown valve 0.2 Beta failure 2 
Table 5-9. Failure probabilities of flash drum components 
(Khan et al. , (2002, b), plant specific data, safety expert feedback) 
End-state categories B 
Severity Level 2 
Dollar Value $10,000.00 $100,000.00 $1,000,000.00 















l-P2 I 1-PS A 
~3 1-P4 1-P7 1-P6 I 1-P8 A 4 A 
P5 IP7 I 1-P9 5 B 
IPS I 1-P10 6 B 
IP9 I 
[P10 7 c 
P6 8 c 
1-P7 9 A 
1-P6 I 1-PB 10 A 
P1 P4 IP7 I 1-P9 11 B 
IPS I 1-PlO 12 B 
IP9 I 
IP10 13 c 
P6 14 c 
1-PS 15 A 
1-P4 l-P7 16 A 
1-P6 I 1-PB 17 A 
P5 IP7 I 1-P9 18 B 
[PS J 1-PlO 19 B 
P2 IP9 I 
!Pta 20 c 
P6 21 c 
1-P7 22 A 
1-P6 I 1-P8 23 A 
P4 IP7 I 1-P9 24 B 
IPS I l-P10 25 B 
IP9 I 
IP10 26 c 
P6 27 c 




































Year 1 Year2 Year3 Year4 YearS 
5 3 2 4 1 
3 2 2 1 3 
2 2 2 1 1 
5 2 2 4 3 
3 2 2 1 2 
2 2 1 1 2 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 
1 2 2 2 I 
4 2 3 1 1 
0 I 2 1 0 
0 1 2 2 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 
0 1 I 2 I 
4 1 1 3 1 
3 2 I I 2 
0 1 2 1 1 
0 1 2 2 1 
0 0 0 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 2 I 
3 2 2 3 I 
4 1 I 2 1 
1 2 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
I 0 I 0 I 
Table 5-11. ASP data from the Flash drum unit during a five year penod 
(Safety expert feedback) 
Data Mean No. of Event 
Incidents Cumulative Form Occurrence 
2 2 1 < 1.571 <2 
1 3 1<1.333<2 
1 4 1< 1.235<2 
2 6 1<1.409<2 
2 8 1< 1.519<2 
Table 5-12. Predictive model of the flash drum unit 
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5.1.5. Results and Discussions 
5.1.5.1. Individual Units 
5.1.5.1.1. Separator 
The ASP data of the separator (Table 5-2) shows that even though none of the 280 accident 
precursor events which occurred-in the 5 year period resulted in fluid release, occurrence of other 
incidents in this period increase the likelihood of this event over the interval. Hence as the 
posterior results show, the failure probability, and as a result the risk, of the system increases 
over this time. Table 5-13 and Figure 5-7 show both numerically and graphically the changes in 
the risk profile over the 5 year period. To show the risk variations more clearly a logarithmic 
scale is selected for Figure 5-7. It may be observed that the real time risk function is below the 
risk acceptability limit at the start of unit operation but tends to increase and become 
significantly greater than this value after the end of the 5 year period. 
Prior Risk Posterior Ris k ($) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
A l.OOE+04 l.OOE+04 l.OOE+04 l.OOE+04 9.99E+03 9.99E+03 
B 9.07E-03 1.23E+OO 7.27E+OO 2.36E+Ol 5.61E+Ol 9.26E+Ol 
c 4.77E-03 7.57E-Ol 3.93E+OO l.llE+Ol 2.30E+Ol 3.45E+Ol 
Table 5-13. Risk profile for the separator unit 
It is important to note that between the three possible end-states of continued operation, system 







Ill l.OOE-01 ~ 
l.OOE-02 
l.OOE-03 
0 1 2 Years 3 4 5 
-.-Real time risk ~Risk Limit 
Figure 5-7. Posterior risk profile of the separator unit over 5 years 
Regarding the predictive model, as per Table 5-4, it may be concluded that there is a low 
likelihood of an initiating event occurrence in the fifth year. This may be attributed to the fact 
that only two initiating events have occurred during this period. 
5.1.5.1.2. Compressor 
The ASP data of the compressor show that there are indeed incident leading to fa ilure of the 
system (in this case high pressure fluid release) during the 5 year period. Even though the 
number of incidents (77) is less than the separator, as Table 5-14 and Figure 5-8 show the risk 
profile of this unit takes an increasing trend. This trend indicates that the unit starts with a design 
risk below the risk acceptability limit ( 1) and increases significantly during the next 5 years. 
Prior Risk Posterior Risk($) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
A l.OOE+04 l.OOE+04 l.OOE+04 9.99E+03 9.99E+03 9.99E+03 
B L.83E+OO 1.06E+Ol 2.57E+Ol 5.65E+Ol 8.99E+Ol 1.07E+02 
c 9.47E-Ol 3.27E+OO 5.77E+OO 1.83E+O 1 3.65E+Ol 4.01E+Ol 
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Years 
...._Real time risk -+-Risk limit 
4 
Figure 5-8. Posterior risk profile of the Compressor unit over 5 years 
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Predictive model for the compressor shown in Table 5-8 also demonstrates that a the rate of 
initiating event change during the 5 years the model provides new estimates for predicting the 
number of abnormal events within the next time interval. Even though the changes are not large 
enough to add one unit to the rounded value (since the number of abnormal events are discrete 
the values obtained by th model are rounded to omit the decimal digits) variation in the actual 
mean may be seen. 
5.1.5.1.3. Flash Drum 
Table 5-15 and Figure 5-9 show the posterior risk profi le of the flash drum both numerically and 
graphically. 
The results of the risk analysis follow the same concept of separator and compressor which i 
increasing with time. The major difference between this unit and the others is that the design risk 
of this unit is greater than the acceptable risk limit (1) which can be explained by the fact the 
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flash drum is the last unit of the system and is used only as required, hence considering a design 
risk greater than one is acceptable for this unit. 
Prior Risk Posterior Risk ($) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
A 1.00£+04 9.99£+03 1.00£+04 9.99£+03 9.99£+03 9.98£+03 
8 5.03£-03 3.81£+01 4.27£-01 1.02£+00 1.97£+00 3.09£+00 
c 2.76£+00 4.35£+01 3.51£+01 5.90£+01 8.95£+01 1.35£+02 
Table 5-15. Risk profile for the flash drum umt 
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Figure 5-9. Posterior risk profile of the Flash drum unit over 5 years 
Similar conclusions as the compressor can be made for the flash drum regarding the predictive 
model. 
5.1.5.2 Overall Process System 
It is not simple to compare the three units of this process together due to the difference in their 
level of safety and performance. However by reviewing the overall risk of the selected units it 
may be concluded that all three units show degradation over the 5 year period. This is evident 
from the increase in the risk profile (Figures 5-7 to 5-9). The risk profile acts as an indicator 
showing the increasing likelihood of a release occurring within the system. This indicator shows 
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that in the absence of a robust action plan, release and possibly an explosion with great 
consequences has a reasonable likelihood of occurrence. 
As may be seen in Figures 5-7 to 5-9 that the rate of change of the risk profile in early production 
years is considerably higher than those of the later years (years 3 to 5). This is because of the 
decreasing trend in the number of incident and/or near misses. In early years defects causing 
incidents and/ near misses were identified and recertified, which has decreased the rate of change 
of the risk profile, 
The trend ofthe risk profile in Figures 5-7 to 5-9 confirms the common behaviour of a degrading 
process system without a proper preventive maintenance action plan. Implementing a precise 
maintenance plan and schedule for each unit which covers both preventive and reactive 
maintenance would significantly improve the risk profile. Detailed calculation for the three units 
may be seen in Appendix B. 
5.1.6. Conclusion 
This study shows that dynamic risk assessment is a useful tool which has the ability to update the 
risk profile of the system with respect to the ASP data being extracted. This methodology 
enables the use of a real time risk profile which can alert the management based on the number 
and type of deviations, incidents, or near misses. This approach not only has the ability to update 
itself with changes in the system but it is also capable of predicting the number abnormal events 
in the next time interval. Therefore this tool has the ability to identifying within a process the 
most vulnerable unit which provides sufficient time to apply accident prevention and risk 
management. 
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5.2. Modelling of BP Texas Refinery Accident using Dynamic Risk Assessment Approach 
5.2.1. BP Texas City Refinery 
5.2.1.1. A Brief History 
BP Texas City refmery is located in Texas City, Texas, 30 miles southeast ofHouston. With an 
area of 1,200 acres it contains 29 oil refining units and 4 chemical units and it is able to produce 
up to 10 million gallons of gasoline per day (about 2.5 percent ofthe gasoline sold in the United 
States) as well as jet fuel and chemical feed stock. The number of employees at the time of the 
accident was reported as 1,800 BP workers and 800 contractors (CSB, 2007). 
5.2.1.2. Process Description 
The Isomerization unit (ISOM) was installed in the 1980's and consisted of 4 sections: ultrafmer 
desulfurizer unit, Penex reactor unit, vapor recovery/ liquid recycle unit and raffmate splitter unit. 
The raffinate splitter where the accident occurred is a distillation tower that takes raffmate, a 
non-aromatic primary straight chain hydrocarbon mixture and separates it into light and heavy 
components. Figure 5-10 shows the raffmate section ofthe ISOM unit. 
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Figure 5-l 0. Raffmate section of the ISOM unjt (CSB, 2007) 
The raffmate section of the ISOM unit consists of many components such as reboilers, heat 
exchangers, air cool condensers, raffmate splitter tower, reflux drum and blowdown drum. In 
present study we have focused on the three main components of raffinate splitter tower, the 
reflux drum and the blowdown drum. 
5.2.1.3. Raffinate Splitter Tower 
The raffinate splitter tower was a 52m vertical disti llation tower with a capacity of 586,100 L. 
Figure 5-10 shows the control systems included in the tower (CSB, 2007): 
• Automatic flow control valve: to adjust the feed rate of ljquid raffmate. 
• Level control Valve: to maintain a constant level in the tower. 
• Level transmitter: to di play the liquid level in the tower. 
• Site glass: to vi ually indicate liquid level in the tower. 
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• High and high-high level alarms 
• 3 parallel safety relief valves: located in the overhead vapour line and are activated at 40, 41 
and 42 Psig respectively. 
• Manual chain valve: bypasses the 3 safety relief valves 
5.2.1.4. Reflux Drum 
The reflux drum operated as a flooded drum and was equipped with the following control 
systems also displayed in Figure 5-10 (CSB, 2007). 
• 1.5 inch reflux bypass valve 
• Safety relief valve 
• Purge and vent valve 
5.2.1.5. Blowdown Drum 
The blowdown drum was designed to accept mixed liquid and/or vapor hydrocarbons from 
venting relief valves during unit upsets or following a unit shutdown. This unit was equipped 
with the following safety systems which may be seen in Figure 5-10 (CSB, 2007): 
• 2 Manual block valves 
• High level alarm 
• Level site glass 
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5.2.3. Accident Description 
The accident under study occurred on March 23, 2005 at 1:20 PM. The accident occurred during 
the start up of the ISOM unit killing 15, injuring 180 and resulting in a fmancial loss of $1.5 
billion (CSB, 2007). The detailed report on the accident is published by US Chemical Safety 
Board that may be accessed through the following link: 
http://www. chemsafety. gov/ index. cfm ?fo lder=comp leted investigations&page=info&INV ID= 
52 (last checked on April16, 2009). A simpler brief version is presented below. 
The accident occurred during the start-up of the ISOM unit. The raffmate section of the ISOM 
unit was shut down on Feb21, 2005 and the raffmate splitter tower was drained, gas freed and 
steamed out. During start up the raffinate tower was overfilled due to faulty readings from the 
level transmitter. Pressure relief devices opened overfilling the blowdown stack resulting in the 
release of a flammable liquid geyser from the blowdown drum which was not equipped with a 
flare. The release of flammables let to an explosion and fire (CSB, 2007). 
5.2.4. Dynamic Risk Assessment 
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, dynamic risk assessment is applied in 5 steps: 
5.2.4.1. Step 1: Scenario Identification 
The first step in Dynamic Risk Assessment approach is to identify the potential accident 
scenario. Accident scenario may be identified by a number of specifications such as the initiating 
abnormal event, possible end-states and safety barriers or protective layers involved. It is 
important in each scenario to clarify the definition of failure as without this defmition the 
methodology has no application. 
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As the accident in BP Texas City refinery has already occurred scenario identification was 
accomplished by reviewing the reports issued on the accident. According to the fmal report 
issued by CSB in 2007, the initial abnormal event is excess flow of liquid raffmate entering the 
splitter tower. Three possible end-states which may occur from this initiating event are process 
upsets (A), process shutdowns (B) and fluid release (C). Failure in this scenario is defmed as 
fluid release (C) which on fmding a source of ignition may lead to an explosion with severe 
consequences. The accident in BP Texas city was caused by a chain of events leading to an end-
state of category (C). 
Table 5-16 shows the failure probabilities of safety barriers of the ISOM unit involved in this 
scenario in terms of discrete values and distributions: 
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Failure frequency 
# Event Description Distribution Discrete Distribution parameters 
value 
a b 
1 Excess feed loading 0.08 Gamma 0.2 0.4 
Raffinate splitter tower control system: 
2 Failure oflevel transmitter 0.01 Beta 11 1089 
3 Failure of high level alarm 0.15 Beta 9 51 
4 Failure of level site glass 0.1 Beta 10 90 
5 Failure ofhigh high level alarm 0.15 Beta 9 51 
6 Failure of heavy raffrnate level 0.02 Beta 10 490 
control valve 
7 Failure of manual chain valve 0.2 Beta 2 8 bypassing the three relief valves 
8 Failure of first automatic safety 0.015 Beta 80 5253 
valve (set at 40 psig) 
9 Failure of second automatic safety 0.015 Beta 80 5253 
valve (set at 41 psig) 
10 Failure of third automatic safety 0.015 Beta 80 5253 
valve (set at 42 psig) 
Reflux drum 
11 Failure of 1.5 inch reflux bypass 0.02 Beta 9 441 
valve 
12 Failure of safety relief valve 0.015 Beta 80 5253 
13 Failure of vent and purge valve 0.02 Beta 10 490 
Blowdown drum 
14 Failure of 6 inch manual block 0.2 Beta 3 12 
valve chained open 
15 Failure ofhigh level alarm 0.15 Beta 9 51 
16 Failure of level site glass 0.1 Beta 10 90 
17 Failure of Manual block valve kept 0.2 Beta 2 8 
closed 
18 Failure ofESD valve 0.2 Beta 2 8 
Table 5-16. Failure probabilities of the ISOM unit safety barriers 
(Source: Plant specific data, safety expert feedback) 
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5.2.4.2. Step 2: Prior Function Calculation 
With all safety barriers and failure frequencies known the next step is to form the event tree for 
this scenario. Figure 5-11 shows part of the event tree for the ISOM unit. The complete event 
tree may be seen in Appendix C. From the event tree it is evident that a total of 190 possible end-
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Figure 5-11. Event tree of ISOM unit in BP Texas city refinery 
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The prior failure function of each safety system represents our knowledge about the system prior 
to the start of operation. If no knowledge is available an uninformative prior may be used. 
Herein, as shown in Table 5-16, the prior failure probabilities of each safety system is presented 
both as a discrete value and a probability density function of type Beta. Beta is generally selected 
to represent the failure probability of a system as this distribution is used to describe uncertainty 
about the occurrence of an event, given a number of trials "n" have been made with a number of 
recorded successes "s" (V ose, 2003). Parameters of these distributions are selected such that the 
mean values would match the discrete failure probabilities. Any prior end-state probability may 
be calculated by multiplying the failure probabilities of the relative safety barriers of each branch 
connecting the initial event to that particular end-state. 
5.2.4.3. Step 3: Formation of the likelihood function 
Up to this point dynamic risk assessment has followed the same procedure as a conventional 
quantitative risk assessment approach. However as discussed in Chapter 4, the novelty of this 
methodology begins with the formation of the likelihood function. This function is formed using 
real time data from the process as it operates which represent the number of near misses and 
incident which occur within the process during the period of study. 
In the BP Texas City case study ASP data are collected from the CBS 2007 report which has data 
records since 1994. These events have been divided into the two categories ofprocess shutdown 
(B) and release (C). Table 5-17 shows category C of these events. 
Many approaches exist for selecting likelihood functions, among the most convenient is using a 
conjugate pair of the prior function. Beta and binomial distributions are conjugate pairs and 
hence binomial distribution is selected to represent the likelihood function. This choice is 
convenient due to the fact that ASP data are specific numbers within a discrete domain which is 
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also best presented by a binomial distribution. Therefore the likelihood function may be defined 
as: 
Where f(Dataix) denotes the likelihood function, n is the total number of trials, s is the number of 
successes andfis the number of failures which can also be shown as n-s. 
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Date Description End-state 
115ft tall DIH tower filled with liquid, which lead to emergency 
relief valves opening to the ISOM blowdown system. A large 
12-Feb-94 amount of vapour was seen coming from the blowdown drum; Release 
high flammable vapour readings were measured at ground level 
in the area. The ISOM unit was shut down. 
Leaking DIH relief valves caused a similar accident as above that 
17-Feb-94 resulted in a vapour release out ofthe blowdown stack. A section Release 
ofiSOM unit was shut down. 
The ISOM stabilizer tower emergency relief valves opened 5 or 
27-Feb-94 6 times over 4 hours. A large vapour cloud was observed near Release 
ground level. 
An 8" chain vent valve off the raffrnate splitter tower overhead 
piping was inadvertently left open for over 20 hours during a 
08-May- raffrnate section start up resulting in a significant flammable 
95 vapour release out of the blowdown stack. Hydrocarbon vapours Release 
were reported as "pouring out" of the blowdown drum in the 
ISOM logbook and high flammable vapour readings were 
measured at ground level. The valve was eventually closed. 
04-0ct-98 Blowdown stack caught fire during stormy weather. Fire 
During partial ISOM unit shutdown that required draining liquid 
from process equipment into the blowdown system, the draining 
resulted in liquid flowing into the sewer system by way of the 
piping that was chained open off the drum to the sewer. The high 
16-Jan-99 level alarm on the blowdown drum below the outlet of the piping Release 
to the sewer should have been triggered by the rising high liquid 
level but was not. Underground sewer boxes designed to hold 
and separate out liquid hydrocarbons filled and released 
flammable vapours from the box seals. 
Fuelled by leaking pressure relief valves on the hydrogen steam 
23-Jul-00 drier the ISOM blowdown stack caught fire and continued to Fire 
burn over five 12 hour shifts. 
The DIH tower Pressure relief valves again lifted after a short 
25-Mar-04 loss of electric power to the ISOM unit resulting in a significant Release 
vapour cloud at or near ground level. 
Table 5-17. ASP data of category C rn BP Texas City refinery (CSB 2007) 
5.2.4.4. Step 4: Posterior Function Calculation 
Posterior failure function may be obtained from the pnor and likelihood functions using 
Bayesian inference. The posterior function can be formulated as shown below: 
f(xiData) ex: f(Datalx)f(x) 
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Wheref(x iData) is the posterior function, f(Data lx) is the likelihood function andf(x) is the prior. 
Therefore, for the ISOM unit of the BP Texas City refmery the posterior failure function may be 
shown as: 
It may be noted that the posterior function is the same distribution type as the prior (Beta) with 
the parameters updated by the likelihood function. The mean value of the posterior function 
which represents the failure probability of a protective layer in the event tree is updated from the 
. a a+s pnor mean of-b to b 1 a+ a+s+ + 
Posterior end-state probabilities may be obtained using the event tree approach. 
5.2.4.5. Step 5: Consequence Assessment 
To this point the previous sections demonstrate the probability assessment of the methodology. 
To develop the risk profile consequence assessment is also required. 
Consequence assessment is a straight forward approach as the consequence of an abnormal event 
is considered to remain constant throughout the lifetime ofthe process. 
In the BP case study the focus of consequence assessment is on asset loss and human fatality, the 
two categories in which the consequences were severe. Each group of end-states is matched with 
a severity class. The classifications and equivalent dollar value of damage are shown in Table 5-
18. 
With all posterior probabilities and their related consequences known, posterior risk is obtained 
by multiplying the posterior failure probability of each end-state by its related consequence. The 
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posterior risk profile may be developed over the period of study (1994-2005) as a function of 
time. 
End-State Category Severity Class Dollar value of damage 
A 1 $10,000.00 
B 2 $100,000.00 
c 4 $10,000,000.00 
Table 5-18. Classification of end-states in BP Texas city case study 
5.2.5. Results and Discussion 
The BP Texas City refinery has been analyzed using dynamic risk assessment methodology for a 
period of 11 years (1994-2005) as a mean to test and validate this approach as a predictive tool 
for accident occurrence. Abnormal events causing process upsets, shutdown and release were 
considered in this study for the development of the posterior risk profile. It is important to note 
that risk in present study is defmed for "failure" which is considered as release. Although other 
end-states may affect the risk, they are not considered as part of the risk profile. Furthermore, the 
analysis is conducted using publically available information of the BP Texas City refmery 
incident, which is sufficient to make scientifically valid conclusive observations. However, there 
may be confidential data that may refine or revise the risk profile which the authors do not have 
access to. For example, data on the number ofprocess upsets were not available throughout the 
11 years and therefore were not used in this study. Table 5-19 illustrates the results of the 
dynamic risk assessment over the period of 11 years. 
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r-- ------------------------------ ----
Years Risk($) B c 
0 1.04E+02 2.59E+03 
2.40E+02 1.33E+04 
2 4.35E+02 2.37E+04 
3 5.45E+02 2.72E+04 
4 7.52E+02 3.22E+04 
5 9.11E+02 4.25E+04 
6 1.21E+03 5.70E+04 
7 1.43E+03 6.79E+04 
8 1.72E+03 7.38E+04 
9 2.02E+03 . 7.91E+04 
10 2.30E+03 8.29E+04 
11 2.61E+03 9.66E+04 
Table 5-19. Risk values ofthe ISOM unit from 1994-2005 
Table 5-19 shows the risk associated with release is greater than process shutdown even at the 
beginning of the study (1994) and risk profiles (both unplanned shutdowns and release) increase 
by approximately one order of magnitude by the end of the 11 years (2005). Figure 5-12 shows 
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Figure 5-12. Risk profile of the ISOM unit 
The risk profile in Figure 5-12 is an indicator ofthe increasing risk of a release occurring within 
the system. This indicator shows that in the absence of a robust action plan, an accident of major 
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consequences ha a reasonable likelihood of occurrence. The increasing trend of the risk profile 
represents the common behavior of a degrading process system without a proper preventive or 
predictive maintenance plan. Implementing a precise maintenance plan for each unit which 
covers both preventive and reactive maintenance would significantly improve the risk profile. It 
is important to note that although the risk profile hown herein is developed without the ASP 
data of category A (process upsets) it still shows a significant increase over the 11 years. With 
data from safety audits and recorded near misses and incidents, the actual risk profile would 
likely show a more dramatic increasing trend for the arne duration. 
Dynamic risk as e sment i an important learning tool but is can also be u ed a a predictive tool 
to estimate accident likelihood within the next time interval. Figure 5-13 shows the failure 
frequency of the ISOM unit. 
Failure Probabilities 
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Figure 5-13. Failure frequency ofthe ISOM unit 
The slope of the trend line shown in Figure 5-13 represents the hazard rate, which is the 
probability of failure per unit time associated with the raffinate tower. This above equation could 
be used as a predictive tool to estimate the average occurrence probability of a release within the 
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different time intervals. As an example, the average probability of release in the 12 years may be 
obtained simply by substituting the value in the equation: 
p(t = 12) = 0.0008 X 12 - 0.0005 = 0.0091 
The above approach is very straight forward and easy to use, however there are disadvantages. 
According to the above equation failures are equally distributed over the time domain even 
though in reality the occurrence of failure over time is random. Also, with this equation it is only 
possible to calculate the average probability of one release over the next time period with the 
assumption that the system is behaving as good as it was before. To overcome this problem 
Poisson process may be used. Over longer periods of the time, for low likelihood events both 
results would converge. 
A Poisson process is a simple model of a stochastic point process. A stochastic point process is 
characterized by events occurring at instants distributed randomly over the time domain. Thus 
this model accounts for the randomness of release in a process. In a Poisson process the 
probability distribution of the number of failures in a time interval is (Ebeling, 2000): 
. (A.t)i e - .lt 
Pr(Nt = J) = .1 ]· 
Where j is number of releases in a time interval and A is the hazard rate. Therefore, according to 
the hazard rate model obtained from the dynamic risk assessment approach probability of j 
events occurring in t years will be: 
. (0.0008t)i e - (O.OOOBt) 
Pr(Nt = J) = .1 1· 
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To validate the model recorded data of the number of releases through the 11 years are used to 
calculate the probability of release in each time interval using both the linear approach and the 
Poisson process. The probability of a release in year 12 is calculated to demonstrate the 











Probability of release Probability of release 
by Linear Hazard Model Poisson Process 
Discrete Cumulative Discrete Cumulative 
3.00E-04 3.00E-04 8.00E-04 8.00E-04 
3.00E-04 6.00E-04 8.00E-04 1.60E-03 
3.00E-04 9.00E-04 8.00E-04 2.40E-03 
l.lOE-03 2.00E-03 1.60E-03 4.00E-03 
3.50E-03 5.50E-03 3.99E-03 7.99E-03 
4.30E-03 9.80E-03 4.79E-03 1.28E-02 
5.10E-03 1.49E-02 5.58E-03 1.84E-02 
8.30E-03 2.32E-02 8.76E-03 2.71E-02 
9.10E-03 3.23E-02 9.55E-03 3.67E-02 
Table 5-20. Occurrence probability of release in the ISOM unit 
(The last row is predictive results) 
As Table 5-20 indicates the likelihood ofrelease occurrence increases significantly with time. In 
the early stage there were significant difference in the release probabilities between the linear 
hazard model and the Poisson process based likelihood estimate. The linear hazard rate model 
gives a lower likelihood of release. However over longer periods (predictive year; shown by dark 
background) both models converges and give just above 3% chances of a release occurrence. 
This is a fairly high value by all standards. In fact from a process facility perspective, a release 
would be considered eminent. In a standard process facility, safety systems are designed to keep 
the release probability as low as one in ten thousand to one in hundred thousand. 
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5.2.6. Conclusion 
This study demonstrates the testing and application of the dynamic risk assessment method 
developed in earlier studies as a powerful learning tool with predictive abilities. This tool is 
heavily dependent on the incident and near miss data, the preciseness of the data dictate the 
accuracy of the approach and demonstrate the importance of a strong safety culture throughout 
the process facility and also monitoring and recording of the incident. Applicability ofthis tool to 
the BP case study shows that the accident was predictable and may have been prevented if 
dynamic risk assessment was applied to the process unit and a robust action plan was developed 
to resolve the issues. 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1. Summary 
This study has demonstrated the importance of the dynamic risk assessment approach in the 
process industries. After an overview of the concepts of QRA this work begins by a detailed 
description of the dynamic risk assessment approach using accident precursor data and Bayesian 
theory. The approach is then tested and validated by a study previously conducted on a 
pressurized water reactor as part of the U.S. regulatory commission. After validating the dynamic 
risk assessment model, the approach is applied to two case studies in order to demonstrate its 
ability as an updating and predictive tool in process facilities. 
The first study was on the process facility of an offshore oil and gas platform This tool 
established convincing results by determining the risk profile of each unit in the time frame and 
therefore identifying the most critical unit of the process using the accident precursor data. Also, 
the predictive abilities of the model were demonstrated by calculating the number of abnormal 
events in the next time interval. 
The second study was based on the BP Texas City accident in 2005. Using the ASP data from 
the reports issued on the event, the risk profile of the process unit was obtained and revised 
throughout its lifetime. The results of this study was also encouraging as it demonstrated that the 
accident was predictable and may have been prevented if the dynamic risk assessment model was 
applied to the process in time. 
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The case studies show great potential in the dynamic risk assessment approach as a predictive 
tool to be incorporated in quantitative risk assessment and management in the near future. 
6.2. Conclusion 
This study shows that the dynamic risk assessment approach is a powerful tool with updating and 
predicting abilities which can be applied successfully to the process industry. The methodology 
may be used as part of a QRA approach to develop the real time risk profile of a process based 
on the number and type of deviations, incidents, or near misses. Therefore, it is clear that the tool 
is heavily dependent on the ASP data, in other words, the preciseness of the data dictates the 
accuracy of the approach. This emphasises more on the importance of a strong safety culture 
throughout the process facility to monitor and record all abnormal events experience by the 
process including process upsets, near misses and incidents. With a strong safety culture in place, 
the application of this tool assures the availability of the real time risk profile of the process. 
Using the real time risk profile along with a predictive model would help in rectifying issues 
early on before they escalate to accident. These abilities make this tool very valuable for risk 
management and decision makers. 
6.3. Future Work 
It is important to note that this study does not cover the following aspects: 
• Data dependencies 
• Expertise required to model and interpret results 
• The need for precise process system model (prior information) 
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• Modelling uncertainties 
• Parameter reliability 
This work may be improves through: 
• Non-conjugate prior-posterior distributions: so far in this work to avoid complexity in 
calculations, all prior-posterior distributions are selected as conjugate pairs. Hence it is 
required to investigate other types of prior distributions and their effects on the posterior 
function. 
• Empirical distributions 
• Linking event and fault trees for integrated dynamic risk simulation. 
Details on the specific aspects of the recommended work scopes such as accident precursor data 
in terms of discrete event happening over intervals of time, initiating event frequency, and past 
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APPENDIX A 
Risk assessment of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) plant 
Event Priors Event Posteriors 
Events 
Original Data Mean Values Original Data Mean Values 
PO l.OOE-01 l.OOE-01 5.83E-02 5.83E-02 
Pl 3.00E-Ol 3.00E-Ol 3.00E-Ol 3.00E-Ol 
P2 l.OOE+OO l.OOE+OO l.OOE+OO l.OOE+OO 
P3 2.28E-03 2.28E-03 2.26E-03 2.26E-03 
P4A 9.88E-05 9.88E-05 9.88E-05 9.88E-05 
P4B 1.70E-02 1.70E-02 1.59E-02 1.59E-02 
P5 9.60E-01 9.60E-Ol 8.89E-Ol 8.26E-Ol 
P6A 3.30E-04 3.30E-04 3.30E-04 3.30E-04 
P6B 3.00E-02 3.00E-02 2.81E-02 3.00E-02 
P7 7.70E-Ol 7.70E-Ol 7.70E-Ol 7.70E-Ol 
PSA 5.90E-Ol 5.90E-01 5.90E-01 5.90E-01 
PSB 6.09E-02 6.09E-02 6.09E-02 6.09E-02 
P9A 2.52E-04 2.52E-04 2.52E-04 2.52E-04 
P9B l.OOE-02 l.OOE-02 l.OOE-02 l.OOE-02 
PlO l.lSE-03 l.ISE-03 l.lSE-03 l.lSE-03 
Pll O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO 
P12 9.30E-05 9.30E-05 9.30E-05 9.30E-05 
.. Table A-1. Single event probabilities, dynamic nsk assessment approach vs. the ongmal data 
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End Prior End-state probabilities Posterior End-state probabilities 
States Original Data Mean values Original data Mean values 
3-CD 3.7E- l l 3.67E- l l 5.9E-l l 5.92E-l l 
4-CD 4.5E-10 4.54E-10 7.3E- 10 7.33E-10 
5-CD l.OE- 10 9.97E- l l 1.6E-10 1.61E-10 
8-CD 2.7E-10 2.72E-10 1.6E- 10 1.58E-10 
9-CD O.OE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OE+OO O.OOE+OO 
10-CD 3.4E-09 3.36E-09 2.0E-09 1.96E-09 
11-CD 3.0E-08 2.96E-08 1.7E-08 1.72E-08 
13-CD 2.3E- l l 2.29E-ll 7. 1E-l l 3.66E-ll 
14-CD 2.8E-10 2.83E-10 8.8E-10 4.53E-10 
15-CD 6.2E-ll 6.21E-ll 1.9E-10 9.94E-11 
16-CD 3.5E-07 3.54E-07 5.6E-09 5.67E-07 
18-CD 1.2E-07 1.22E-07 2.0E-07 1.96E-07 
19-CD 8.1E-08 8.07E-08 1.2E-07 1.29E-07 
21-CD 5.7E-10 5.66E-IO 5.8E- l0 3.03E-l0 
22-CD 7.0E-09 7.00E-09 7.3E-09 3.75E-09 
23-CD l.SE-09 1.54E-09 1.6E-09 8.22E-10 
24-CD 8.8E-06 8.76E-06 1.6E-06 4.69E-06 
26-CD 3.0E-06 3.03E-06 1.6E-06 1.62E-06 
27-CD 1.2E-06 1.16E-06 6.3E-07 6.28E-07 
. .. . . Table A-2. End-state probabilities, dynamic nsk assessment approach vs. the ongmal data 
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~OOP I R~or Th I EP AFW POR1l I ~OR\1 Res.~!? I SEAL lDCA I EP lle.co"-ery I HPI PORV End 5 t"" Enlf..:ta~ proba: 
UlOE..OO OK 1 1.2CE.()3 
0 .04 
LOOE+OO OK 2 3.95£-()7 
1..00£+00 0.999 I 
1.00Et00 I I 93DE.()5 ro ~ 3.67E·11 
0.998 BDE-()4 I I 0.001 ro 4 ... 54£·10 
I Du .()4 C1> 5 9.97£·11 
0..96 OK 6 2.87E-02 
LOOE+OO OK 7 2.92E-06 
1.00 I 
0.999 I I 93DE-.()5 ro 8 2.72E·10 
1.00 0.99 I I 0.00 CD 9 O.OOEtOO 
I 0.001 CD 10 3.31i£-09 
9 .8f.E.()5 
0..01 ro 11 2.91i£-OB 
l.OOE+OO OK 12 2.Sillf-07 
0.999 I 
0..030 l.OOE+OO I 1 93DE.()5 CD B 2.29f-1l 
0..410 I I 0.001 co 14 uaE-10 
0.130 I I 2..5 u .()4 co 15 6 .21E·1l 
I 0.590 co 16 3.54£-07 
9_70[.()1 
0.939 0 1( 17 1.S9E-06 
O.D4 o.no I 
I 0.061 CD 18 l.22E-07 
3..00[.()2 ro 19 8.07Hl8 
LOOE+OO 0 1( 20 6 .0BE-06 
0 .983 0.999 I 
l.OOE+OO I 1 9..30!.()5 CD 2l 3 .61i£·10 
0 .410 I I 0.001 co 22 7.00E-09 
0.230 I I 2..52E.()4 ro 23 1.54£-09 
0.002 I 0.590 C1> 24 S.71i£-06 
0.96 
0 .9 39 01( 25 4.67£-05 
o.no I 
I 0.061 CD 26 3.03E-06 
0.017 ro 27 1.11i£-06 
0.00 01( 28 0..00£+00 
Figure A-1. Prior end-state probability calculation using event tree 
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L......:;;LOO;;.;;.;.P _ _.I~,;~~.e:,;;;;;;;Kto=r..;.T;.;!rip~;,~IL.-...;EP;;....__.,_.;;Af';..l:.:.f_.L..:..PO;;R:;:.:N;......JIL..:.;POR:;::.:. ~' R.::;.e~~:rt:,::i'l~ ~..;s::EA::;:.::,;li!:::OCA;.::;;..&I.:~::..:;;.Re:::co::;.:;:•-e;:,iryUIL.-...;H.:.:.P.:..I_L....:.:.:.:.R ....Ii....:POR.=:.:.:.'l....L-.:~::;:;.:.......11 •End 5-mtes 
1nOE+OO 0 1 
0.17.:12.86 
l .OOE+OO 0 1( 2 
1.00E-oo 0.999 I 
LOOE-oo I I 9 .. 3oE-Os co 3 
0.998 BilE"~ I I 0:00•1 co ¢ 
I 2.S2E-04 co 5 
0"825714 0 11( 6 
l .OOE+OO 0 1( 7 
1.00 I 
o.m 1 I !UOE-<lS co 8 
1 .. 00 0.99 I I a.oo co 9 
I O.OOl co 10 
USE .OS 
om. co u 
1.00E+OO 0 1( u 
0.999 I 
0.017 LOOE-oo I I 9.3oE-Os CD l3 
OAlO I I 0.001 co 14 
0.230 I I 2.S2E-04 co 15 
I 0.590 co 16 
9.7«"01 
0.9:39 0 11( 17 
0.1742.86 o.no I 
I 0.()61 co 18 
3-<IOE-02 co 19 
l .OOE+OO 0 11( 20 
0.9~ 0.999 I 
LOOE-oo I I !UOE-{)5 co 21 
OA10 I I o.oot CD 22 
0.230 I I l.SlE-04 CD 23 
0.002 I 0.590 co 24 
~25714 
0.'9:39 0 11( 25 
0.770 I 
I 0..()61 co 26 
0.016 co 27 
0.00 0 28 
Figure A-2. Posterior end-state probability calculation using event tree 
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Table A-3. Consequence severity table 
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---------- - ----------------------------- ------
End Severity Prior Risk Estimation Posterior Risk Estimation 
States Class Original Data Mean values Original data Mean values 
3-CD 4 3.70E-04 3.67E-04 5.90E-04 5.92E-04 
4-CD 4 4.50E-03 4.54£-03 7.30E-03 7.33£-03 
5-CD 4 9.97£-04 9.97£-04 1.60£-03 1.61£-03 
8-CD 4 2.72£-03 2.72E-03 1.60E-03 1.58£-03 
9-CD 4 O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO O.OOE+OO 
10-CD 4 3.36E-02 3.36E-02 2.00£-02 1.9,6£-02 
11-CD 4 2.96E-01 2.96£-01 1.70£-01 1.72£-01 
13-CD 5 2.29£-03 2.29£-03 7.10£-03 3.66£-03 
14-CD 5 2.83£-02 2.83£-02 8.80£-02 4.53£-02 
15-CD 5 6.21£-03 6.21£-03 1.90£-02 9.94£-03 
16-CD 5 3.54E+01 3.54E+01 5.60£-01 5.67E+01 
18-CD 5 1.22E+01 1.22E+01 2.00E+01 1.96E+01 
19-CD 4 8.07£-01 8.07E-01 1.20E+OO 1.29E+OO 
21-CD 5 5.66£-02 5.66E-02 5.80£-02 3.03£-02 
22-CD 5 7.00£-01 7.00£-01 7.30£-01 3.75E-01 
23-CD 5 1.54£-01 1.54£-01 1.60£-01 8.22E-02 
24-CD 5 8.76E+02 8.76E+02 1.60E+02 4.69E+02 
26-CD 4 3.03E+01 3.03E+01 1.60E+01 1.62E+01 
27-CD 4 1.16E+01 1.16E+01 6.30E+OO 6.28E+OO 




Dynamic Risk Assessment of an Offshore Process facility 
B.l. Separator: 
Years F2 I S2 F3 S3 F4 S4 FS ss F6 S6 F7 S7 F8 S8 F9 S9 FlO SIO Fll Sll 
I 30 36 32 4 29 33 26 7 42 13 16 26 19 7 23 12 9 14 0 9 
2 57 67 59 8 59 57 44 13 81 22 28 53 38 15 40 26 16 24 0 16 
3 84 97 87 10 88 83 63 20 121 30 41 80 55 25 59 37 25 34 0 25 
4 Ill 126 11 2 14 11 4 109 85 24 161 38 57 104 73 31 79 51 35 44 0 35 
5 131 149 132 17 132 131 102 29 188 46 69 119 84 35 95 58 43 52 0 43 
Table B-1. Number of failure/success of separator safety systems m the 5 year penod 
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Event a+F b+S Mean Value 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2 40 67 94 121 141 426 457 487 516 539 0.0858 0.1279 0.1618 0.1900 0.2074 
3 41 68 96 121 141 445 449 451 455 458 0.0844 0.1315 0.1755 0.2101 0.2354 
4 40 70 99 125 143 572 596 622 648 670 0.0654 0.1051 0.1373 0.1617 0.1759 
5 38 56 75 97 114 595 601 608 612 617 0.0600 0.0852 0.1098 0.1368 0.1560 
6 62 101 141 181 208 278.71 287.71 295.71 303.71 311.71 0.1820 0.2598 0.3229 0.3734 0.4002 
7 26 38 51 67 79 516 543 570 594 609 0.0480 0.0654 0.0821 0.1014 0.1148 
8 99 118 135 153 164 53260.33 53268.33 53278.33 53284.33 53288.33 0.0019 0.0022 0.0025 0.0029 0.0031 
9 33 50 69 89 105 502 516 527 541 548 0.0617 0.0883 0.1158 0.1413 0.1608 
10 18 25 34 44 52 65 75 85 95 103 0.2169 0.2500 0.2857 0.3165 0.3355 
11 2 2 2 2 2 17 24 33 43 51 0.1053 0.0769 0.0571 0.0444 0.0377 
Table B-2. Posterior parameter of beta distribution and mean value for separator safety systems over the 5 year period 
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Prior Posterior Frequency 
End-state Category Severity Dollar value Frequency level I 2 3 4 5 
I A I $ 10,000.00 9.56E-O I 8.37E-O I 7.57E-01 6.91E-01 6.40E-0 1 6.06E-OI 
2 A I $ 10,000.00 1.87E-02 6.78E-02 9.39E-02 1.13E-OI 1.23E-O I IJOE-01 
3 A I $ 10,000.00 3.55E-04 3.54E-03 6.48E-03 9.44E-03 1.22E-02 1.44E-02 
4 A I $ 10,000.00 2.62E-05 7.48E-04 2.12E-03 4.12E-03 6.53E-03 8.47E-03 
5 A I $10,000.00 3.85E-08 1.3 1 E-06 4.28E-06 9.23E-06 1.6 1 E-05 2. 19E-05 
6 B 2 $100,000.00 6.69E-IO 6.72E-08 3.1 1E-07 8.63E-07 1.8 1 E-06 2.79E-06 
7 B 2 $ 100,000.00 9.44E-11 1.66E-08 9.57E-08 3.26E-07 8.01 E-07 1.35E-06 
8 c 4 $3,000,000.00 2.36E-11 1.96E-09 7.98E-09 1.97E-08 3.73E-08 5.31 E-08 
9 A I $ 10,000.00 5.24E-07 3.54E-05 1.36E-04 3.27E-04 6.34E-04 9.25E-04 
10 B 2 $ 100,000.00 9. 10E-09 1.82E-06 9.85E-06 3.06E-05 7.13E-05 1.18E-04 
II B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.28E-09 4.52E-07 3.03E-06 1.15E-05 3. 16E-05 5.72E-05 
12 c 4 $3,000,000.00 3.21E-IO 5.32E-08 2.53E-07 6.98E-07 1.47E-06 2.24E-06 
13 A I $10,000.00 3.63E-04 4.12E-03 8.92E-03 1.37E-02 1.72E-02 1.97E-02 
14 A I $ 10,000.00 2.67E-05 8.72E-04 2.92E-03 5.97E-03 9.21 E-03 1. 16E-02 
15 B 2 $ 100,000.00 3.93E-08 1.52E-06 5.90E-06 1.34E-05 2.27E-05 2.99E-05 
16 B 2 $ 100,000.00 6.82E- IO 7.83E-08 4.29E-07 1.25E-06 2.55E-06 3.8 1 E-06 
17 B 2 $ 100,000.00 9.63E-I I 1.94E-08 1.32E-07 4.72E-07 1.13E-06 1.85E-06 
18 c 4 $3,000,000.00 2.4 1E-11 2.28E-09 1.1 OE-08 2.86E-08 5.25E-08 7.26E-08 
19 A I $ 10,000.00 5.35E-07 4.13E-05 1.87E-04 4.74E-04 8.94E-04 1.27E-03 
20 B 2 $ 100,000.00 9.28E-09 2. 13E-06 1.36E-05 4.43E-05 1.01 E-04 1.6 1 E-04 
2 1 B 2 $ 100,000.00 IJIE-09 5.27E-07 4.18E-06 1.67E-05 4.45E-05 7.83E-05 
22 c 4 $3,000,000.00 3.28E-IO 6.20E-08 3.48E-07 1.01 E-06 2.07E-06 3.07E-06 
23 A I $ 10,000.00 2.40E-02 7.54E-02 1.05E-01 1.24E-O I 1.37E-O I 1.44E-O I 
24 A I $ 10,000.00 4.56E-04 3.94E-03 7.22E-03 1.04E-02 1.37E-02 1.60E-02 
25 A I $ 10,000.00 3.36E-05 8.33E-04 2.36E-03 4.53E-03 7.29E-03 9.4 1E-03 
26 A I $ 10,000.00 4.94E-08 1.45E-06 4.77E-06 1.02E-05 1.80E-05 2.43E-05 
27 B 2 $ 100,000.00 8.57E-10 7.48E-08 3.47E-07 9.49E-07 2.02E-06 3. 10E-06 
28 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.21E-IO 1.85E-08 1.07E-07 3.58E-07 8.94E-07 1.50E-06 
29 c 4 $3,000,000.00 3.03E-II 2. 18E-09 8.89E-09 2.17E-08 4. 16E-08 5.90E-08 
30 A I $ 10,000.00 6.72E-07 3.94E-05 1.51E-04 3.59E-04 7.08E-04 1.03E-03 
31 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.17E-08 2.03E-06 I.IOE-05 3.36E-05 7.96E-05 1.3 1 E-04 
32 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.65E-09 5.03E-07 3.38E-06 1.27E-05 3.52E-05 6.36E-05 
33 c 4 $3,000,000.00 4 .12E-10 5.92E-08 2.82E-07 7.68E-07 1.64E-06 2.49E-06 
34 A I $ 10,000.00 4.65E-04 4.59E-03 9.95E-03 1.50E-02 1.92E-02 2.19E-02 
35 A I $ 10,000.00 3.42E-05 9.70E-04 3.26E-03 6.57E-03 1.03E-02 1.29E-02 
36 A I $ 10,000.00 5.04E-08 1.69E-06 6.58E-06 1.47E-05 2.53E-05 3.33E-05 
37 B 2 $ 100,000.00 8.75E-10 8.71E-08 4.78E-07 1.38E-06 2.85E-06 4.24E-06 
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Prior Posterior Frequency 
End-state Category Severity Dollar value Frequency s level I 2 3 4 
38 B 2 $100,000.00 1.23E-10 2.16E-08 1.47E-07 5.19E-07 1.26E-06 2.06E-06 
39 c 4 $3,000,000.00 3.09E-11 2.54E-09 1.23E-08 3.15E-08 5.87E-08 8.07E-08 
40 A I $10,000.00 6.86E-07 4.60E-05 2.08E-04 5.21 E-04 9.98E-04 1.41E-03 
4 1 B 2 $100,000.00 1.1 9E-08 2.37E-06 1.5 1E-05 4.87E-05 1.12E-04 1.79E-04 
42 B 2 $100,000.00 1.68E-09 5.86E-07 4.66E-06 1.84E-05 4.97E-05 8.70E-05 
43 c 4 $3,000,000.00 4.20E-10 6.90E-08 3.88E-07 I.IIE-06 2.31 E-06 3.4 1E-06 
.. Table B-3. End-state probabthttes for the separator over the 5 year penod 
Prior Risk 
Posterior Risk 
End-state Category Severity level Dollar value I 2 3 4 s 
I A I $10,000.00 9.56E+03 8.37E+03 7.57E+03 6.9 1E+03 6.40E+03 6.06E+03 
2 A I $ 10,000.00 1.87E+02 6.78E+02 9.39E+02 1.1 3E+03 1.23E+03 1.30E+03 
3 A I $ 10,000.00 3.55E+OO 3.54E+O I 6.48E+OI 9.44E+OI 1.22E+02 1.44E+02 
4 A I $ 10,000.00 2.62E-01 7.48E+OO 2. 12E+O I 4.12E+OI 6.53E+O I 8.47E+O I 
5 A I $ 10,000.00 3.85E-04 IJ IE-02 4.28E-02 9.23E-02 1.61E-0 1 2.19E-O I 
6 B 2 $100,000.00 6.69E-05 6.72E-03 3.11 E-02 8.63E-02 1.81E-01 2.79E-OI 
7 B 2 $100,000.00 9.44E-06 1.66E-03 9.57E-03 3.26E-02 8.01E-02 1.35E-O I 
8 c 4 $3,000,000.00 7.08E-05 5.88E-03 2.39E-02 5.92E-02 1.12E-0 1 1.59E-O I 
9 A I $10,000.00 5.24E-03 3.54E-O I 1.36E+OO 3.27E+OO 6.34E+OO 9.25E+OO 
10 B 2 $100,000.00 9.10E-04 1.82E-O I 9.85E-0 1 3.06E+OO 7.13E+OO 1.1 8E+O I 
II B 2 $100,000.00 1.28E-04 4.52E-02 3.03E-O I 1.15E+OO 3.16E+OO 5.72E+OO 
12 c 4 $3,000,000.00 9.63E-04 1.60E-O I 7.58E-O I 2. 10E+OO 4.40E+OO 6.73E+OO 
13 A I $ 10,000.00 3.63E+OO 4.12E+OI 8.92E+OI 1.37E+02 1.72E+02 1.97E+02 
14 A I $ 10,000.00 2.67E-01 8.72E+OO 2.92E+O I 5.97E+OI 9.2 1E+O I 1.1 6E+02 
15 B 2 $100,000.00 3.93E-03 1.52E-01 5.90E-01 1.34E+OO 2.27E+OO 2.99E+OO 
16 B 2 $100,000.00 6.82E-05 7.83E-03 4.29E-02 1.25E-O I 2.55E-01 3.8 1 E-01 
17 B 2 $100,000.00 9.63E-06 1.94E-03 1.32E-02 4.72E-02 1.13E-O I 1.85E-01 
18 c 4 $3,000,000.00 7.22E-05 6.84E-03 3.30E-02 8.58E-02 1.58E-OI 2.18E-O I 
19 A I $ 10,000.00 5.35E-03 4.13E-O I 1.87E+OO 4.74E+OO 8.94E+OO 1.27E+OI 
20 B 2 $100,000.00 9.28E-04 2. 13E-O I 1.36E+OO 4.43E+OO I.OIE+OI 1.61E+OI 
21 B 2 $100,000.00 1.31 E-04 5.27E-02 4.18E-O I 1.67E+OO 4.45E+OO 7.83E+OO 
22 c 4 $3,000,000.00 9.83E-04 1.86E-O I 1.04E+OO 3.04E+OO 6.21E+OO 9.2 1E+OO 
23 A I $ 10,000.00 2.40E+02 7.54E+02 1.05E+03 1.24E+03 1.37E+03 1.44E+03 
24 A I $ 10,000.00 4.56E+OO 3.94E+O I 7.22E+O I 1.04E+02 1.37E+02 1.60E+02 
91 
Prior Risk Posterior Risk 
End-state Category Severity level Dollar value I 2 3 4 5 
25 A I $10,000.00 3.36E-01 8.33E+OO 2.36E+OI 4.53E+OI 7.29E+OI 9.41E+OI 
26 A I $ 10,000.00 4.94E-04 1.45E-02 4.77E-02 1.02E-01 1.80E-OI 2.43E-O I 
27 B 2 $ 100,000.00 8.57E-05 7.48E-03 3.47E-02 9.49E-02 2.02E-01 3.10E-0 1 
28 B 2 $100,000.00 1.21 E-05 1.85E-03 I.O?E-02 3.58E-02 8.94E-02 1.50E-O I 
29 c 4 $3,000,000.00 9.08E-05 6.54E-03 2.67E-02 6.51 E-02 1.25E-O I 1.77E-O I 
30 A I $ 10,000.00 6.72E-03 3.94E-OI 1.51 E+OO 3.59E+OO 7.08E+OO 1.03E+OI 
3 1 B 2 $100,000.00 1.17E-03 2.03E-OI I.I OE+OO 3.36E+OO 7.96E+OO 1.31E+OI 
32 B 2 $100,000.00 1.65E-04 5.03E-02 3.38E-O I 1.27E+OO 3.52E+OO 6.36E+OO 
33 c 4 $3,000,000.00 1.23E-03 1.78E-O I 8.45E-0 1 2.30E+OO 4.92E+OO 7.48E+OO 
34 A I $ 10,000.00 4.65E+OO 4.59E+OI 9.95E+OI 1.50E+02 1.92E+02 2.1 9E+02 
35 A I $10,000.00 3.42E-01 9.70E+OO 3.26E+O I 6.57E+OI 1.03E+02 1.29E+02 
36 A I $10,000.00 5.04E-04 1.69E-02 6.58E-02 1.47E-O I 2.53E-O I 3.33E-O I 
37 B 2 $100,000.00 8.75E-05 8.71 E-03 4.78E-02 1.38E-OI 2.85E-OI 4.24E-O I 
38 B 2 $100,000.00 1.23E-05 2.16E-03 1.47E-02 5.19E-02 1.26E-OI 2.06E-O I 
39 c 4 $3,000,000.00 9.26E-05 7.62E-03 3.68E-02 9.44E-02 1.76E-OI 2.42E-O I 
40 A I $10,000.00 6.86E-03 4.60E-O I 2.08E+OO 5.21E+OO 9.98E+OO 1.41E+OI 
4 1 B 2 $100,000.00 1.19E-03 2.37E-O I 1.51 E+OO 4.87E+OO 1.12E+OI 1.79E+OI 
42 B 2 $100,000.00 1.68E-04 5.86E-02 4.66E-01 1.84E+OO 4.97E+OO 8.70E+OO 
43 c 4 $3,000,000.00 1.26E-03 2.07E-0 1 1.16E+OO 3.34E+OO 6.93E+OO 1.02E+OI 
Table B-4. Risk values for the separator over the 5 year penod 
B.2. Compressor: 
Years F2 S2 F3 S3 F4 S4 F5 S5 F6 S6 F7 S7 F8 S8 F9 S9 
1 7 19 10 2 13 4 0 13 6 7 3 4 5 4 0 5 
2 14 35 17 4 24 7 0 24 11 13 7 6 9 9 0 9 
3 24 54 25 5 39 10 1 38 17 21 13 8 13 17 1 12 
4 32 70 31 7 51 12 2 49 22 27 18 9 18 22 3 15 
5 35 77 34 8 56 13 2 54 24 30 20 10 22 22 3 19 




b+S Mean value 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2 17 24 34 42 45 409 425 444 460 467 0.0399 0.0535 0.0711 0.0837 0.0879 
3 19 26 34 40 43 443 445 446 448 449 0.0411 0.0552 0.0708 0.0820 0.0874 
4 24 35 50 62 67 543 546 549 551 552 0.0423 0.0602 0.0835 0.1011 0.1082 
5 1 1 2 3 3 112 123 137 148 153 0.0088 0.0081 0.0144 0.0199 0.0192 
6 16 21 27 32 34 497 503 511 517 520 0.0312 0.0401 0.0502 0.0583 0.0614 
7 83 87 93 98 100 53257.33 53259.33 53261.33 53262.33 53263.33 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0018 0.0019 
8 14 18 22 27 31 55 60 68 73 73 0.2029 0.2308 0.2444 0.2700 0.2981 
9 2 2 3 5 5 13 17 20 23 27 0.1333 0.1053 0.1304 0.1786 0.1563 





End-state Category Severity level Dollar value I 2 3 4 5 
I A I $10,000.00 9.56E-O I 9.2 1E-01 8.94E-0 1 8.63E-01 8.41 E-0 1 8.32E-01 
2 A I $10,000.00 1.91 E-02 3.78E-02 4.91 E-02 6.03E-02 6.75E-02 ?.I I E-02 
3 A I $10,000.00 3.78E-04 1.60E-03 2.99E-03 5.13E-03 ?.OOE-03 7.93E-03 
4 B 2 $ 100,000.00 4.82E-07 1.99E-06 3.76E-06 6.77E-06 9.40E-06 1.04E-05 
5 B 2 $ 100,000.00 6.81 E-08 4.39E-07 1.01 E-06 1.90E-06 2.86E-06 3.74E-06 
6 c 2 $ 100,000.00 1.70E-08 6.76E-08 1.19E-07 2.86E-07 6.21 E-07 6.93E-07 
7 B 2 $ 100,000.00 6.56E-06 4. 12E-05 9.63E-05 2.05E-04 3.17E-04 3.65E-04 
8 B 2 $ 100,000.00 9.27E-07 9.09E-06 2.58E-05 5.77E-05 9.63E-05 1.31 E-04 
9 c 2 $ 100,000.00 2.32E-07 1.40E-06 3.04E-06 8.66E-06 2.09E-05 2.42E-05 
10 c 2 $ 100,000.00 3.90E-06 1.48E-05 2.54E-05 7.90E-05 1.51 E-04 1.66E-04 
II A I $10,000.00 2.45E-02 3.82E-02 5.02E-02 6.52E-02 7.52E-02 7.84E-02 
12 A I $10,000.00 4.84E-04 1.62E-03 3.06E-03 5.55E-03 7.80E-03 8.74E-03 
13 B 2 $ 100,000.00 6.19E-07 2.01 E-06 3.85E-06 7.32E-06 1.05E-05 1.15E-05 
14 B 2 $ 100,000.00 8.73E-08 4.44E-07 1.03E-06 2.06E-06 3.18E-06 4.13E-06 
15 c 2 $ 100,000.00 2. 18E-08 6.83E-08 1.21E-07 3.09E-07 6.92E-07 7.64E-07 
16 B 2 $ 100,000.00 8.42E-06 4. 16E-05 9.85E-05 2.22E-04 3.53E-04 4.02E-04 
17 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.19E-06 9.18E-06 2.64E-05 6.24E-05 I.O? E-04 1.44E-04 
18 c 2 $ 100,000.00 2.97E-07 1.4 1 E-06 3. 11E-06 9.36E-06 2.33E-05 2.67E-05 
19 c 2 $ 100,000.00 5.00E-06 1.49E-05 2.60E-05 8.54E-05 1.68E-04 1.83E-04 




End-state Category Severity level Dollar value I 2 3 4 5 
I A I $ 10,000.00 9.56E+03 9.2 1E+03 8.94E+03 8.63E+03 8.41E+03 8.32E+03 
2 A I $10,000.00 1.91 E+02 3.78E+02 4.91E+02 6.03E+02 6.75E+02 7.11E+02 
3 A 1 $10,000.00 3.78E+OO 1.60E+OI 2.99E+Ol 5.13E+Ol 7.00E+Ol 7.93E+Ol 
4 B 2 $100,000.00 4.82E-02 1.99E-O l 3.76E-O l 6.77E-O l 9.40E-O l 1.04E+OO 
5 B 2 $100,000.00 6.8 1 E-03 4.39E-02 1.01 E-01 1.90E-O I 2.86E-O l 3.74E-O l 
6 c 2 $100,000.00 l.?OE-03 6.76E-03 1.19E-02 2.86E-02 6.2 1 E-02 6.93E-02 
7 B 2 $100,000.00 6.56E-0 1 4.1 2E+OO 9.63E+OO 2.05E+Ol 3. 17E+Ol 3.65E+O l 
8 B 2 $100,000.00 9.27E-02 9.09E-01 2.58E+OO 5.77E+OO 9.63E+OO 1.31E+O I 
9 c 2 $100,000.00 2.32E-02 1.40E-O I 3.04E-Ol 8.66E-O I 2.09E+OO 2.42E+OO 
10 c 2 $100,000.00 3.90E-OI 1.48E+OO 2.54E+OO 7.90E+OO 1.5 1E+O I 1.66E+Ol 
II A I $ 10,000.00 2.45E+02 3.82E+02 5.02E+02 6.52E+02 7.52E+02 7.84E+02 
12 A I $ 10,000.00 4.84E+OO 1.62E+OI 3.06E+OI 5.55E+Ol 7.80E+O I 8.74E+O l 
13 B 2 $100,000.00 6. 19E-02 2.0 1E-0 1 3.85E-O I 7.32E-O I 1.05E+OO 1.1 5E+OO 
14 B 2 $100,000.00 8.73E-03 4.44E-02 1.03E-O l 2.06E-O I 3. 18E-O I 4.13E-O l 
15 c 2 $100,000.00 2. 18E-03 6.83E-03 1.21 E-02 3.09E-02 6.92E-02 7.64E-02 
16 B 2 $100,000.00 8.42E-0 1 4. 16E+OO 9.85E+OO 2.22E+OI 3.53E+OI 4.02E+OI 
17 B 2 $100,000.00 1.1 9E-O I 9. 18E-OI 2.64E+OO 6.24E+OO 1.07E+Ol 1.44E+O I 
18 c 2 $100,000.00 2.97E-02 1.4 1E-Ol 3.11 E-O l 9.36E-O I 2.33E+OO 2.67E+OO 
19 c 2 $100,000.00 S.OOE-01 1.49E+OO 2.60E+OO 8.54E+OO 1.68E+OI 1.83E+O I 
Table B-8. Risk values for the compressor over the 5 year penod 
B.3. Flash Drum 
Years F2 S2 F3 S3 F4 S4 F5 S5 F6 S6 F7 S7 FS ss F9 S9 FlO SlO 
1 16 26 21 5 15 22 19 3 2 32 25 7 11 15 4 7 0 3 
2 28 45 37 8 27 38 32 6 2 57 44 13 22 23 10 12 0 9 
3 40 65 55 10 41 54 45 9 3 83 64 19 35 31 16 19 0 14 
4 57 84 70 14 55 72 60 12 4 111 84 27 46 40 22 24 0 20 
5 69 101 86 15 64 91 75 16 7 132 101 31 57 47 29 28 1 25 
Table B-9. Number of failure/success of flash drum safety systems m the 5 year penod 
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a+F b+S Mean values 
Event 
1 2 3 4 5 I 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2 26.00 38.00 50.00 67.00 79.00 416.00 435.00 455.00 474.00 491.00 0.0705 0.0803 0.0990 0.1238 0.1386 
3 30.00 46.00 64.00 79.00 95.00 446.00 449.00 451.00 455.00 456.00 0.0804 0.0929 0.1243 0.1479 0.1724 
4 26.00 38.00 52.00 66.00 75.00 561.00 577.00 593.00 611.00 630.00 0.0705 0.0618 0.0806 0.0975 0.1064 
5 29.00 42.00 55.00 70.00 85.00 493 .00 496.00 499.00 502.00 506.00 0.0780 0.0781 0.0993 0.1224 0.1438 
6 10.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 15.00 424.00 449.00 475.00 503.00 524.00 0.0283 0.0218 0.0226 0.0233 0.0278 
7 34.00 53.00 73.00 93.00 110.00 448.00 454.00 460.00 468.00 472.00 0.0902 0.1045 0.1370 0. 1658 0.1890 
8 91.00 102.00 115.00 126.00 137.00 53268.33 53276.33 53284.33 53293.33 53300.33 0.2097 0.0019 0.0022 0.0024 0.0026 
9 13.00 19.00 25.00 31.00 38.00 58.00 63.00 70.00 75.00 79.00 0.0365 0.2317 0.2632 0.2925 0.3248 
10 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 11.00 17.00 22.00 28.00 33.00 0.0058 0.1053 0.0833 0.0667 0.0833 




End-state Category Severity level Dollar value 1 2 3 4 5 
I A I $ 10,000.00 9.56E-OI 8.55E-01 8.34E-OI 7.89E-OI 7.47E-O I 7.13E-01 
2 A I $10,000.00 1.87E-02 6.41 E-02 7.39E-02 9.27E-02 1.03E-O I 1.14E-01 
3 A I $ 10,000.00 3.67E-04 4.79E-03 5.48E-03 8.62E-03 1.17E-02 1.50E-02 
4 A I $10,000.00 7.48E-06 3.75E-04 6.39E-04 1.37E-03 2.31 E-03 3.50£-03 
5 B 2 $100,000.00 9.55E-09 9.59E-05 9.40E-07 2.17E-06 3.87E-06 6.07E-06 
6 B 2 $100,000.00 1.35E-09 3.61E-06 2.54E-07 7.1 1E-07 1.49E-06 2.68E-06 
7 c 2 $100,000.00 3.37E-10 2. 11 E-08 2.98E-08 6.46E-08 1.07E-07 2.43E-07 
8 c 2 $ 100 000.00 7.64E-06 1.53E-04 1.36E-04 2.3 1 E-04 3.34E-04 5.31 E-04 
9 A I $ 10,000.00 3.75E-04 4 .66E-03 4 .63E-03 7.6 1 E-03 1.03E-02 1.25E-02 
10 A I $ 10,000.00 7.63E-06 3.65E-04 5.39E-04 1.21 E-03 2.04E-03 2.90E-03 
II B 2 $ 100,000.00 9.75E-09 9.33E-05 7.93E-07 1.92E-06 3.41E-06 5.03E-06 
12 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.38E-09 3.51 E-06 2. 14E-07 6.28E-07 1.32E-06 2.22E-06 
13 c 2 $ 100,000.00 3.44E-10 2.05E-08 2.52E-08 5.71 E-08 9.41E-08 2.01 E-07 
14 c 2 $100,000.00 7.80E-06 1.49E-04 1.15E-04 2.04E-04 2.94E-04 4.40E-04 
15 A I $10,000.00 2.40E-02 6.04E-02 6.95E-02 8.20E-02 9.81 E-02 1.06E-01 
16 A I $10 000.00 4 .71E-04 4 .51 E-03 5.15E-03 7.62E-03 1.11 E-02 1.40E-02 
17 A I $10,000.00 9.59E-06 3.54E-04 6.0 1 E-04 1.21 E-03 2.2 1E-03 3.26E-03 
18 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.22E-08 9 .04E-05 8.83E-07 1.92E-06 3.70E-06 5.67E-06 
19 B 2 $100,000.00 1.73E-09 3.41 E-06 2.38E-07 6.28E-07 1.43E-06 2.50E-06 
20 c 2 $ 100,000.00 4.32E-IO 1.99E-08 2.80E-08 5.7 1 E-08 1.02E-07 2.27E-07 
21 c 2 $ 100,000.00 9.80E-06 1.45E-04 1.28E-04 2.05E-04 3. 19E-04 4.96E-04 
22 A I $10,000.00 4.80E-04 4.39E-03 4.35E-03 6.73E-03 9 .84E-03 1.16E-02 
23 A I $10 000.00 9.79E-06 3.44E-04 5.07E-04 1.07E-03 1.95E-03 2.70E-03 
24 B 2 $100,000.00 1.25E-08 8.79E-05 7.45E-07 1.70E-06 3.26E-06 4.69E-06 
25 B 2 $100,000.00 1.76E-09 3.31E-06 2.01E-07 5.55E-07 1.26E-06 2.07E-06 
26 c 2 $ 100 000.00 4.41E-IO 1.93E-08 2.37E-08 5.05E-08 8.99E-08 1.88E-07 
27 c 2 $100,000.00 I .OOE-05 1.41 E-04 1.08E-04 1.81 E-04 2.8 1 E-04 4.10E-04 
.. Table B-11. End-state probabthttes for the flash drum over the 5 year penod 
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Prior Risk Posterior Risk 
End-state Category Severity level Dollar value I 2 3 4 s 
I A I $ 10,000.00 9.56E+03 8.55E+03 8.34E+03 7.89E+03 7.47E+03 7.13E+03 
2 A I $ 10,000.00 1.87E+02 6.41 E+02 7.39E+02 9.27E+02 1.03E+03 1.14E+03 
3 A I $ 10,000.00 3.67E+OO 4.79E+OI 5.48E+OI 8.62E+OI 1.17E+02 1.50E+02 
4 A I $ 10,000.00 7.48E-02 3.75E+OO 6.39E+OO 1.37E+OI 2.31E+O I 3.50E+0 1 
5 B 2 $ 100,000.00 9.55E-04 9.59E+OO 9.40E-02 2.17E-OI 3.87E-0 1 6.07E-O I 
6 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.35E-04 3.61E-0 1 2.54E-02 7.11 E-02 1.49E-01 2.68E-01 
7 c 2 $ 100,000.00 3.37E-05 2. 11 E-03 2.98E-03 6.46E-03 1.07E-02 2.43E-02 
8 c 2 $ 100,000.00 7.64E-O I 1.53E+01 1.36E+01 2.3 1 E+01 3.34E+01 5.3 1E+OI 
9 A I $ 10,000.00 3.75E+OO 4.66E+01 4.63E+01 7.61E+01 1.03E+02 1.25E+02 
10 A 1 $ 10,000.00 7.63E-02 3.65E+OO 5.39E+OO 1.2 1E+01 2.04E+OI 2.90E+0 1 
11 B 2 $ 100,000.00 9.75E-04 9.33E+OO 7.93E-02 1.92E-OI 3.41E-O I 5.03E-0 1 
12 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.38E-04 3.5 1 E-0 1 2. 14E-02 6.28E-02 1.32E-0 1 2.22E-0 1 
13 c 2 $ 100,000.00 3.44E-05 2.05E-03 2.52E-03 5.7 1 E-03 9.4 1 E-03 2.01 E-02 
14 c 2 $ 100,000.00 7.80E-01 1.49E+0 1 1.1 5E+OI 2.04E+01 2.94E+01 4.40E+0 1 
15 A 1 $ 10,000.00 2.40E+02 6.04E+02 6.95E+02 8.20E+02 9.8 1E+02 1.06E+03 
16 A 1 $ 10,000.00 4.71E+OO 4.5 1E+OI 5.15E+OI 7.62E+OI 1.11E+02 1.40E+02 
17 A 1 $ 10,000.00 9.59E-02 3.54E+OO 6.0 1E+OO 1.2 1E+OI 2.2 1E+0 1 3.26E+0 1 
18 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.22E-03 9.04E+OO 8.83E-02 1.92E-01 3.70E-01 5.67E-01 
19 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.73E-04 3.4 1E-0 1 2.38E-02 6.28E-02 1.43E-OI 2.50E-0 1 
20 c 2 $ 100,000.00 4.32E-05 1.99E-03 2.80E-03 5.7 1E-03 1.02E-02 2.27E-02 
21 c 2 $ 1 00,000.00 9.80E-01 1.45E+OI 1.28E+01 2.05E+01 3.19E+O I 4.96E+0 1 
22 A I $ 10,000.00 4.80E+OO 4.39E+01 4.35E+OI 6.73E+01 9.84E+0 1 1.16E+02 
23 A I $ 10,000.00 9.79E-02 3.44E+OO 5.07E+OO 1.07E+01 1.95E+0 1 2.70E+0 1 
24 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.25E-03 8.79E+OO 7.45E-02 1.70E-01 3.26E-01 4.69E-01 
25 B 2 $ 100,000.00 1.76E-04 3.3 1 E-01 2.0 1E-02 5.55E-02 1.26E-01 2.07E-01 
26 c 2 $100,000.00 4.41 E-05 1.93E-03 2.37E-03 5.05E-03 8.99E-03 I.SSE-02 
27 c 2 $ 100,000.00 I.OOE+OO 1.4 1E+01 1.08E+0 1 1.8 1E+OI 2.8 1E+O I 4 .10E+OI 
Table B-12. Rtsk values for the flash drum over the 5 year penod 
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APPENDIXC 
Modelling of BP Texas Refinery Accident using Dynamic Risk Assessment 
Approach 
Success/Failure Years 
Safety Systems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
F2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FPsv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spsv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Fll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sll 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
F18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Table C-1. Number offatlure/success ofthe ISOM urnt safety systems over the 11 year penod 
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tSOMTower 
R•flu-. Drum Bkrwdown Drum Emacft'lc.y System 
l ev•l Co ntrol & A~rm Control Sy..stem Ucftt~ffen~• 
l..,.el transmitter I HlA I S<teci&J• I HHIA I Hu vy ralllnote I Manual I PSV Bypon volv• l PSV I Vent & po~e &• Manual I HlA I Site II••• I Manual ESOntv• 
Con.trol system wtve ~IYt VJtve n .lve 
1-P6 
" 1-P2 I 1-P14 A 
I,, 1-P7 1-1'17 ~1-1'18 










]PIS 10 c 
1-P14 11 













I ..PI S 18 8 
PlS I 
P18 19 c 
1 -1'14 lO 
" 1-4'11 1·P17 11 












1· P18 27 
PI S 
]P18 21 c 
1-4'14 
" " 1-PU l · Pl1 :10 
" Pll ~1-4'18 
1-4'15 








1-P18 36 8 
Pl5 
]PIS )7 c 
1..PU 38 c 
~I 1-1'18 PU I 39 
P18 40 c 
1-4'6 41 
" 1-P4 J 1-P14 42 












I ..PIS 49 I 
PlS J 
]P18 50 c 
100 
ISOMTow.r 
RefluwONm BJowdown Drum Em...-cency System 
~vel Control & Alorm Control S}'stlm Licht Raffinat• 
L.v•l transmitter HLA Site &fus I HHLA Hei\IY raffinate Man.tral PSV I Vont & pure• 611 ManuaJ Site cl•n l Monu•l PSV Sypau.nlve HLA ESDv.lve 
Control system ~I'Ve valve ..... 
··""' 1-1'14 S1 A 
1-P..., 1-1'17 52 A 
P7 1-P16 1-1'18 53 8 




1-1'17 55 A 
P16 I 1-1'18 56 8 
1P11 I 
P18 57 c 
1-1'18 58 B 
PlS J 
IP18 59 c 
1-1'14 60 A 
l-P11 1-1'17 61 A 
Prw 1-P16 I 1-P18 .....__ 
1-P15 IP17 I 
62 8 
P14 IP18 61 c 
1-1'17 54 A 





1-1'18 61 B 
PlS I 
IP18 68 c 
1-P14 69 A 
1-P12 1-1'17 70 A 
Pll 1-P16 I 1-P18 71 8 
~ IP17 I 
P14 IP1ll n c 
1-1'17 7J A 
P16 I 1-PU ,. 8 
IP17 I 
IP18 75 c 
1-1'18 76 B 
P15 I 
IP18 71 c 
1-I'B 71 c 
~P13 1-P18 J 7'J B 
P18 BO c 
1-P6 11 A 
P4 J 1-P14 12 A 
1-P7 1-1'17 ll A 
P6 1-P16 I 1-Pl8 14 8 
1-P15 IP17 I 
P14 P18 15 c 
1-1'17 86 A 
P16 I 1-1'18 ~ B 
11'17 J 
jP18 II c 
1-1'18 ., 8 
PlS 
IP18 90 c 
1-P14 91 A 
1-P..., 1-1'17 92 A 
P7 1-P16 I 1-1'18 93 8 
ll!L P17 
P14 IPLa 94 c 
1-1'17 95 A 





1-P18 91 B 
PlS I 
IP18 99 c 
1-1'14 100 A 
1-Pll 1-1'17 101 A 
Pnv 
.....__ 
l-Pl6 I 1-1'18 U)Z B 
1-1'15 IP17 I 
P14 IP18 103 c 
1-1'17 101 A 
P16 I 1-P18 105 8 
IP17 I 
P18 106 c 
1-P1R tnl R 
------~--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISOMTower 
Reflux Drum Slowdown Drum Em•rc~ Syst•m 
level C.ontrol& At.rm I Control System I Licht R•ffin•t• 
HlA I Site &lass HHlA I Heilwy n1ffin~tf! M .. rw~l PSV I V• m & pur:• VManu~l , I Manu~l L.v~l tnnsmitt::a:r PSV Bypa.s.svaJ11e HLA Site cl~ss £SOvo""' Control syst-em va.tve Viii VII! Vilfve v1lve 
1-1'14 10!1 A 













1-P18 116 B 
PlS I 
IP18 117 c 
1-PU 118 c 
~I 1-P18 PB 113 B 
IP18 120 c 
1-P6 121 A 












1-P18 1l9 8 
PlS I 
P18 130 c 
l -1'14 131 A 
1-P, 1-1'17 I ll A 
!L..__ ~1-P18 
1-1'15 
P14 r--- P18 
133 8 
I'W c 






1-P18 138 8 
PlS 
IP18 1U c 
1-1'14 140 A 












1-P18 147 8 
P15 
IP18 148 c 
1-Pl4 149 A 





! 51 8 
151 c 






1-P18 156 B 
PlS I 
P18 157 c 
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ISOMTower 
ReflWl Drvm &lowdown Drum EDM<Ciln<y Syste m 
l evel Control & AJa.rm I Control System I Licht Roffinote 
L . ... tnnsmitter I HLA I Site crus HHLA I HoaYV ra!linote I Monual PSV B~s v~tve PSV I Vent & purre 6• M1nual 
Sit o ""'' ' ManU»I 
HLA ESO valve 
Control system voJve vatve v1tve valve 
1-P13 158 c 
~. 1-1'18 P13 I 159 8 
IP18 160 t 
1-1'14 161 
" 1-Pm 1-1'17 162 
" P> 1-P16 I 1-1'18 163 8 
1-Pl> IP17 I 
P14 IP18 164 t 
1-1'17 165 
" P16 J 1-Pla 166 8 
IP17 I 
IP18 167 c 
1-P18 168 a 
P15 I 
LPla 169 c 
1-P14 170 
" 1-Pll 1-1'17 171 
" P..., 1-P16 I 1-1'18 
'---





" P16 1-1'18 175 8 
IP17 I 
IP18 176 c 
1-1'18 1n 8 
P15 I 
IP18 178 c 
1-1'14 179 
" 1-P12 1-1'17 180 
" Pll 1-P16 J 1-Pl8 111 8 
1-Pl S 11'17 I 
1'14 11'18 18Z t 
1-1'17 183 
" P16 I 1-P18 114 B 
IP17 I 
IP18 185 c 
1-1'18 186 8 
1'15 I 
IP18 187 c 
1-1'13 188 t 
~. 1-P18 1'13 I 189 a 
IP18 190 c 
Figure C-1. Event tree ofthe ISOM unit 
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Prior 
Class Severity Dollar value Frect_uency Posterior Frequency End-
State 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 A I $ 10,000.00 9.70E-OI 9.62E-OI 9.56E-01 9.54E-01 9.50E-OI 9.46E-0 1 9.40E-OI 9.33E-01 9.29E-OI 9.24E-O I 9. 19E-O I 9.11 E-01 
2 A I $10,000.00 1.27E-02 1.18E-02 1.34E-02 1.27E-02 1.16E-02 1.07E-02 1.03E-02 9.59E-03 9.65E-03 1.03E-02 1.03E-02 1.03E-02 
3 A I $ 10,000.00 1.94E-03 3.18E-03 4.79E-03 4.71 E-03 4.74E-03 4.49E-03 4.60E-03 4 .65E-03 4.71 E-03 4.97E-03 5.12E-03 5.01 E-03 
4 B 2 $100,000.00 3.88E-04 7.68E-04 1.55E-03 1.96E-03 2.49E-03 3.06E-03 3.9 1E-03 3.95E-03 4.94E-03 6.25E-03 7.06E-03 7.78E-03 
5 c 4 $10,000,000.00 9.69E-05 4.26E-04 8.46E-04 9.80E-04 1.07E-03 1.43E-03 1.84E-03 1.87E-03 2.12E-03 2.44E-03 2.54E-03 2.88E-03 
6 A I $10,000.00 2.15E-04 3.50E-04 5.79E-04 5.63E-04 5.60E-04 5.20E-04 5.75E-04 5.82E-04 5.76E-04 7. 10E-04 7.24E-04 8.10E-04 
7 B 2 $100,000.00 4.31E-05 8.44E-05 1.87E-04 2.34E-04 2.94E-04 3.54E-04 4.89E-04 4.94E-04 6.05E-04 8.92E-04 9.98E-04 1.26E-03 
8 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.08E-05 4.69E-05 1.02E-04 1.1 7E-04 1.26E-04 1.65E-04 2.30E-04 2.34E-04 2.59E-04 3.49E-04 3.59E-04 4.65E-04 
9 B 2 $ 100,000.00 3.80E-04 6.61 E-04 1.28E-03 1.37E-03 1.65E-03 1.68E-03 2.0 1 E-03 2.30E-03 2.58E-03 3.03E-03 3.48E-03 3.62E-03 
10 c 4 $10,000,000.00 9.50E-05 3.67E-04 6.98E-04 6.87E-04 7.08E-04 7.83E-04 9.48E-04 1.09E-03 I.I OE-03 1.18E-03 1.25E-03 1.34E-03 
11 A I $10,000.00 3.17E-03 6.54E-03 5.57E-03 6.37E-03 7.75E-03 8.0 1E-03 8.72E-03 1.03E-02 1.03E-02 9.69E-03 9.72E-03 1.03E-02 
12 A I $10,000.00 4.84E-04 1.77E-03 2.00E-03 2.35E-03 3.15E-03 3.36E-03 3.89E-03 S.OIE-03 5.04E-03 4.65E-03 4.82E-03 5.01E-03 
13 B 2 $100,000.00 9.69E-05 4.26E-04 6.46E-04 9.80E-04 1.66E-03 2.29E-03 3.3 1E-03 4 .25E-03 5.29E-03 5.85E-03 6.64E-03 7.77E-03 
14 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.42E-05 2.37E-04 3.52E-04 4.90E-04 7.10E-04 1.07E-03 1.56E-03 2.01 E-03 2.27E-03 2.29E-03 2.39E-03 2.88E-03 
15 A I $10,000.00 5.38E-05 1.94E-04 2.41 E-04 2.81 E-04 3.73E-04 3.89E-04 4 .86E-04 6.26E-04 6.17E-04 6.65E-04 6.81 E-04 8.10E-04 
16 B 2 $100,000.00 1.08E-05 4.68E-05 7.80E-05 1.1 7E-04 1.96E-04 2.66E-04 4.14E-04 5.31E-04 6.48E-04 8.36E-04 9.39E-04 1.26E-03 
17 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 2.69E-06 2.60E-05 4.26E-05 5.86E-05 8.40E-05 1.24E-04 1.95E-04 2.52E-04 2.78E-04 3.27E-04 3.38E-04 4 .65E-04 
18 B 2 $100,000.00 9.50E-05 3.67E-04 5.32E-04 6.86E-04 I.IOE-03 1.26E-03 1.70E-03 2.48E-03 2.76E-03 2.84E-03 3.27E-03 3.62E-03 
19 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.37E-05 2.04E-04 2.90E-04 3.43E-04 4.71E-04 5.87E-04 8.0 1E-04 1.17E-03 1.18E-03 I.IIE-03 1.18E-03 1.34E-03 
20 A I $ 10 000.00 2.07E-06 4.48E-06 3.81 E-06 4.36E-06 5.30E-06 5.60E-06 6.37E-06 7.86E-06 7.87E-06 7.38E-06 7.58E-06 8.34E-06 
21 A I $ 10,000.00 3.17E-07 1.21E-06 1.37E-06 1.6 1 E-06 2.16E-06 2.35E-06 2 .84E-06 3.82E-06 3.84E-06 3.55E-06 3.75E-06 4.06E-06 
22 B 2 $100,000.00 6.35E-08 2.92E-07 4.42E-07 6.70E-07 1.13E-06 1.60E-06 2.42E-06 3.24E-06 4.03E-06 4.46E-06 5. 17E-06 6.30E-06 
23 c 4 $10,000 000.00 1.59E-08 1.62E-07 2.41E-07 3.35E-07 4.85E-07 7.47E-07 1.14E-06 1.53E-06 1.73E-06 1.75E-06 1.86E-06 2.33E-06 
24 A I $10,000.00 3.53E-08 1.33E-07 1.65E-07 1.92E-07 2.55E-07 2.72E-07 3.55E-07 4.77E-07 4.70E-07 5.06E-07 5.3 1 E-07 6.57E-07 
25 B 2 $100,000.00 7.05E-09 3.21E-08 5.34E-08 8.01E-08 1.34E-07 1.85E-07 3.02E-07 4.05E-07 4.94E-07 6.37E-07 7.32E-07 1.02E-06 
26 c 4 $10 000 000.00 1.76E-09 1.78E-08 2.9 1 E-08 4.01 E-08 5.74E-08 8.65E-08 1.42E-07 1.92E-07 2.12E-07 2.49E-07 2.63E-07 3.77E-07 
27 B 2 $ 100,000.00 6.22E-08 2.51E-07 3.64E-07 4.70E-07 7.52E-07 8.78E-07 1.24E-06 1.89E-06 2.10E-06 2.16E-06 2.55E-06 2.93E-06 
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Prior 
Class Severity DoUar value Frequency Poster ior Frequency End-
State 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
28 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.56E-{)8 1.40E-{)7 1.99E-{)7 2.35E-{)7 3.22E-{)7 4.1 0E-{)7 5.85E-{)7 8.95E-{)7 9.01E-{)7 8.46E-{)7 9.17E-{)7 1.09E-{)6 
29 A I $10,000.00 4. 17E-{)8 I.IOE-{)7 9.37E-08 1.07E-{)7 1.30E-{)7 1.50E-{)7 1.84E-{)7 2.45E-{)7 2.45E-{)7 2.30E-{)7 2.35E-{)7 2.96E-{)7 
30 A I $10,000.00 6.38E-{)9 2.97E-{)8 3.36E-{)8 3.95E-{)8 5.30E-{)8 6.29E-{)8 8.23E-{)8 1.1 9E-{)7 1.19E-{)7 I.IOE-{)7 1. 17E-{)7 1.44E-{)7 
31 8 2 $ 100 000.00 1.28E-{)9 7. 17£-{)9 1.09E-{)8 1.65E-{)8 2.78£-{)8 4.29E-{)8 7.00E-{)8 I.OI E-{)7 1.25E-{)7 1.39E-{)7 1.61E-{)7 2.23£-{)7 
32 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.19E-IO 3.98E-{)9 5.92E-{)9 8.23E-{)9 1.19E-{)8 2.00E-{)8 3.29E-{)8 4.77E-{)8 5.38E-{)8 5.43E-{)8 5.78E-{)8 8.28E-{)8 
33 A I $10,000.00 7.09E- IO 3.27E-{)9 4.06E-{)9 4.72E-{)9 6.27E-{)9 7.29E-{)9 1.03E-{)8 1.49£-{)8 1.46E-{)8 1.58E-08 1.65E-{)8 2.33E-{)8 
34 8 2 $100,000.00 1.42E-10 7.88E-IO 1.31E-{)9 1.97E-{)9 3.29E-{)9 4.97E-{)9 8.75E-{)9 1.26E-{)8 1.54E-{)8 1.98E-{)8 2.27E-{)8 3.61E-{)8 
35 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.54E-11 4.38E-10 7. 16E-I O 9.84E-I O 1.41 E-{)9 2.32E-{)9 4.12E-{)9 5.97E-{)9 6.58E-{)9 7.76E-{)9 8.18£-{)9 1.34E-{)8 
36 8 2 $ 100,000.00 1.25E-{)9 6.1 7E-{)9 8.95E-09 1.15E-{)8 1.85E-{)8 2.35E-{)8 3.60E-{)8 5.88E-{)8 6.54E-{)8 6.72E-08 7.91E-{)8 1.04E-{)7 
37 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.13E- IO 3.43E-{)9 4.88E-{)9 5.77E-{)9 7.92E-{)9 1.1 OE-{)8 1.70E-{)8 2.79E-{)8 2.80E-{)8 2.63E-08 2.85E-{)8 3.86E-{)8 
38 c 4 $10,000,000.00 7.78E-IO 2.49E-{)9 2.47E-09 2.96E-{)9 3.92E-{)9 4.90E-{)9 6.72E-{)9 9.63E-{)9 1.03E-{)8 1.02E-{)8 I.IOE-{)8 1.48E-{)8 
39 8 2 $100,000.00 1.27E-Il 3.59£-11 3.59£-11 4.43£-11 6.17E-11 7.50E-ll 1.03E-l 0 I.60E- l 0 1.76E-IO 1.80E-I O 1.99E-l 0 2.86E-10 
40 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.18E-12 1.99E-l l 1.96E- l l 2.21E-ll 2.64E-ll 3.50E-ll 4.83E-I l 7.58E-ll 7.54E-ll 7.03E-ll 7. 16E-l l 1.06E-I 0 
41 A I $ 10,000.00 7.50E-{)3 8.03E-{)3 7.96E-{)3 7.94E-{)3 8.58E-{)3 9.56E-{)3 1.02E-{)2 1.07E-{)2 1.14E-{)2 1.24E-{)2 1.35E-{)2 1.50E-{)2 
42 A I $ 10,000.00 9.79E-{)5 9.83E-{)5 1.11 E-{)4 1.06E-{)4 1.05E-{)4 1.08E-{)4 I.IIE-{)4 1.1 OE-{)4 1. 18E-{)4 1.39E-{)4 1.52E-{)4 1.69E-{)4 
43 A I $ 10,000.00 1.50E-{)5 2.66E-{)5 3.99E-{)5 3.91E-{)5 4.28E-{)5 4.53E-{)5 4.97E.{)5 5.36E.{)5 5.75E.{)5 6.67E-{)5 7.55E.{)5 8.24E-{)5 
44 8 2 $100,000.00 3.00£.{)6 6.41£.{)6 1.29£.{)5 1.63£-{)5 2.25£.{)5 3.09£.{)5 4.23£.{)5 4.54E.{)5 6.04£.{)5 8.39£-{)5 1.04£.{)4 1.28£-{)4 
45 c 4 $10,000,000.00 7.49E-{)7 3.56E.{)6 7.04£.{)6 8. 15£.{)6 9.63E.{)6 1.44E.{)5 1.99E.{)5 2. 15E.{)5 2.59E-{)5 3.28E.{)5 3.75E.{)5 4.73E.{)5 
46 A I $ 10,000.00 1.66E.{)6 2.92E.{)6 4.82E-{)6 4.68E-{)6 5.06E.{)6 5.25E.{)6 6.22E.{)6 6.69E.{)6 7.04E-{)6 9.53E-{)6 1.07E.{)5 1.33E.{)5 
47 8 2 $100,000.00 3.33E.{)7 7.04E.{)7 1.56E.{)6 1.95E-{)6 2.66E.{)6 3.58E.{)6 5.28E.{)6 5.68E.{)6 7.40E-{)6 1.20E.{)5 1.47E.{)5 2.07E.{)5 
48 c 4 $10,000,000.00 8.32E.{)8 3.91E.{)7 8.5IE-{)7 9.75E-{)7 1.14E.{)6 1.67£.{)6 2.49E.{)6 2.69E.{)6 3.17E-{)6 4.69E-{)6 5.30E-{)6 7.65E-{)6 
49 8 2 $ 100,000.00 2.94£.{)6 5.52E.{)6 1.06£-{)5 1.14E-{)5 1.49E.{)5 1.69E.{)5 2.18E-{)5 2.65£.{)5 3.15£.{)5 4.07£-{)5 5.13£-{)5 5.95£-{)5 
50 c 4 $10,000,000.00 7.34£.{)7 3.06E.{)6 5.8 1£-{)6 5.71E-{)6 6.40E.{)6 7.9 1E.{)6 1.02E.{)5 1.26E.{)5 1.35E.{)5 1.59E.{)5 1.85E-{)5 2.21E-{)5 
51 A I $10,000.00 2.45E.{)5 5.46E.{)5 4.64E-{)5 5.30E-{)5 7.00E.{)5 8.10E-{)5 9.42£.{)5 1. 19E-{)4 1.26E-{)4 1.30E-04 1.43E-{)4 1.69E-{)4 
52 A I $10,000.00 3.74E.{)6 1.48E.{)5 1.66E-{)5 1.96E-{)5 2.85E.{)5 3.40E.{)5 4.20E.{)5 5.76E.{)5 6.16E.{)5 6.25E.{)5 7. 10E.{)5 8.24E.{)5 
53 8 2 $100,000.00 7.49E.{)7 3.56£.{)6 5.37E.{)6 8.15£-{)6 1.50E.{)5 2.32E-{)5 3.57E.{)5 4.89E-{)5 6.47E.{)5 7.86E-{)5 9.79E.{)5 1.28E-{)4 
54 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.87E.{)7 1.98E.{)6 2.93E.{)6 4.07E-{)6 6.42E.{)6 1.08E-{)5 1.68E.{)5 2.32E.{)5 2.77E.{)5 3.08E-{)5 3.52E-{)5 4.73E.{)5 
105 
Prior 
Class Severity Dollar value Frequency Posterior Frequency End-
State 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
55 A I $ 10,000.00 4.16£.{)7 1.62£.{)6 2.01£.{)6 2.34£.{)6 3.37£.{)6 3.93£.{)6 5.26£.{)6 7.20£.{)6 7.54£.{)6 8.93£.{)6 1.00£.{)5 1.33£.{)5 
56 B 2 $100 000.00 8.32£.{)8 3.91£.{)7 6.50£-07 9.74£.{)7 1.77£.{)6 2.68£.{)6 4.47£.{)6 6.11£.{)6 7.92£.{)6 1.12£.{)5 1.38£.{)5 2.06£.{)5 
57 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.08£.{)8 2.17£.{)7 3.54£.{)7 4.87£.{)7 7.59£.{)7 1.25£.{)6 2.10£.{)6 2.89£.{)6 3.39£.{)6 4.40£.{)6 4.98£.{)6 7.64£.{)6 
58 B 2 $100,000.00 7.34£.{)7 3.06£.{)6 4.43£.{)6 5.71£-06 9.94£.{)6 1.27£.{)5 1.84£.{)5 2.85£.{)5 3.37£.{)5 3.81 E-05 4.82£.{)5 5.95£.{)5 
59 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.83£.{)7 1.70£.{)6 2.42£.{)6 2.85£.{)6 4.26£.{)6 5.93£.{)6 8.66£.{)6 1.35£.{)5 1.45£.{)5 1.49£.{)5 1.74£.{)5 2.20£.{)5 
60 A I $ 10,000.00 1.60£.{)8 3.74£.{)8 3.17£.{)8 3.62£.{)8 4.79£.{)8 5.65£.{)8 6.88£.{)8 9.05£.{)8 9.62£.{)8 9.92£.{)8 1.12£.{)7 1.37£.{)7 
61 A I $10,000.00 2.45£.{)9 1.01£.{)8 1.14£.{)8 1.34£.{)8 1.95£.{)8 2.37£.{)8 3.07£.{)8 4.39£.{)8 4.69£.{)8 4 .76£.{)8 5.53£.{)8 6.68£.{)8 
62 B 2 $100,000.00 4.91£-10 2.44£.{)9 3.68£.{)9 5.57£.{)9 1.02£.{)8 1.62£.{)8 2.61£.{)8 3.73£.{)8 4.93£.{)8 5.99£.{)8 7.63£.{)8 1.04£.{)7 
63 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.23£-10 1.35£.{)9 2.01£.{)9 2.79£.{)9 4.39£.{)9 7.55£.{)9 1.23£.{)8 1.77£.{)8 2.1 1£.{)8 2.34£.{)8 2.75£.{)8 3.84£.{)8 
64 A I $10,000.00 2.73£-10 1. 11 £.{)9 1.37£.{)9 1.60£.{)9 2.31£.{)9 2.75£.{)9 3.84£.{)9 5.49£.{)9 5.75£.{)9 6.8 1£.{)9 7.83£.{)9 1.08£.{)8 
65 B 2 $100,000.00 5.45£-11 2.68£-10 4.45£-10 6.67£-10 1.21£.{)9 1.87£.{)9 3.26£.{)9 4.66£.{)9 6.03£.{)9 8.56£.{)9 1.08£.{)8 1.67£.{)8 
66 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.36£-11 1.49E-IO 2.43£-10 3.33E-10 5.19E-10 8.74£-10 1.54£.{)9 2.21£.{)9 2.59£.{)9 3.35£.{)9 3.88£.{)9 6 .20£.{)9 
67 B 2 $100,000.00 4.81£-10 2.10£.{)9 3.03£.{)9 3.91£.{)9 6.80£.{)9 8.87£.{)9 1.34£.{)8 2 .1 7£.{)8 2.57£.{)8 2.90£.{)8 3.76£.{)8 4.82£.{)8 
68 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.20£-10 1. 16£.{)9 1.66£.{)9 1.95£.{)9 2.91£.{)9 4.14£.{)9 6.32£.{)9 1.03£.{)8 1. 10£.{)8 1.14£.{)8 1.35£.{)8 1.79£.{)8 
69 A I $10,000.00 3.22£-10 9. 18£-10 7.80£-10 8.90£-10 1.18£.{)9 1.52£.{)9 1.99£.{)9 2.82£.{)9 2.99£.{)9 3.09£.{)9 3.47£.{)9 4.86£.{)9 
70 A I $10,000.00 4.93£-11 2.48E-I 0 2.79£-10 3.29£-10 4.79£-10 6.36£-10 8.89£-10 1.37£.{)9 1.46£.{)9 1.48£.{)9 1.72£.{)9 2.37£.{)9 
71 B 2 $100,000.00 9.86£-12 5.98E-11 9.04£-11 1.37£-1 0 2.51£-10 4.34£-10 7.56£-10 1.1 6£.{)9 1.53£.{)9 1.86£.{)9 2.37£.{)9 3 .67£.{)9 
72 c 4 $10 000 000.00 2.47£-12 3.32E-I I 4.93£-11 6.85£-11 1.08£-10 2.02£ -10 3.56£-10 5.49£-10 6.57£-10 7.30£-1 0 8.53£-10 1.36£.{)9 
73 A I $10,000.00 5.48£-12 2.73£-1 1 3.38£-11 3.93£-11 5.66£-11 7.36£-11 I. II E-10 1.7 1£-10 1.79£-10 2.12E-IO 2.43£-10 3.83£-10 
74 B 2 $100,000.00 I.IOE-12 6.57£-12 1.09£-11 1.64£-11 2.97£-11 5.02£-11 9.45£-11 1.45£-10 1.88£-10 2.66£-10 3.35£-10 5.94£-10 
75 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.74£-13 3.65£-12 5.96£-12 8.19£-12 1.27£-11 2.34£-11 4.45£-11 6.87£-11 8.05£-11 1.04£-10 1.21 E-1 0 2.20£-10 
76 B 2 $ 100,000.00 9.67£-12 5.15£-1 1 7.45£-11 9.60£-11 1.67£-10 2.38£-10 3.89£-10 6.77£-10 8.00£-10 9.04£-10 1.17£.{)9 1.71 £.{)9 
77 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.42£-12 2.86£-11 4.07£-11 4.80£-11 7.1 6£-11 I.IIE-10 1.83£-10 3.20£-10 3.43£-1 0 3.54£-10 4.20£-10 6.34£-10 
78 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 6.01£-12 2.08£-1 1 2.06£-11 2.46£-11 3.55£-11 4.95£-11 7.26£-1 1 I.IIE-10 1.25E-IO 1.37£-10 1.63£-10 2.43£-10 
79 B 2 $100,000.00 9.82£-14 2.99£-13 2.99£-13 3.68£-13 5.57£-13 7.57£-13 I.IJE-12 1.84£ -12 2.15£-12 2.41£-12 2.93£-12 4.7 1£-12 
80 c 4 $10,000 000.00 2.45£-14 1.66£-13 1.63£-13 1.84£-13 2.39£-13 3.53£-13 5.21 E-13 8.72£-13 9.21 E-13 9.44£-13 1.06£-12 1.74£-12 
81 A I $10,000.00 8.33£.{)4 9.81£.{)4 9.73£.{)4 9.70£.{)4 1.04£.{)3 1.16£.{)3 1.2]£.{)3 1.27£.{)3 1.33£.{)3 1.44£.{)3 1.69£.{)3 2.34£.{)3 
106 
Prior 
Class Severity Dollar value Frequency Posterior Frequency End-
State 0 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 11 
82 A I $10,000.00 1.09E-<l5 1.20E-<l5 1.36E-<l5 1.30E-<l5 1.27E-<l5 1.31E-<l5 1.33E-<l5 1.30E-<l5 1.38E-<l5 1.61 E-<J5 1.91E-<l5 2.64E-<l5 
83 A I $10 000.00 1.66E-<J6 3.25E-<J6 4.88E-<l6 4.78E-<l6 5.17E-<l6 5.48E-<l6 5.95E-<l6 6.33E-<l6 6.73E-<l6 7.73E-<l6 9.44E-<l6 1.29E-<l5 
84 8 2 $100,000.00 3.33E-<l7 7.83E-<l7 1.58E-<l6 1.99E-<l6 2.72E-<J6 3.74E-<l6 5.05E-<J6 5.37E-<l6 7.07E-<l6 9.72E-06 1.30E-<l5 2.00E-<l5 
85 c 4 $10,000,000.00 8.32E-<l8 4.35E-<l7 8.60E-<J7 9.96E-<l7 1.16£-<>6 1.74E-<l6 2.38E-<l6 2.55E-<l6 3.03E-<l6 3.80E-<l6 4.69E-<l6 7.40E-<l6 
86 A I $10,000.00 1.85E-<l7 3.57E-<l7 5.89E-<l7 5.72E-<l7 6. 12E-<l7 6.35E-<l7 7.43E-<l7 7.92E-<l7 8.24E-<l7 I.IOE-<>6 1.33E-<J6 2.08E-<l6 
87 8 2 $100,000.00 3.70E-<l8 8.61E-<l8 1.91 E-<>7 2.38E-<J7 3.21E-<l7 4.33E-<l7 6.32E-<l7 6.72E-<l7 8.66E-<l7 1.39E-<l6 1.84E-<l6 3.23E-<l6 
88 c 4 $10,000,000.00 9.25E-<l9 4.78E-<l8 1.04E-07 1.19E-<l7 1.38E-<l7 2.02E-<l7 2.97E-<l7 3.18E-<l7 3.71E-<l7 5.43E-<l7 6.63E-<l7 1.20E-<J6 
89 B 2 $100,000.00 3.26E-<l7 6.74E-<l7 1.30E-<l6 1.40E-<l6 1.80E-<l6 2.05E-<l6 2.60E-<l6 3. 14E-<l6 3.69E-<l6 4.71E-<l6 6.41E-<l6 9.30E-<l6 
90 c 4 $10,000,000.00 8.16E-<J8 3.75E-<l7 7.IOE-<l7 6.98E-<l7 7.73E-<l7 9.56E-<l7 1.22E-<l6 1.49E-<J6 1.58E-<l6 1.84E-<l6 2.3IE-<l6 3.45E-<l6 
91 A I $10,000.00 2.72E-<l6 6.67E-<l6 5.67E-<l6 6.47E-<l6 8.46E-<l6 9.79E-<J6 1.13E-<l5 1.40E-<l5 1.48E-<J5 1.51E-<J5 1.79E-<l5 2.64E-<l5 
92 A I $10,000.00 4.16E-<l7 1.80E-<l6 2.03E-<l6 2.39E-<l6 3.45E-<l6 4.11E-<l6 5.03E-<l6 6.82E-<l6 7.21E-<l6 7.24E-<l6 8.88E-<l6 1.29E-<l5 
93 B 2 $100,000.00 8.32E-<l8 4.35E-<l7 6.57E-<l7 9.96E-<l7 1.81E-<l6 2.80E-<l6 4.27E-<l6 5.78E-<l6 7.57E-<J6 9.10E-<l6 1.22E-<l5 2.00E-<l5 
94 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.08E-<J8 2.42E-<l7 3.58E-<l7 4.98E-<l7 7.76E-<l7 1.31E-<l6 2.01E-<l6 2.74E-<l6 3.24E-<l6 3.56E-06 4.41E-<l6 7.39E-<l6 
95 A I $10,000.00 4.62E-<l8 1.98E-<l7 2.45E-<l7 2.86E-<l7 4.08E-<l7 4.76E-<l7 6.28E-<l7 8.52E-<l7 8.83E-<l7 1.03E-<l6 1.26E-<J6 2.08E-<l6 
96 B 2 $100,000.00 9.24E-<l9 4.78E-<l8 7.94E-<l8 1.19E-<l7 2.14E-<l7 3.24E-<l7 5.34E-<l7 7.23E-<l7 9.27E-<l7 1.30E-<J6 1.73E-<J6 3.22E-<l6 
97 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.31E-<l9 2.65E-<l8 4.33E-<l8 5.95E-<J8 9.17E-<J8 1.51E-<l7 2.51E-<l7 3.42E-<l7 3.97E-<l7 5.09E-<J7 6.23E-<J7 1.19E-<l6 
98 B 2 $100,000.00 8.15E-<l8 3.74E-<l7 5.42E-<l7 6.98E-<l7 1.20E-<J6 1.53E-<J6 2.20E-<l6 3.37E-<l6 3.95E-<l6 4.41 E-<l6 6.02E-<l6 9.30E-<l6 
99 c 4 $10 000 000.00 2.04E-<l8 2.08E-<J7 2.96E-<l7 3.49E-<l7 5.15E-<l7 7.16E-<l7 1.04E-<l6 1.60E-<l6 1.69E-<l6 1.73E-<l6 2.17E-<l6 3.44E-<l6 
100 A I $10,000.00 1.78E-<l9 4.57E-<l9 3.88E-<l9 4.43E-<l9 5.79E-<l9 6.83E-<l9 8.23E-<l9 1.07E-<l8 1.13E-<J8 1.15E-<l8 1.40E-<l8 2.14E-<l8 
101 A I $10,000.00 2.73E-IO 1.23E-<l9 1.39E-<l9 1.64E-<l9 2.36E-<l9 2.87E-<J9 3.67E-<J9 5.20E-<l9 5.49E-<l9 5.52E-09 6.92E-<l9 1.04E-<J8 
102 B 2 $100,000.00 5.45E-ll 2.98E-10 4.50E-10 6.81E-10 1.24E-<l9 1.96E-<J9 3. 12E-<l9 4.41E-<l9 5.77E-<l9 6.94E-<l9 9.54E-<l9 1.62E-<l8 
103 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.36E-ll 1.65E-10 2.45E-10 3.41E-IO 5.30E-IO 9.13E-IO 1.47E-<l9 2.09E-<l9 2.47E-<l9 2.71E-<l9 3.43E-<l9 5.99E-<l9 
104 A I $10,000.00 3.03E-11 1.36E-10 1.68E-10 1.96E-10 2.79E-10 3.32E-10 4.59E-1 0 6.50E-10 6.73E-10 7.88E-10 9.78E-IO 1.69E-<l9 
lOS B 2 $100,000.00 6.06E-12 3.27E-11 5.44E-l l 8.15E-11 1.46E-IO 2.26E-10 3.90E-IO 5.51E-IO 7.06E-10 9.91 E-10 1.35E-<l9 2.61E-<l9 
106 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.51 E-12 1.82E-ll 2.96E-II 4.07E-II 6.27E-11 1.06E-10 1.84E-I 0 2.61E-IO 3.03E-IO 3.88E-10 4.86E-10 9.68E-10 
107 8 2 $100 000.00 5.34E-ll 2.56E-IO 3.71E-10 4.77E-10 8.22E-10 1.07E-<l9 1.61E-<l9 2.57E-<l9 3.01E-<l9 3.36E-<J9 4.70E-<J9 7.54E-<l9 
108 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.34E-11 1.42E-1 0 2.02E-10 2.39E-10 3.52E-10 S.OOE-10 7.56E-IO 1.22E-<l9 1.29E-<J9 1.32E-<l9 1.69E-<l9 2.79E-<l9 
107 
Prior 
Class Severity Dollar value Frequency Posterior Frequency End-
State 0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
109 A I $10,000.00 3.58£-11 1.12£-10 9.53£-11 1.09£-10 1.42£-10 1.83£-10 2.38£-10 3.33£-10 3.50£-10 3.57£-10 4.34£-1 0 7.60£-1 0 
110 A I $10 000.00 5.48£-12 3.03£-11 3.41£-11 4.02£-11 5.79£-11 7.69£-11 1.06£-10 1.62£-10 1.71£-10 1.72£-10 2.15£-10 3.70£-10 
111 8 2 $100,000.00 I.IOE-12 7.3 1£-12 I.IOE-11 1.67£-11 3.04£-11 5.24£-11 9.04£-11 1.37£-10 1.79£-10 2.16£-10 2.96£-10 5.74£-10 
112 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 2.74£-13 4.06£-12 6.02£-12 8.37£-12 1.30£-11 2.45£-11 4.25£- 11 6.50£-11 7.69£-1 1 8.45£-11 1.07£-10 2.13£-10 
113 A I $10,000.00 6.09£-13 3.33£-12 4. 13£-12 4.80£-12 6.85£-12 8.90£-12 1.33£- 11 2.02£-11 2.09£-11 2.45E-11 3.04E-11 5.98E-11 
114 8 2 $100,000.00 1.22E-13 8.03£-13 1.34E-12 2.00£-12 3.59£-12 6.07£-1 2 1.13E- 11 1.71E-11 2.20£-11 3.08E-11 4.19E-11 9.28E-11 
115 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.04£-14 4.46£-13 7.28£-13 I.OOE-12 1.54E-12 2.83£-12 5.32£-12 8.12£-12 9.42E-12 1.21E-11 1.51£-11 3.44E-11 
116 8 2 $100,000.00 1.07£-12 6.29£-12 9.11 E-12 1.1 7E-11 2.02E-11 2.87E-11 4.65£-11 8.00£-11 9.36£-11 1.05£-10 1.46E-10 2.67E-10 
117 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 2.69£-13 3.50£-12 4.97E-12 5.86£-12 8.65E-12 1.34E-ll 2.19E-11 3.79£-11 4.01£-1 1 4.09E-II 5.25£-11 9.90E-II 
118 c 4 $10,000,000.00 6.68£-13 2.54E-12 2.51£-12 3.01£-12 4.29£-12 5.98£-12 8.68£-12 1.31£-11 1.47E-11 1.59E-11 2.04£-11 3.80£-11 
119 8 2 $100,000.00 1.09E-14 3.66£-14 3.65£-14 4.50£-14 6.74£-14 9.16£-14 1.32£-13 2.18£-13 2.52£-13 2.79£-13 3.67£-13 7.36E-13 
120 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.73£-15 2.03£-14 1.99£-14 2.25E-14 2.89£-14 4.27£-14 6.23£-14 1.03£-13 1.08£-13 1.09E-13 1.32£-13 2.72£-13 
121 A I $10,000.00 1.25£-03 1.33£-03 1.31E-03 1.31£-03 1.39£-03 1.86£-03 1.94E-03 2.01£-03 2.09£-03 2.45£-03 2.61 E-03 2.82£-03 
122 A I $10,000.00 1.63£-05 1.62£-05 1.84£-05 1.75£-05 1.70£-05 2.11£-05 2.13£-05 2.07£-05 2.17£-05 2.75£-05 2.93E-05 3.19£-05 
123 A I $10,000.00 2.50£-06 4.39£-06 6.59E-06 6.46£-06 6.92£-06 8.85£-06 9.51£-06 I .OOE-05 1.06£-05 1.32E-05 1.45E-05 1.55E-05 
124 8 2 $100,000.00 4.99£-07 1.06£-06 2. 13£-06 2.69£-06 3.64£-06 6.03£-06 8.08£-06 8.52£-06 I. II E-05 1.66E-05 2.00£-05 2.41£-05 
125 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.25£-07 5.88£-07 1.16£-06 1.35E-06 1.56£-06 2.81£-06 3.80E-06 4.04£-06 4.76£-06 6.49£-06 7.22£-06 8.9 1 E-06 
126 A I $10,000.00 2.77E-07 4.82E-07 7.96E-07 7.72£-07 8.19£-07 1.02E-06 1.19£-06 1.26£-06 IJOE-06 1.88E-06 2.06£-06 2.51 E-06 
127 8 2 $100,000.00 5.55£-08 1.16£-07 2.58E-07 3.22E-07 4.30E-07 6.98£-07 I .OIE-06 1.07£-06 1.36£-06 2.37£-06 2.83£-06 3.89£-06 
128 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.39£-08 6.46£-08 1.40E-07 1.61£-07 1.84£-07 3.26£-07 4.76£-07 5.05£-07 5.83£-07 9.27£-07 1.02£-06 1.44£-06 
129 8 2 $100,000.00 4.90£-07 9.11£-07 1.76£-06 1.89E-06 2.41£-06 3.31£-06 4.16E-06 4.97£-06 5.80£-06 8.04£-06 9.87£-06 1.12E-05 
130 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 1.22£-07 5.06£-07 9.59£-07 9.43£-07 1.03£-06 1.54£-06 1.96£-06 2.36£-06 2.48£-06 3.15£-06 3.55£-06 4.15£-06 
131 A I $10,000.00 4.08£-06 9.01£-06 7.66E-06 8.74£-06 1.13£-05 1.58£-05 1.80£-05 2.23£-05 2.32£-05 2.57£-05 2.76£-05 3.18£-05 
132 A I $10,000.00 6.24E-07 2.44£-06 2.74E-06 3.23£-06 4.61£-06 6.63£-06 8.04£-06 1.08£-05 1.13£-05 1.24£-05 1.37£-05 1.55£-05 
133 8 2 $100,000.00 1.25£-07 5.87£-07 8.87£-07 1.35E-06 2.42E-06 4.52£-06 6.84£-06 9.17E-06 1.19E-05 1.55£-05 1.88£-05 2.40£-05 
134 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.12£-08 3.26£-07 4.84E-07 6.73£-07 1.04£-06 2. 11 £-06 3.22£-06 4.34E-06 5.10£-06 6.08£-06 6.79£-06 8.90£-06 
135 A I $10,000.00 6.93£-08 2.68£-07 3.31E-07 3.86E-07 5.46£-07 7.68E-07 I.OIE-06 1.35£-06 1.39£-06 1.76£-06 1.93£-06 2.5 1£-06 
108 
Prior 
Class Severity Dollar value Frequency Posterior Frequency End-
State 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
136 8 2 $100,000.00 1.39E-08 6.45E-08 1.07E-07 1.61£-07 2.86£-07 5.23E-07 8.54E-07 1.15E-06 1.46E-06 2.22E-06 2.67E-06 3.89E-06 
137 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 3.47E-09 3.59E-08 5.85E-08 8.04£-08 1.23E-07 2.44E-07 4.02E-07 5.43E-07 6.25E-07 8.69E-07 9.60E-07 1.44£-06 
138 8 2 $100,000.00 1.22E-07 5.06E-07 7.32E-07 9.43E-07 1.61£-06 2.48£-06 3.52E-06 5.35E-06 6.20E-06 7.53E-06 9.28E-06 1.12E-05 
139 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.06E-08 2.81E-07 3.99E-07 4.71E-07 6.89£-07 1.16E-06 1.66E-06 2.53£-06 2.66E-06 2.95E-06 3.34E-06 4.15£-06 
140 A I $10,000.00 2.67E-09 6.17£-09 5.24E-09 5.98E-09 7.74E-09 1.1 OE-08 1.32E-08 1.70E-08 1.77E-08 1.96E-08 2.15E-08 2.58E-08 
141 A I $10,000.00 4.09E-10 1.67E-09 1.88E-09 2.21E-09 3.15E-09 4.63E-09 5.87£-09 8.24E-09 8.64E-09 9.41E-09 1.07E-08 1.26E-08 
142 8 2 $100,000.00 8.18E-11 4.02E-10 6.07E-10 9.20E- 10 1.66E-09 3.16£-09 4.99E-09 6.99£-09 9.07E-09 1.18E-08 1.47£-08 1.95£-08 
143 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.04E-11 2.23E-10 3.31E-10 4.60£-10 7.10£-10 1.47E-09 2.35£-09 3.31E-09 3.89£-09 4.63E-09 5.29£-09 7.22E-09 
144 A I $10,000.00 4.54E-1 1 1.83E-1 0 2.27E-10 2.64E-10 3.73E-10 5.36£-10 7.34£-10 1.03£-09 1.06E-09 1.34E-09 1.51 E-09 2.03E-09 
145 8 2 $100,000.00 9.08E-12 4.42£-11 7.34E-11 l.IOE-10 1.96E-10 3.66E-10 6.24£-10 8.74£-10 1.11 E-09 1.69E-09 2.08£-09 3.15E-09 
146 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.27E-12 2.45E-11 4.00E-Il 5.50E-11 8.39E-11 1.71E-JO 2.94E-10 4.14E-10 4.76E-10 6.62E-10 7.48£-10 1.17E-09 
147 8 2 $100,000.00 8.02£-11 3.46E-1 0 5.01£-10 6.45E-10 1.1 OE-09 1.73E-09 2.57£-09 4.08E-09 4.73£-09 5.74E-09 7.23E-09 9.08E-09 
148 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.00E-11 1.92E-1 0 2.73£-10 3.22E-10 4.71£-10 8.07E-10 1.21£-09 1.93E-09 2.03E-09 2.25E-09 2.60E-09 3.36£-09 
149 A I $10,000.00 5.37E-Il 1.51 E-10 1.29E-10 1.47E-10 1.90E-1 0 2.96E-IO 3.81E-10 5.28£-10 5.5 1E- IO 6.10E-10 6.68£-10 9.16£-10 
150 A I $ 10,000.00 8.22E-12 4.10£-11 4.61E-ll 5.43E-11 7.75E-ll 1.24E-10 1.70E-10 2.56£-10 2.69E-10 2.93E-IO 3.31 E-10 4.46E-10 
151 8 2 $100,000.00 1.64E-12 9.88E-12 1.49E- l l 2.26E-1 1 4.07E- l l 8.46E-11 1.45E-l 0 2. 18E-10 2.82£-10 3.68E-10 4.56E-10 6.92£-10 
152 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 4. 11 E-13 5.49£-1 2 8. 14E-12 1. 13E-11 1.74E-11 3.95E- ll 6.80E-11 1.03E-10 1.2 1 E-10 1.44E-10 1.64E-JO 2.56£-10 
153 A I $ 10,000.00 9.13E-13 4.50£- 12 5.57E-12 6.49E-12 9.16£-12 1.44E-ll 2.13E-Il 3.21E-11 3.29E-l l 4.18E-Il 4.68£-11 7.21E-11 
154 8 2 $100,000.00 1.83E-13 1.09£-12 1.80E-12 2.70E-12 4.81£-12 9.80E-12 1.8IE-11 2.72E-II 3.46E-11 5.26E-11 6.45£-11 1.12E-IO 
155 c 4 $10,000,000.00 4.57E-14 6.03E-13 9.84E-13 1.35E-12 2.06£-12 4.57£-12 8.50£-12 1.29E-11 1.48£-11 2.06E-11 2.32E-ll 4.14£-11 
156 8 2 $100,000.00 1.61E-12 8.50E-12 1.23E-11 1.58E-11 2.70E-ll 4.64£-1 1 7.44£-11 1.27£-10 1.47E-1 0 1.79E-10 2.24E-10 3.22E-IO 
157 c 4 $10,000,000.00 4.03E-13 4.72£-12 6.71E-12 7.92E-12 1.16E-ll 2.16E-ll 3.50E-II 6.01£-11 6.3IE-11 6.99E-11 8.08£-11 1.19E-1 0 
158 c 4 $10,000,000.00 l.OOE-12 3.43E-12 3.40£- 12 4.06E-12 5.74E-12 9.66E-12 1.39£-11 2.08£-11 2.3 1£-11 2.71E-11 3.13£-11 4.58£-11 
159 B 2 $100,000.00 1.64E-14 4.94E-14 4.93 £-14 6.08E-14 9.01 E-14 1.48E-13 2.12E-13 3.45E-13 3.96E-13 4.77£ -13 5.64£-13 8.86£-13 
160 c 4 $10,000,000.00 4.09E-15 2.75£-14 2.69E-14 3.04£-14 3.86E-14 6.90£-14 9.97£-14 1.64E-13 1.70E-13 1.87E-13 2.03£-13 3.28E-13 
161 A I $10 000.00 1.80E-04 1.60£-04 1.37E-04 1.3IE-04 1.27£-04 1.72E-04 1.62£-04 1.58E-04 1.55E-04 1.69E-04 1.70E-04 1.76E-04 
162 A I $10,000.00 2.75£-05 4.33£-05 4.91£-05 4.82E-05 5.19E-05 7.24E-05 7.23E-05 7.68E-05 7.54£-05 8.10E-05 8.43E-05 8.55E-05 
109 
Prior 
Class Severity DoUar value Frequency Posterior Frequency End-
State 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
163 B 2 $100,000.00 5.50E..Q6 1.04E..Q5 1.59E..Q5 2.01E..Q5 2.72E..Q5 4.94E..Q5 6. 14E..Q5 6.5 1E..Q5 7.92E..Q5 1.02E..Q4 1.16E..Q4 1.33E..Q4 
164 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.38E..Q6 5.80E..Q6 8.66E..Q6 I.OOE..Q5 1. 17E..Q5 2.30E..Q5 2.89E..Q5 3.08E..Q5 3.39E..Q5 3.98E..Q5 4.18E..Q5 4.91E..Q5 
165 A I $10,000.00 3.06E..Q6 4.76E..Q6 5.93E..Q6 5.77E..Q6 6. 14E..Q6 8.38E..Q6 9.03E..Q6 9.60E..Q6 9.23E..Q6 1.16E..Q5 1.19E..Q5 1.38E..Q5 
166 B 2 $100,000.00 6.12E..Q7 1.15E..Q6 1.92E..Q6 2.40E..Q6 3.22E..Q6 5.71E..Q6 7.68E..Q6 8.14E..Q6 9.70E..Q6 1.45E..Q5 1.64E..Q5 2.14E..Q5 
167 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.53E..Q7 6.38E..Q7 1.05E..Q6 1.20E..Q6 1.38E..Q6 2.67E..Q6 3.61E..Q6 3.86E..Q6 4.16E..Q6 5.69E..Q6 5.92E..Q6 7.94E-06 
168 B 2 $100,000.00 5.40E-06 8.99E-06 1.3 1E..Q5 1.41 E..Q5 1.8 1 E..Q5 2.71E-05 3.16E..Q5 3.80E-05 4.13E..Q5 4.93E..Q5 5.72E-05 6.18E-05 
169 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.35E-06 5.00E..Q6 7.14E..Q6 7.04E..Q6 7.76E-06 1.26E-05 1.49E..Q5 1.80E..Q5 1.77E..Q5 1.93E..Q5 2.06E-05 2.29E-05 
170 A I $10,000.00 1.1 8E-07 I.IOE-07 9.38E..Q8 8.94E..Q8 8.71 E-08 1.20E..Q7 1.18E..Q7 1.21E-07 1.18E..Q7 1.28E..Q7 1.33E..Q7 1.42E-07 
171 A I $10,000.00 1.80E-08 2.97E..Q8 3.36E..Q8 3.30E..Q8 3.55E-08 5.06E-08 5.28E..Q8 5.85E-08 5.75E..Q8 6.17E..Q8 6.57E..Q8 6.93E-08 
172 B 2 $100,000.00 3.61 E-09 7. 15E-09 1.09E..Q8 1.38E..Q8 1.86E-08 3.45E-08 4.49E..Q8 4.96E..Q8 6.03E-08 7.76E..Q8 9.06E..Q8 1.07E-07 
173 c 4 $10,000,000.00 9.02E-10 3.97E-09 5.93E..Q9 6.88E..Q9 7.98E..Q9 1.61 E-08 2. 11 E..Q8 2.35E..Q8 2.59E..Q8 3.04E..Q8 3.26E..Q8 3.98E-08 
174 A I $10,000.00 2.00E..Q9 3.26E-09 4.06E..Q9 3.95E..Q9 4.20E-09 5.85E-09 6.60E..Q9 7.32E..Q9 7.04E..Q9 8.81E..Q9 9.29E..Q9 1.12E-08 
175 B 2 $100,000.00 4.01E-10 7.86E-10 1.31 E..Q9 1.64E-09 2.20E-09 3.99E-09 5.6 1 E-09 6.2 1 E-09 7.39E..Q9 I. I IE..Q8 1.28E-08 1.74E-08 
176 c 4 $10,000,000.00 I.OOE-10 4.37E-I O 7. 17E- IO 8.22E-10 9.44E-10 1.86E..Q9 2.64E-09 2.94E-09 3.17E..Q9 4.34E-09 4.61E..Q9 6.43E-09 
177 B 2 $100,000.00 3.54E-09 6.16E-09 8.96E-09 9.64E..Q9 1.24E-08 1.89E-08 2.3 1 E-08 2.90E-08 3.15E..Q8 3.76E..Q8 4.46E..Q8 5.01E-08 
178 c 4 $10,000,000.00 8.84E-10 3.42E-09 4.89E..Q9 4.82E-09 5.30E-09 8.82E-09 1.09E-08 1.37E-08 1.35E..Q8 1.47E..Q8 1.61 E..Q8 1.85E-08 
179 A I $10,000.00 2.37E..Q9 2.69E-09 2.30E..Q9 2.20E..Q9 2.14E-09 3.23E-09 3.43E-09 3.75E-09 3.67E-09 4.00E-09 4. 12E..Q9 5.05E-09 
180 A I $10 000.00 3.63E-10 7.29E-IO 8.25E-IO 8. 11 E-10 8.72E-10 1.35E-09 1.53E-09 1.82E..Q9 1.79E..Q9 1.92E..Q9 2.04E..Q9 2.46E-09 
181 B 2 $100,000.00 7.25E-II 1.76E-I 0 2.67E-10 3.38E-10 4.58E-IO 9.24E- IO 1.30E-09 1.54E..Q9 1.88E..Q9 2.41 E..Q9 2.81E..Q9 3.81 E-09 
182 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.81 E-1 1 9.76E-11 1.46E-10 1.69E-10 1.96E-IO 4.31E-IO 6.11E-10 7.32E-10 8.05E-10 9.45E-IO 1.01 E..Q9 1.41 E-09 
183 A I $10,000.00 4.03E-11 8.01E-1 1 9.97E-11 9.69E-1 1 1.03E-I 0 1.57E-I 0 1.91E-IO 2.28E-10 2.19E-10 2.74E-10 2.89E-10 3.97E-10 
184 B 2 $100,000.00 8.06E-12 1.93E-I I 3.23E-11 4.04E-11 5.4 1E-11 1.07E-I 0 1.62E-1 0 1.93E-I 0 2.30E-I O 3.45E-IO 3.98E-IO 6.16E-10 
185 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.01E-12 1.07E-Il 1.76E-11 2.02E-1 1 2.32E-11 4.99E-11 7.64E-11 9.15E-Il 9.85E-11 1.35E-I 0 1.43E-IO 2.28E-IO 
186 B 2 $100,000.00 7.11E-1 1 1.51E-10 2.20E-10 2.37E-10 3.04E-10 5.06E-10 6.69E-10 9.0 1E-10 9.79E-IO 1.1 7E..Q9 1.38E..Q9 1.78E-09 
187 c 4 $10 000,000.00 1.78E-11 8.40E-11 1.20E-10 1.18E-1 0 1.30E-1 0 2.36E-1 0 3.15E-10 4.27E-10 4.20E-10 4.58E-10 4.98E-10 6.58E-10 
188 c 4 $10 000 000.00 4.42E-11 6.09E-11 6.08E- 11 6.07E-1 1 6.45E-11 1.05E-10 1.25E-1 0 1.48E-10 1.54E-10 1.78E-10 1.93E-1 0 2.52E-10 
189 B 2 $100,000.00 7.22E-13 8.80E-13 8.83E-13 9.08E-13 l.OIE-12 1.61E-12 1.90E-12 2.45E-12 2.63E-12 3.13E-12 3.48E-12 4.89E-12 
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Prior 
Class Severity Dollar value Frequency Posterior Frequency End-
State 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
190 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 1.80E-1 3 4.89E-1 3 4.82E-1 3 4.54E-1 3 4.35E-1 3 7.53E-1 3 8.96E-13 1.1 6E-1 2 1.1 3E-1 2 1.22E-1 2 1.25E-12 1.81E-1 2 
.. Table C-2. End-state probab1httes for the ISOM umt over the 11 year penod 
Prior 
Class Severity Dollar value Risk Posterior Risk End-
State 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 A I $10,000.00 9.70E+03 9.62E+03 9.56E+03 9.54E+03 9.50E+03 9.46E+03 9.40E+03 9.33E+03 9.29E+03 9.24E+03 9. 19E+03 9. 11 E+03 
2 A I $ 10,000.00 1.27E+02 1.1 8E+02 1.34E+02 1.27E+02 1.16E+02 1.07E+02 1.03E+02 9.59E+O I 9.65E+O I 1.03E+02 1.03E+02 1.03E+02 
3 A I $10,000.00 1.94E+O I 3.18E+O I 4.79E+OI 4.71E+OI 4.74E+OI 4.49E+OI 4.60E+O I 4.65E+O I 4.71E+O I 4.97E+O I 5.12E+O I 5.01E+O I 
4 B 2 $100,000.00 3.88E+OI 7.68E+OI 1.55E+02 1.96E+02 2.49E+02 3.06E+02 3.91E+02 3.95E+02 4.94E+02 6.25E+02 7.06E+02 7.78E+02 
5 c 4 $10,000,000.00 9.69E+02 4.26E+03 8.46E+03 9.80E+03 1.07E+04 1.43E+04 1.84E+04 1.87E+04 2.12E+04 2.44E+04 2.54E+04 2.88E+04 
6 A I $ 10 000.00 2.15E+OO 3.50E+OO 5.79E+OO 5.63E+OO 5.60E+OO 5.20E+OO 5.75E+OO 5.82E+OO 5.76E+OO 7. 10E+OO 7.24E+OO 8. 10E+OO 
7 B 2 $100,000.00 4.3 1E+OO 8.44E+OO 1.87E+O I 2.34E+O I 2.94E+O I 3.54E+O I 4.89E+O I 4.94E+O I 6.05E+O I 8.92E+O I 9.98E+O I 1.26E+02 
8 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.08E+02 4.69E+02 1.02E+03 1.17E+03 1.26E+03 1.65E+03 2.30E+03 2.34E+03 2.59E+03 3.49E+03 3.59E+03 4.65E+03 
9 B 2 $100,000.00 3.80E+O I 6.61E+O I 1.28E+02 1.37E+02 1.65E+02 1.68E+02 2.01E+02 2.30E+02 2.58E+02 3.03E+02 3.48E+02 3.62E+02 
10 c 4 $10,000 000.00 9.50E+02 3.67E+03 6.98E+03 6.87E+03 7.08E+03 7.83E+03 9.48E+03 1.09E+04 I.I OE+04 1.1 8E+04 1.25E+04 1.34E+04 
11 A I $10,000.00 3.1 7E+O I 6.54E+O l 5.57E+O I 6.37E+O I 7.75E+O I 8.0 1E+O I 8.72E+O I 1.03E+02 1.03E+02 9.69E+O I 9.72E+O I 1.03E+02 
12 A I $10,000.00 4.84E+OO 1.77E+O I 2.00E+OI 2.35E+O I 3.15E+O I 3.36E+O I 3.89E+O I 5.01E+O I 5.04E+O I 4.65E+O I 4.82E+O I 5.01E+O I 
13 B 2 $100,000.00 9.69E+OO 4.26E+O I 6.46E+O I 9.80E+O l 1.66E+02 2.29E+02 3.31E+02 4.25E+02 5.29E+02 5.85E+02 6.64E+02 7.77E+02 
14 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.42E+02 2.37E+03 3.52E+03 4.90E+03 7.10E+03 1.07E+04 1.56E+04 2.01E+04 2.27E+04 2.29E+04 2.39E+04 2.88E+04 
15 A I $10,000.00 5.38E-OI 1.94E+OO 2.4 1E+OO 2.81E+OO 3.73E+OO 3.89E+OO 4.86E+OO 6.26E+OO 6.17E+OO 6.65E+OO 6.81E+OO 8.10E+OO 
16 B 2 $100,000.00 1.08E+OO 4.68E+OO 7.80E+OO 1.17E+O I 1.96E+O I 2.66E+OI 4.14E+OI 5.31E+OI 6.48E+O I 8.36E+OI 9.39E+O I 1.26E+02 
17 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.69E+O I 2.60E+02 4.26E+02 5.86E+02 8.40E+02 1.24E+03 1.95E+03 2.52E+03 2.78E+03 3.27E+03 3.38E+03 4.65E+03 
18 B 2 $100,000.00 9.50E+OO 3.67E+O I 5.32E+O I 6.86E+OI I.IOE+02 1.26E+02 1.70E+02 2.48E+02 2.76E+02 2.84E+02 3.27E+02 3.62E+02 
19 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 2.37E+02 2.04E+03 2.90E+03 3.43E+03 4.71E+03 5.87E+03 8.01E+03 1.17E+04 1.1 8E+04 I.II E+04 1.1 8E+04 1.34E+04 
Ill 
Prior 
Class Severity DoUar value Risk Posterior Risk End-
State 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ll 
20 A I $10,000.00 2.07E-02 4.48E-02 3.81 E-02 4.36E-02 5.30E-02 5.60E-02 6.37E-02 7.86E-02 7.87E-02 7.38E-02 7.58E-02 8.34E-02 
21 A I $10 000.00 3.17E-03 1.21E-02 1.37E-02 1.61 E-02 2.16E-02 2.35E-02 2.84E-02 3.82E-02 3.84E-02 3.55E-02 3.75E-02 4.06E-02 
22 8 2 $100,000.00 6.35E-03 2.92E-02 4.42E-02 6.70E-02 1.13E-01 1.60E-OI 2.42E-OI 3.24E-OI 4.03E-OI 4.46E-OI 5. 17E-OI 6.30E-OI 
23 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.59E-O I 1.62E+OO 2.41E+OO 3.35E+OO 4.85E+OO 7.47E+OO 1.14E+O I 1.53E+OI 1.73E+OI 1.75E+OI 1.86E+O I 2.33E+O I 
24 A I $10,000.00 3.53E-04 1.33E-03 1.65E-03 1.92E-03 2.55E-03 2.72E-03 3.55E-03 4.77E-03 4.70E-03 5.06E-03 5.31E-03 6.57E-03 
25 8 2 $100,000.00 7.05E-04 3.21 E-03 5.34E-03 S.OIE-03 1.34E-02 1.85E-02 3.02E-02 4.05E-02 4.94E-02 6.37E-02 7.32E-02 1.02E-OI 
26 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.76E-02 1.78E-OI 2.91E-OI 4.01E-OI 5.74E-01 8.65E-OI 1.42E+OO 1.92E+OO 2.12E+OO 2.49E+OO 2.63E+OO 3.77E+OO 
27 8 2 $100,000.00 6.22E-03 2.51E-02 3.64E-02 4.70E-02 7.52E-02 8.78E-02 1.24E-OI 1.89E-Ol 2. 10E-OI 2.16E-OI 2.55E-OI 2.93E-OI 
28 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.56E-OI 1.40E+OO 1.99E+OO 2.35E+OO 3.22E+OO 4.10E+OO 5.85E+OO 8.95E+OO 9.01E+OO 8.46E+OO 9.17E+OO 1.09E+OI 
29 A I $10,000.00 4.17E-04 l.IOE-03 9.37E-04 1.07E-03 1.30E-03 1.50E-03 1.84E-03 2.45E-03 2.45E-03 2.30E-03 2.35E-03 2.96E-03 
30 A I $10,000.00 6.38E-05 2.97E-04 3.36E-04 3.95E-04 5.30E-04 6.29E-04 8.23E-04 1.19E-03 1.19E-03 I.IOE-03 1.17E-03 1.44E-03 
31 8 2 $100,000.00 1.28E-04 7.17E-04 1.09E-03 1.65E-03 2.78E-03 4.29E-03 7.00E-03 l.OIE-02 1.25E-02 1.39E-02 1.61E-02 2.23E-02 
32 c 4 $10,000 000.00 3.19E-03 3.98E-02 5.92E-02 8.23E-02 1.19E-01 2.00E-01 3.29E-01 4.77E-0 1 5.38E-01 5.43E-O I 5.78E-01 8.28E-01 
33 A I $10,000.00 7.09E-06 3.27E-05 4.06E-05 4.72E-05 6.27E-05 7.29E-05 1.03E-04 1.49E-04 1.46E-04 1.58E-04 1.65E-04 2.33E-04 
34 8 2 $100,000.00 1.42E-05 7.88E-05 1.31 E-04 1.97E-04 3.29E-04 4.97E-04 8.75E-04 1.26E-03 1.54E-03 1.98E-03 2.27E-03 3.61E-03 
35 c 4 $10,000 000.00 3.54E-04 4.38E-03 7.16E-03 9.84E-03 1.41E-02 2.32E-02 4. 12E-02 5.97E-02 6.58E-02 7.76E-02 8.18E-02 1.34E-01 
36 8 2 $100,000.00 1.25E-04 6. 17E-04 8.95E-04 1.15E-03 1.85E-03 2.35E-03 3.60E-03 5.88E-03 6.54E-03 6.72E-03 7.9 1E-03 1.04E-02 
37 c 4 $10 000,000.00 3.13E-03 3.43E-02 4.88E-02 5.77E-02 7.92E-02 l.IOE-01 1.70E-OI 2.79E-OI 2.80E-O I 2.63E-01 2.85E-OI 3.86E-01 
38 c 4 $10,000,000.00 7.78E-03 2.49E-02 2.47E-02 2.96E-02 3.92E-02 4.90E-02 6.72E-02 9.63E-02 1.03E-OI 1.02E-01 l.IOE-01 1.48E-01 
39 8 2 $100,000.00 1.27E-06 3.59E-06 3.59E-06 4.43E-06 6.17E-06 7.50E-06 1.03E-05 1.60E-05 1.76E-05 I .SOE-05 1.99E-05 2.86E-05 
40 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.18E-05 1.99E-04 1.96E-04 2.21E-04 2.64E-04 3.50E-04 4.83E-04 7.58E-04 7.54E-04 7.03E-04 7.16E-04 1.06E-03 
41 A I $10,000.00 7.50E+OI 8.03E+OI 7.96E+OI 7.94E+OI 8.58E+O I 9.56E+OI 1.02E+02 1.07E+02 1.14E+02 1.24E+02 1.35E+02 1.50E+02 
42 A I $10,000.00 9.79E-OI 9.83E-OI 1.11 E+OO 1.06E+OO 1.05E+OO 1.08E+OO l.IIE+OO l.IOE+OO 1.18E+OO 1.39E+OO 1.52E+OO 1.69E+OO 
43 A I $10,000.00 1.50E-01 2.66E-OI 3.99E-OI 3.91E-01 4.28E-OI 4.53E-OI 4.97E-OI 5.36E-OI 5.75E-0 1 6.67E-01 7.55E-OI 8.24E-O I 
44 8 2 $100,000.00 3.00E-01 6.41 E-0 I 1.29E+OO 1.63E+OO 2.25E+OO 3.09E+OO 4.23E+OO 4.54E+OO 6.04E+OO 8.39E+OO 1.04E+OI 1.28E+OI 
45 c 4 $10,000 000.00 7.49E+OO 3.56E+OI 7.04E+OI 8.15E+OI 9.63E+OI 1.44E+02 1.99E+02 2.15E+02 2.59E+02 3.28E+02 3.75E+02 4.73E+02 
46 A I $10,000.00 1.66E-02 2.92E-02 4.82E-02 4.68E-02 5.06E-02 5.25E-02 6.22E-02 6.69E-02 7.04E-02 9.53E-02 1.07E-OI 1.33E-O I 
112 
Prior Risk Posterior Risk 
End- Class Severity Dollar value 
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47 B 2 $100 000.00 3.33£-02 7.04£-02 1.56£-0 1 1.95£-0 I 2.66£-01 3.58£-01 5.28£-01 5.68£-01 7.40£-01 1.20£+00 1.47£+00 2.07£+00 
48 c 4 $10,000,000.00 8.32£-01 3.91£+00 8.5 1 E+OO 9.75£+00 1.14£+01 1.67£+01 2.49£+01 2.69£+01 3.17£+0 1 4 .69£+0 1 5.30£+0 1 7.65£+01 
49 B 2 $100,000.00 2.94£-01 5.52£-01 1.06£+00 1.14£+00 1.49£+00 1.69£+00 2.18£+00 2.65£+00 3.15£+00 4.07E+OO 5.13£+00 5.95E+OO 
50 c 4 $10,000,000.00 7.34£+00 3.06£+01 5.81£+0 1 5.71£+01 6.40£+01 7.91£+01 1.02£+02 1.26£+02 1.35£+02 1.59£+02 1.85£+02 2.21£+02 
51 A I $10,000.00 2.45£-01 5.46£-01 4.64£-01 5.30E-01 7.00£-01 8.10£-01 9.42£-0 I 1.19£+00 1.26E+OO IJOE+OO 1.43E+OO 1.69£+00 
52 A I $10,000.00 3.74£-02 1.48£-01 1.66£-01 1.96£-01 2.85£-01 3.40£-01 4.20£-01 5.76£-01 6.16£-01 6.25£-01 7.10£-01 8.24£-01 
53 B 2 $100,000.00 7.49£-02 3.56£-01 5.37£-01 8.15£-01 1.50£+00 2.32E+OO 3.57£+00 4.89£+00 6.47£+00 7.86£+00 9.79£+00 1.28£+01 
54 c 4 $10 000 000.00 1.87£+00 1.98£+01 2.93£+01 4.07£+01 6.42£+01 1.08£+02 1.68£+02 2.32£+02 2.77£+02 3.08£+02 3.52£+02 4.73£+02 
55 A I $10 000.00 4.16£-03 1.62£-02 2.01£-02 2.34£-02 3.37£-02 3.93£-02 5.26£-02 7.20£-02 7.54£-02 8.93£-02 I.OOE-01 1.33£-0 I 
56 B 2 $100,000.00 8.32£-03 3.91£-02 6.50£-02 9.74£-02 1.77£-01 2.68£-01 4.47£-0 I 6.11£-01 7.92£-01 1.12£+00 1.38£+00 2.06£+00 
57 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.08£-01 2.17£+00 3.54£+00 4.87£+00 7.59£+00 1.25£+01 2.10£+01 2.89£+01 3.39£+01 4.40£+01 4.98£+01 7.64£+01 
58 B 2 $100,000.00 7.34£-02 3.06£-01 4.43£-01 5.71£-01 9.94£-01 1.27E+OO 1.84£+00 2.85£+00 3.37£+00 3.81£+00 4.82£+00 5.95£+00 
59 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.83£+00 1.70£+01 2.42£+01 2.85£+01 4.26£+01 5.93£+01 8.66£+01 1.35E+02 1.45£+02 1.49£+02 1.74E+02 2.20E+02 
60 A I $10,000.00 1.60£-04 3.74£-04 3.17£-04 3.62£-04 4.79£-04 5.65£-04 6.88£-04 9.05£-04 9.62£-04 9.92£-04 1.12£-03 1.37£-03 
61 A I $10 000.00 2.45£-05 1.0 I E-04 1.14£-04 1.34£-04 1.95£-04 2.37£-04 3.07E-04 4.39£-04 4.69£-04 4.76£-04 5.53£-04 6.68£-04 
62 B 2 $100,000.00 4.91 E-05 2.44£-04 3.68£-04 5.57£-04 1.02£-03 1.62£-03 2.61 E-03 3.73£-03 4.93£-03 5.99£-03 7.63£-03 1.04£-02 
63 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.23£-03 1.35£-02 2.0 1£-02 2.79£-02 4.39£-02 7.55E-02 1.23£-0 I 1.77E-O I 2.11£-0 1 2.34£-0 1 2.75£-01 3.84£-01 
64 A I $10,000.00 2.73£-06 I.IIE-05 1.37£-05 1.60£-05 2.31 E-05 2.75£-05 3.84£-05 5.49£-05 5.75£-05 6.81£-05 7.83£-05 1.08£-04 
65 B 2 $100,000.00 5.45£-06 2.68£-05 4.45£-05 6.67£-05 1.21 E-04 1.87£-04 3.26£-04 4.66£-04 6.03£-04 8.56£-04 1.08£-03 1.67£-03 
66 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.36£-04 1.49£-03 2.43£-03 3.33£-03 5.19£-03 8.74£-03 1.54£-02 2.21£-02 2.59£-02 3.35£-02 3.88£-02 6.20£-02 
67 B 2 $100,000.00 4.81 E-05 2.10£-04 3.03£-04 3.91£-04 6.80£-04 8.87£-04 1.34£-03 2.17E-03 2.57£-03 2.90£-03 3.76£-03 4.82£-03 
68 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.20£-03 1.16£-02 1.66£-02 1.95£-02 2.91 E-02 4.14£-02 6.32£-02 1.03£-0 I 1.1 OE-01 1.14£-01 1.35£-0 I 1.79£-0 I 
69 A I $10 000.00 3.22£-06 9.18£-06 7.80£-06 8.90£-06 1.18£-05 1.52£-05 1.99£-05 2.82£-05 2.99£-05 3.09£-05 3.47£-05 4.86£-05 
70 A I $10,000.00 4.93£-07 2.48£-06 2.79£-06 3.29£-06 4.79£-06 6.36E-06 8.89E-06 1.37£-05 1.46£-05 1.48£-05 1.72£-05 2.37£-05 
71 B 2 $100,000.00 9.86£-07 5.98£-06 9.04£-06 1.37£-05 2.51 E-05 4.34£-05 7.56£-05 1.16£-04 1.53£-04 1.86£-04 2.37£-04 3.67£-04 
72 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.47£-05 3.32£-04 4.93£-04 6.85£-04 1.08£-03 2.02£-03 3.56£-03 5.49£-03 6.57£-03 7.30£-03 8.53£-03 1.36£-02 
73 A I $10,000.00 5.48£-08 2.73£-07 3.38£-07 3.93£-07 5.66£-07 7.36£-07 1.11 E-06 1.71 E-06 1.79£-06 2.12£-06 2.43£-06 3.83£-06 
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End- Class Severity DoUar value 
State 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
74 B 2 $100 000.00 1.1 OE-{)7 6.57E.{)7 1.09E.{)6 1.64E.{)6 2.97E.{)6 5.02E.{)6 9.45E.{)6 1.45E.{)5 1.88E.{)5 2.66E.{)5 3.35E.{)5 5.94E.{)5 
75 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.74E.{)6 3.65E.{)5 5.96E.{)5 8. 19E.{)5 1.27E.{)4 2.34E.{)4 4.45E.{)4 6.87E.{)4 8.05E.{)4 1.04E.{)3 1.21E.{)3 2.20E.{)3 
76 B 2 $100,000.00 9.67E.{)7 5.15E.{)6 7.45E.{)6 9.60E.{)6 1.67E.{)5 2.38E.{)5 3.89E.{)5 6.77E.{)5 8.00E.{)5 9.04E.{)5 1.17E.{)4 1.71 E-{)4 
77 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 2.42E.{)5 2.86E.{)4 4.07E.{)4 4.80E.{)4 7.16E.{)4 !.II E-{)3 1.83E.{)3 3.20E.{)3 3.43E.{)3 3.54E.{)3 4.20E.{)3 6.34E.{)3 
78 c 4 $10,000,000.00 6.01E.{)5 2.08E.{)4 2.06E.{)4 2.46E.{)4 3.55E.{)4 4.95E.{)4 7.26E.{)4 1.11 E-{)3 1.25£.{)3 1.37E.{)3 1.63£.{)3 2.43E.{)3 
79 B 2 $100,000.00 9.82E.{)9 2.99E.{)8 2.99E.{)8 3.68£.{)8 5.57E.{)8 7.57E.{)8 l.IIE-{)7 1.84E.{)7 2.15E.{)7 2.4 1E.{)7 2.93E.{)7 4.7 1E.{)7 
80 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.45E.{)7 1.66E.{)6 1.63E.{)6 1.84E.{)6 2.39E.{)6 3.53E.{)6 5.21E.{)6 8.72E-06 9.21E.{)6 9.44E.{)6 1.06E.{)5 1.74E.{)5 
81 A I $10,000.00 8.33E+OO 9.81E+OO 9.73E+OO 9.70E+OO 1.04E+O I 1.16E+OI 1.21E+OI 1.27E+OI 1.33E+OI 1.44E+OI 1.69E+OI 2.34E+O I 
82 A I $10 000.00 1.09E.{)I 1.20E.{)I 1.36E.{)I I JOE.{) I 1.27E.{) I IJIE-{)1 1.33E.{) I IJOE-01 1.38E.{) I 1.61E.{)I 1.91E.{)I 2.64E.{)I 
83 A I $10,000.00 1.66E.{)2 3.25E.{)2 4.88E.{)2 4.78E.{)2 5.17E.{)2 5.48E.{)2 5.95E.{)2 6.33E-02 6.73E.{)2 7.73E.{)2 9.44E.{)2 1.29E.{) I 
84 B 2 $100,000.00 3.33E.{)2 7.83E.{)2 1.58E.{)I 1.99E.{)I 2.72E.{)I 3.74E.{)I 5.05E.{)I 5.37E-OI 7.07E.{)I 9.72E.{)I IJOE+OO 2.00E+OO 
85 c 4 $10,000,000.00 8.32E.{)I 4.35E+OO 8.60E+OO 9.96E+OO 1.16E+OI 1.74E+OI 2.38E+OI 2.55E+OI 3.03E+OI 3.80E+OI 4.69E+OI 7.40E+OI 
86 A I $10,000.00 1.85E.{)3 3.57E.{)3 5.89E.{)3 5.72E.{)3 6.12E.{)3 6.35E.{)3 7.43E.{)3 7.92E-03 8.24E.{)3 1.1 OE-{)2 1.33E.{)2 2.08E.{)2 
87 B 2 $100,000.00 3.70E.{)3 8.61E.{)3 1.91 E-{)2 2.38E.{)2 3.21E.{)2 4.33E.{)2 6.32E.{)2 6.72E.{)2 8.66E.{)2 1.39E.{)I 1.84E.{)I 3.23E.{) I 
88 c 4 $10,000,000.00 9.25E.{)2 4.78E.{) I 1.04E+OO 1.19E+OO 1.38E+OO 2.02E+OO 2.97E+OO 3.18E+OO 3.71E+OO 5.43E+OO 6.63E+OO 1.20E+OI 
89 B 2 $100 000.00 3.26E.{)2 6.74E.{)2 IJOE-{)1 1.40E.{)I 1.80E.{)I 2.05E.{)I 2.60E.{) I 3.14E.{) I 3.69E.{) I 4.71E.{)I 6.41E.{)I 9.30E.{)I 
90 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 8.16E.{)I 3.75E+OO 7.10E+OO 6.98E+OO 7.73E+OO 9.56E+OO 1.22E+OI 1.49E+OI 1.58E+OI 1.84E+O I 2.31E+O I 3.45E+OI 
91 A I $10,000.00 2.72E.{)2 6.67E.{)2 5.67E.{)2 6.47E.{)2 8.46E.{)2 9.79E.{)2 1.13E.{)I 1.40E-0 1 1.48E.{) I l.SIE-{)1 1.79E.{)I 2.64E-OI 
92 A I $10,000.00 4.16E.{)3 1.80E.{)2 2.03E.{)2 2.39E.{)2 3.45E.{)2 4.11E.{)2 5.03E.{)2 6.82E-02 7.21E.{)2 7.24E.{)2 8.88E.{)2 1.29E.{)I 
93 B 2 $100,000.00 8.32E.{)3 4.35E.{)2 6.57E.{)2 9.96E.{)2 1.81E.{)I 2.80E.{)l 4.27E.{)I 5.78E.{)I 7.57E.{) I 9.10E.{)I 1.22E+OO 2.00E+OO 
94 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.08E.{)I 2.42E+OO 3.58E+OO 4.98E+OO 7.76E+OO IJIE+OI 2.01E+OI 2.74E+OI 3.24E+OI 3.56E+OI 4.41E+OI 7.39E+OI 
95 A I $10,000.00 4.62E.{)4 1.98E.{)3 2.45E.{)3 2.86E.{)3 4.08E.{)3 4.76E.{)3 6.28E.{)3 8.52E.{)3 8.83E.{)3 1.03E.{)2 1.26E.{)2 2.08E.{)2 
96 B 2 $100,000.00 9.24E.{)4 4.78E.{)3 7.94E.{)3 1.19E.{)2 2.14E.{)2 3.24E.{)2 5.34E.{)2 7.23E-02 9.27E.{)2 IJOE-{)1 1.73E.{)I 3.22E.{)I 
97 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.31E.{)2 2.65E.{)I 4.33E.{)I 5.95E.{)I 9.17E.{)I l.SIE+OO 2.51E+OO 3.42E+OO 3.97E+OO 5.09E+OO 6.23E+OO 1.19E+OI 
98 B 2 $100 000.00 8.15E.{)3 3.74E.{)2 5.42E.{)2 6.98E.{)2 1.20E.{)I 1.53E.{) I 2.20E.{)I 3.37E.{)I 3.95E.{)I 4.41E.{)I 6.02E.{)I 9.30E.{)I 
99 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.04E.{)I 2.08E+OO 2.96E+OO 3.49E+OO 5.15E+OO 7.16E+OO 1.04E+OI 1.60E+OI 1.69E+OI 1.73E+OI 2.17E+OI 3.44E+OI 
100 A I $10,000.00 1.78E.{)5 4.57E.{)5 3.88E.{)5 4.43E.{)5 5.79E.{)5 6.83E.{)5 8.23E.{)5 1.07E.{)4 1.13E.{)4 1.15E.{)4 1.40E.{)4 2.14E.{)4 
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101 A I $10 000.00 2.73E-06 1.23E-05 1.39E-05 1.64E-05 2.36E-05 2.87E-05 3.67E-05 5.20E-05 5.49E-05 5.52E-05 6.92E-05 1.04E-04 
102 B 2 $100,000.00 5.45E-06 2.98E-05 4.50£-05 6.81 E-05 1.24E-04 1.96£-04 3.12E-04 4.41E-04 5.77E-04 6.94E-04 9.54£-04 1.62E-03 
103 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.36£-04 1.65E-03 2.45E-03 3.4 1E-03 5.30£-03 9.13E-03 1.47£-02 2.09£-02 2.47E-02 2.7 1E-02 3.43E-02 5.99£-02 
104 A I $10,000.00 3.03E-07 1.36£-06 1.68£-06 1.96E-06 2.79E-06 3.32E-06 4.59E-06 6.50E-06 6.73E-06 7.88E-06 9.78E-06 1.69E-05 
105 B 2 $100,000.00 6.06E-07 3.27E-06 5.44E-06 8. 15E-06 1.46E-05 2.26E-05 3.90E-05 5.51 E-05 7.06E-05 9.91E-05 1.35E-04 2.61E-04 
106 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.51E-05 1.82E-04 2.96E-04 4.07£-04 6.27E-04 1.06E-03 1.84E-03 2.61E-03 3.03E-03 3.88E-03 4.86£-03 9.68£-03 
107 B 2 $100,000.00 5.34E-06 2.56E-05 3.71 E-05 4.77E-05 8.22E-05 1.07E-04 1.61E-04 2.57£-04 3.01E-04 3.36£-04 4.70E-04 7.54E-04 
108 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.34E-04 1.42E-03 2.02E-03 2.39£-03 3.52E-03 5.00£-03 7.56E-03 1.22£-02 1.29£-02 1.32E-02 1.69E-02 2.79E-02 
109 A I $10,000.00 3.58E-07 1.12E-06 9.53£-07 1.09E-06 1.42E-06 1.83E-06 2.38E-06 3.33£-06 3.50E-06 3.57E-06 4.34E-06 7.60E-06 
110 A I $10,000.00 5.48E-08 3.03E-07 3.41E-07 4.02£-07 5.79E-07 7.69£-07 1.06E-06 1.62E-06 1.71£-06 1.72E-06 2.15E-06 3.70E-06 
111 B 2 $100,000.00 I.IOE-07 7.31E-07 I.IOE-06 1.67E-06 3.04E-06 5.24E-06 9.04E-06 1.37E-05 1.79E-05 2.16E-05 2.96E-05 5.74E-05 
112 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.74E-06 4.06E-05 6.02E-05 8.37E-05 1.30E-04 2.45E-04 4.25E-04 6.50E-04 7.69E-04 8.45E-04 1.07E-03 2.13E-03 
113 A I $10,000.00 6.09E-09 3.33E-08 4.13E-08 4.80E-08 6.85E-08 8.90£-08 1.33E-07 2.02E-07 2.09E-07 2.45E-07 3.04E-07 5.98E-07 
114 B 2 $100,000.00 1.22E-08 8.03E-08 1.34E-07 2.00E-07 3.59E-07 6.07E-07 1.13E-06 1.71£-06 2.20E-06 3.08E-06 4.19E-06 9.28E-06 
115 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.04E-07 4.46E-06 7.28E-06 I.OOE-05 1.54E-05 2.83E-05 5.32E-05 8.12E-05 9.42E-05 1.21E-04 1.51E-04 3.44E-04 
116 B 2 $100 000.00 1.07E-07 6.29£-07 9.11E-07 1.17E-06 2.02E-06 2.87E-06 4.65E-06 8.00E-06 9.36£-06 1.05E-05 1.46£-05 2.67E-05 
117 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.69E-06 3.50E-05 4.97E-05 5.86E-05 8.65£-05 1.34E-04 2.19E-04 3.79E-04 4.01£-04 4.09£-04 5.25E-04 9.90E-04 
118 c 4 $10,000,000.00 6.68E-06 2.54£-05 2.51E-05 3.01E-05 4.29E-05 5.98E-05 8.68E-05 IJIE-04 1.47E-04 1.59E-04 2.04E-04 3.80E-04 
119 B 2 $100,000.00 1.09E-09 3.66E-09 3.65E-09 4.50E-09 6.74E-09 9.16E-09 1.32E-08 2.18E-08 2.52E-08 2.79E-08 3.67E-08 7.36E-08 
120 c 4 $1 0,000,000.00 2.73£-08 2.03E-07 1.99E-07 2.25E-07 2.89E-07 4.27E-07 6.23£-07 1.03£-06 1.08E-06 1.09E-06 1.32E-06 2.72E-06 
121 A I $10,000.00 1.25E+OI 1.33E+OI 1.31E+OI 1.31E+OI 1.39E+OI 1.86E+OI 1.94£+01 2.01E+OI 2.09E+O I 2.45E+OI 2.61E+OI 2.82E+OI 
122 A I $10,000.00 1.63E-OI 1.62E-01 1.84E-O I 1.75E-O I 1.70E-01 2.11E-OI 2.13E-OI 2.07E-OI 2.17£-01 2.75E-01 2.93E-OI 3.19E-01 
123 A I $10,000.00 2.50E-02 4.39E-02 6.59E-02 6.46E-02 6.92£-02 8.85E-02 9.51E-02 I.OOE-01 1.06E-01 1.32E-01 1.45E-01 1.55E-O I 
124 B 2 $100,000.00 4.99E-02 1.06E-OI 2.13E-OI 2.69E-01 3.64E-OI 6.03E-OI 8.08£-01 8.52E-OI I.IIE+OO 1.66E+OO 2.00E+OO 2.41E+OO 
125 c 4 $10,000 000.00 1.25E+OO 5.88E+OO 1.16E+O I 1.35E+O I 1.56E+O I 2.81£+01 3.80E+O I 4.04E+O I 4.76E+O I 6.49E+O I 7.22E+OI 8.91E+Ol 
126 A I $10 000.00 2.77E-03 4.82E-03 7.96E-03 7.72E-03 8.19E-03 1.02£-02 1.19E-02 1.26E-02 1.30E-02 1.88E-02 2.06E-02 2.51E-02 
127 B 2 $100,000.00 S.SSE-03 1.16E-02 2.58E-02 3.22E-02 4.30E-02 6.98E-02 I.OIE-01 1.07E-01 1.36E-01 2.37E-01 2.83E-OI 3.89£-01 
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128 c 4 $ 10 000,000.00 1.39£-01 6.46£-01 1.40£+00 1.61£+00 1.84E+OO 3.26E+OO 4.76E+OO 5.05£+00 5.83E+OO 9.27E+OO 1.02E+OI 1.44E+OI 
129 8 2 $100,000.00 4.90£-02 9.11 £-02 1.76£-0 1 1.89£-0 1 2.4 1 E-0 1 3.31 E-01 4.16£-01 4.97£-01 5.80£-01 8.04£-0 1 9.87£-01 1.1 2E+OO 
130 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 1.22£+00 5.06£+00 9.59E+OO 9.43E+OO 1.03£+01 1.54£+01 1.96E+OI 2.36£+01 2.48£+01 3.15E+OI 3.55£+01 4 .15E+OI 
131 A I $10,000.00 4.08£-02 9.01£-02 7.66£-02 8.74£-02 1.13£-01 1.58£-01 1.80£-01 2.23£-01 2.32£-0 1 2.57E-0 1 2.76£-01 3.18E-01 
132 A I $10,000.00 6.24£-03 2.44£-02 2.74£-02 3.23£-02 4.61£-02 6.63£-02 8.04£-02 1.08£-01 1.13£-01 1.24£-01 1.37£-01 1.55£-01 
133 8 2 $100,000.00 1.25£-02 5.87£-02 8.87£-02 1.35£-01 2.42£-01 4.52£-01 6.84£-01 9.1 7£-0 I 1.19E+OO 1.55£+00 1.88£+00 2.40E+OO 
134 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.12£-01 3.26£+00 4.84£+00 6.73£+00 1.04£+01 2.11£+01 3.22£+0 1 4.34£+0 1 5.10£+01 6.08E+OI 6.79E+OI 8.90£+01 
135 A I $10,000.00 6.93£-04 2.68£-03 3.31£-03 3.86£-03 5.46£-03 7.68£-03 l.OIE-02 1.35£-02 1.39£-02 1.76£-02 1.93£-02 2.51£-02 
136 8 2 $100 000.00 1.39£-03 6.45£-03 1.07£-02 1.61 E-02 2.86£-02 5.23£-02 8.54£-02 1.15£-0 I 1.46£-01 2.22£-01 2.67£-0 1 3.89E-01 
137 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.47£-02 3.59£-0 1 5.85£-0 1 8.04E-01 1.23£+00 2.44£+00 4.02E+OO 5.43£+00 6.25E+OO 8.69£+00 9.60E+OO 1.44£+01 
138 8 2 $100 000.00 1.22E-02 5.06£-02 7.32£-02 9.43£ -02 1.61 E-01 2.48£-01 3.52£-01 5.35£-01 6.20E-OI 7.53 E-O I 9.28£-01 1.12£+00 
139 c 4 $10,000,000.00 3.06£-01 2.81£+00 3.99E+OO 4.71E+OO 6.89£+00 1.16£+0 1 1.66£+01 2.53E+OI 2.66£+01 2.95£+01 3.34£+01 4.15£+01 
140 A I $10,000.00 2.67E-05 6.17£-05 5.24E-05 5.98E-05 7.74£-05 l.IOE-04 1.32£-04 1.70£-04 1.77£-04 1.96£-04 2.15£-04 2.58E-04 
141 A I $10 000.00 4.09£-06 1.67£-05 1.88£-05 2.2 1£-05 3.15£-05 4.63£-05 5.87£-05 8.24£-05 8.64£-05 9.4 1£-05 1.07£-04 1.26£-04 
142 8 2 $ 1 00,000.00 8.18£-06 4.02£-05 6.07£-05 9.20£-05 1.66£-04 3.16£-04 4.99£-04 6.99E-04 9.07£-04 1.18£-03 1.47£-03 1.95£-03 
143 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 2.04£-04 2.23£-03 3.31 E-03 4.60£-03 7.10£-03 1.47£-02 2.35£-02 3.31£-02 3.89£-02 4.63£-02 5.29E-02 7.22£-02 
144 A I $ 10,000.00 4.54£-07 1.83£-06 2.27E-06 2.64£-06 3.73£-06 5.36£-06 7.34E-06 1.03E-05 1.06E-05 1.34£-05 1.5 1£-05 2.03£-05 
145 8 2 $100,000.00 9.08£-07 4.42£-06 7.34E-06 1.1 OE-05 1.96E-05 3.66£-05 6.24£-05 8.74E-05 l.IIE-04 1.69E-04 2.08£-04 3.15E-04 
146 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.27£-05 2.45£-04 4.00E-04 5.50E-04 8.39£-04 1.71 E-03 2.94£-03 4.14E-03 4.76£-03 6.62£-03 7.48£-03 1.17£-02 
147 8 2 $100,000.00 8.02£-06 3.46£-05 5.01E-05 6.45£-05 l.IOE-04 1.73£-04 2.57E-04 4.08£-04 4.73£-04 5.74£-04 7.23£-04 9.08£-04 
148 c 4 $10,000,000.00 2.00£-04 1.92£-03 2.73£-03 3.22£-03 4.71£-03 8.07£-03 1.21£-02 1.93£-02 2.03£-02 2.25£-02 2.60£-02 3.36£-02 
149 A I $10,000.00 5.37£-07 1.51£-06 1.29£-06 1.47£-06 1.90£-06 2.96£-06 3.81£-06 5.28£-06 5.51£-06 6.10E-06 6.68£-06 9.16£-06 
150 A I $10,000.00 8.22£-08 4.10£-07 4.61£-07 5.43£-07 7.75£-07 1.24£-06 1.70£-06 2.56£-06 2.69£-06 2.93£-06 3.31£-06 4.46E-06 
151 8 2 $100,000.00 1.64£-07 9.88£-07 1.49E-06 2.26£-06 4.07£-06 8.46E-06 1.45£-05 2.18E-05 2.82£-05 3.68£-05 4.56£-05 6.92£-05 
152 c 4 $10 000 000.00 4.11E-06 5.49£-05 8.14£-05 1.13£-04 1.74£-04 3.95£-04 6.80£-04 1.03£-03 1.2IE-03 1.44E-03 1.64£-03 2.56£-03 
153 A I $10,000.00 9.13£-09 4.50E-08 5.57E-08 6.49£-08 9.16£-08 1.44£-07 2. l3E-07 3.2LE-07 3.29E-07 4.18£-07 4.68£-07 7.21£-07 
154 8 2 $100,000.00 1.83£-08 1.09£-07 1.80£-07 2.70£-07 4.81 E-07 9.80E-07 1.81£-06 2.72£-06 3.46E-06 5.26£-06 6.45£-06 1.12£-05 
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155 c 4 $10,000,000.00 4.57E-07 6.03E-06 9.84E-06 1.35£-05 2.06E-05 4.57£-05 8.50£-05 1.29£-04 1.48£-04 2.06£-04 2.32£-04 4. 14£-04 
156 B 2 $100,000.00 1.61£-07 8.50£-07 1.23E-06 1.58E-06 2.70£-06 4.64E-06 7.44E-06 1.27E-05 1.47£-05 1.79£-05 2.24£-05 3.22£-05 
157 c 4 $10,000,000.00 4.03E-06 4.72£-05 6.71£-05 7.92E-05 1.16£-04 2.16E-04 3.50£-04 6.01E-04 6.3 1£-04 6.99£-04 8.08£-04 1.19E-03 
158 c 4 $10,000,000.00 I.OOE-05 3.43£-05 3.40£-05 4.06£-05 5.74£-05 9.66£-05 1.39E-04 2.08£-04 2.3 1 E-04 2.7 1E-04 3.13E-04 4.58£-04 
159 B 2 $100,000.00 1.64£-09 4.94£-09 4.93E-09 6.08£-09 9.01E-09 1.48E-08 2.12E-08 3.45E-08 3.96E-08 4.77E-08 5.64£-08 8.86E-08 
160 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 4.09£-08 2.75£-07 2.69£-07 3.04£-07 3.86£-07 6.90£-07 9.97E-07 1.64£-06 1.70£-06 1.87E-06 2.03E-06 3.28E-06 
161 A I $ 10,000.00 1.80E+OO 1.60E+OO 1.37E+OO 1.31E+OO 1.27E+OO 1.72E+OO 1.62E+OO 1.58E+OO 1.55E+OO 1.69E+OO 1.70E+OO 1.76E+OO 
162 A I $10,000.00 2.75E-OI 4.33E-OI 4.91E-OI 4.82E-OI 5.19E-OI 7.24£-01 7.23£-01 7.68E-OI 7.54E-01 8.10E-OI 8.43E-OI 8.55E-O I 
163 B 2 $100,000.00 5.50£-0 1 1.04E+OO 1.59E+OO 2.01E+OO 2.72E+OO 4.94E+OO 6.14E+OO 6.51E+OO 7.92E+OO 1.02E+OI 1.16E+OI 1.33E+OI 
164 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.38E+OI 5.80E+OI 8.66E+O I I.OOE+02 1.17£+02 2.30E+02 2.89E+02 3.08£+02 3.39£+02 3.98£+02 4.18£+02 4.91E+02 
165 A I $10,000.00 3.06E-02 4.76E-02 5.93E-02 5.77E-02 6.14£-02 8.38E-02 9.03E-02 9.60E-02 9.23£-02 1.16E-Ol 1.19E-OI 1.38E-O I 
166 B 2 $100,000.00 6.12E-02 1.15E-OI 1.92E-OI 2.40E-OI 3.22E-OI 5.71E-01 7.68E-OI 8.14E-OI 9.70£-01 1.45E+OO 1.64E+OO 2. 14E+OO 
167 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.53E+OO 6.38E+OO 1.05E+OI 1.20E+OI 1.38E+OI 2.67E+Ol 3.61E+Ol 3.86E+Ol 4.16E+OI 5.69E+OI 5.92E+OI 7.94E+OI 
168 B 2 $100,000.00 5.40£-01 8.99£-0 1 1.31£+00 1.4 1E+OO 1.81E+OO 2.71E+OO 3.16£+00 3.80£+00 4. 13£+00 4.93£+00 5.72£+00 6. 18£+00 
169 c 4 $10,000,000.00 1.35E+OI 5.00£+01 7.14£+01 7.04£+0 1 7.76£+01 1.26£+02 1.49£+02 1.80£+02 1.77£+02 1.93E+02 2.06E+02 2.29E+02 
170 A I $10 000.00 1.18£-03 l.IOE-03 9.38E-04 8.94£-04 8.7 1E-04 1.20E-03 1.18E-03 1.21£-03 1.18E-03 1.28E-03 1.33£-03 1.42E-03 
171 A I $10,000.00 1.80E-04 2.97E-04 3.36E-04 3.30E-04 3.55£-04 5.06£-04 5.28£-04 5.85£-04 5.75E-04 6.17E-04 6.57£-04 6.93£-04 
172 B 2 $100,000.00 3.61E-04 7.15£-04 1.09E-03 1.38E-03 1.86E-03 3.45E-03 4.49E-03 4.96E-03 6.03£-03 7.76E-03 9.06E-03 1.07£-02 
173 c 4 $10,000,000.00 9.02E-03 3.97E-02 5.93£-02 6.88E-02 7.98E-02 1.61 E-0 I 2.11 E-0 1 2.35E-01 2.59E-OI 3.04E-O I 3.26E-O I 3.98£-0 1 
174 A I $10,000.00 2.00E-05 3.26£-05 4.06E-05 3.95E-05 4.20E-05 5.85£-05 6.60E-05 7.32£-05 7.04E-05 8.8 1 E-05 9.29£-05 1.12£-04 
\ 
175 B 2 $100,000.00 4.01E-05 7.86E-05 1.31£-04 1.64£-04 2.20£-04 3.99E-04 5.61E-04 6.21 E-04 7.39E-04 1.11 E-03 1.28£-03 1.74£-03 
176 c 4 $10,000,000.00 I .OOE-03 4.37E-03 7.17£-03 8.22£-03 9.44£-03 1.86£-02 2.64£-02 2.94E-02 3.17E-02 4.34£-02 4.61E-02 6.43E-02 
177 B 2 $100,000.00 3.54E-04 6.16£-04 8.96£-04 9.64£-04 1.24E-03 1.89£-03 2.31 E-03 2.90E-03 3.15£-03 3.76£-03 4.46E-03 5.01 E-03 
178 c 4 $10,000,000.00 8.84E-03 3.42E-02 4.89£-02 4.82E-02 5.30£-02 8.82E-02 1.09E-01 1.37E-OI 1.35E-O I 1.47E-OI 1.61£-0 I 1.85E-OI 
179 A I $10 000.00 2.37E-05 2.69E-05 2.30E-05 2.20E-05 2.14£-05 3.23£-05 3.43E-05 3.75£-05 3.67£-05 4.00E-05 4. 12£-05 5.05£-05 
180 A I $10,000.00 3.63E-06 7.29£-06 8.25E-06 8.11E-06 8.72E-06 1.35E-05 1.53E-05 1.82E-05 1.79£-05 1.92£-05 2.04£-05 2.46E-05 
181 B 2 $100,000.00 7.25E-06 1.76E-05 2.67E-05 3.38E-05 4.58E-05 9.24E-05 1.30E-04 1.54£-04 1.88£-04 2.4 1£-04 2.81£-04 3.81E-04 
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182 c 4 $ 10 000 000.00 1.8 1E-04 9.76E-04 1.46E-03 1.69E-03 1.96E-03 4.31 E-03 6.11E-03 7.32E-03 8.05E-03 9.45E-03 1.01 E-02 1.4 1E-02 
183 A I $ 10,000.00 4.03E-07 8.0 1E-07 9.97E-07 9.69E-07 1.03E-06 1.57E-06 1.91 E-06 2.28E-06 2.19E-06 2.74E-06 2.89E-06 3.97E-06 
184 B 2 $ 100 000.00 8.06E-07 1.93E-06 3.23E-06 4.04E-06 5.41 E-06 1.07E-05 1.62E-05 1.93E-05 2.30E-05 3.45E-05 3.98E-05 6.16E-05 
185 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 2.01 E-05 1.07£-04 1.76E-04 2.02£-04 2.32E-04 4.99E-04 7.64E-04 9.15E-04 9.85E-04 1.35E-03 1.43£-03 2.28E-03 
186 B 2 $1 00,000.00 7. 11 E-06 1.51 E-05 2.20E-05 2.37E-05 3.04E-05 5.06E-05 6.69E-05 9.0 1E-05 9.79E-05 1.17E-04 1.38E-04 1.78E-04 
187 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 1.78E-04 8.40E-04 1.20E-03 1.18£-03 1.30E-03 2.36E-03 3.15E-03 4.27E-03 4.20E-03 4.58E-03 4.98£-03 6.58E-03 
188 c 4 $ 10,000,000.00 4.42E-04 6.09£-04 6.08E-04 6.07E-04 6.45E-04 1.05E-03 1.25E-03 1.48E-03 1.54E-03 1.78E-03 1.93E-03 2.52E-03 
189 B 2 $ 100 000.00 7.22E-08 8.80£-08 8.83E-08 9.08E-08 l.OIE-07 1.61 E-07 1.90E-07 2.45E-07 2.63E-07 3.13E-07 3.48E-07 4.89E-07 
190 c 4 $10 000 000.00 1.80E-06 4.89£-06 4.82£-06 4.54E-06 4.35£-06 7.53E-06 8.96E-06 1.1 6E-05 1.13E-05 1.22E-05 1.25E-05 1.8 1 E-05 
Table C-3. Risk values for the ISOM urut over the 11 year penod 
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Figure C-2. Frequency of occurrence of process upsets in the ISOM unit 
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Figure C-5. Risk profile of process shutdown in the ISOM unit 
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